1 | /** @file
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2 | Security2 Architectural Protocol as defined in PI Specification1.2.1 VOLUME 2 DXE
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3 |
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4 | Abstracts security-specific functions from the DXE Foundation of UEFI Image Verification,
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5 | Trusted Computing Group (TCG) measured boot, and User Identity policy for image loading and
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6 | consoles. This protocol must be produced by a boot service or runtime DXE driver.
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7 |
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8 | This protocol is optional and must be published prior to the EFI_SECURITY_ARCH_PROTOCOL.
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9 | As a result, the same driver must publish both of these interfaces.
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10 |
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11 | When both Security and Security2 Architectural Protocols are published, LoadImage must use
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12 | them in accordance with the following rules:
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13 | The Security2 protocol must be used on every image being loaded.
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14 | The Security protocol must be used after the Securiy2 protocol and only on images that
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15 | have been read using Firmware Volume protocol.
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16 |
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17 | When only Security architectural protocol is published, LoadImage must use it on every image
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18 | being loaded.
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19 |
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20 | Copyright (c) 2012 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
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21 | SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
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22 |
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23 | **/
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24 |
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25 | #ifndef __ARCH_PROTOCOL_SECURITY2_H__
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26 | #define __ARCH_PROTOCOL_SECURITY2_H__
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27 |
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28 | ///
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29 | /// Global ID for the Security2 Code Architectural Protocol
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30 | ///
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31 | #define EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL_GUID \
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32 | { 0x94ab2f58, 0x1438, 0x4ef1, {0x91, 0x52, 0x18, 0x94, 0x1a, 0x3a, 0x0e, 0x68 } }
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33 |
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34 | typedef struct _EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL;
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35 |
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36 | /**
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37 | The DXE Foundation uses this service to measure and/or verify a UEFI image.
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38 |
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39 | This service abstracts the invocation of Trusted Computing Group (TCG) measured boot, UEFI
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40 | Secure boot, and UEFI User Identity infrastructure. For the former two, the DXE Foundation
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41 | invokes the FileAuthentication() with a DevicePath and corresponding image in
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42 | FileBuffer memory. The TCG measurement code will record the FileBuffer contents into the
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43 | appropriate PCR. The image verification logic will confirm the integrity and provenance of the
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44 | image in FileBuffer of length FileSize . The origin of the image will be DevicePath in
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45 | these cases.
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46 | If the FileBuffer is NULL, the interface will determine if the DevicePath can be connected
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47 | in order to support the User Identification policy.
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48 |
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49 | @param This The EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL instance.
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50 | @param File A pointer to the device path of the file that is
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51 | being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.
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52 | @param FileBuffer A pointer to the buffer with the UEFI file image.
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53 | @param FileSize The size of the file.
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54 | @param BootPolicy A boot policy that was used to call LoadImage() UEFI service. If
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55 | FileAuthentication() is invoked not from the LoadImage(),
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56 | BootPolicy must be set to FALSE.
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57 |
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58 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The file specified by DevicePath and non-NULL
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59 | FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform policy dictates
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60 | that the DXE Foundation may use the file.
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61 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS The device path specified by NULL device path DevicePath
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62 | and non-NULL FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform
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63 | policy dictates that the DXE Foundation may execute the image in
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64 | FileBuffer.
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65 | @retval EFI_SUCCESS FileBuffer is NULL and current user has permission to start
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66 | UEFI device drivers on the device path specified by DevicePath.
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67 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The file specified by DevicePath and FileBuffer did not
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68 | authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the file should be
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69 | placed in the untrusted state. The image has been added to the file
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70 | execution table.
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71 | @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file specified by File and FileBuffer did not
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72 | authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the DXE
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73 | Foundation may not use File.
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74 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION FileBuffer is NULL and the user has no
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75 | permission to start UEFI device drivers on the device path specified
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76 | by DevicePath.
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77 | @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION FileBuffer is not NULL and the user has no permission to load
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78 | drivers from the device path specified by DevicePath. The
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79 | image has been added into the list of the deferred images.
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80 | **/
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81 | typedef EFI_STATUS (EFIAPI *EFI_SECURITY2_FILE_AUTHENTICATION)(
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82 | IN CONST EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL *This,
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83 | IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File OPTIONAL,
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84 | IN VOID *FileBuffer,
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85 | IN UINTN FileSize,
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86 | IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy
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87 | );
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88 |
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89 | ///
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90 | /// The EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL is used to abstract platform-specific policy from the
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91 | /// DXE Foundation. This includes measuring the PE/COFF image prior to invoking, comparing the
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92 | /// image against a policy (whether a white-list/black-list of public image verification keys
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93 | /// or registered hashes).
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94 | ///
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95 | struct _EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL {
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96 | EFI_SECURITY2_FILE_AUTHENTICATION FileAuthentication;
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97 | };
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98 |
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99 | extern EFI_GUID gEfiSecurity2ArchProtocolGuid;
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100 |
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101 | #endif
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