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source: vbox/trunk/src/libs/openssl-1.1.1j/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c@ 90248

最後變更 在這個檔案從90248是 87984,由 vboxsync 提交於 4 年 前

openssl-1.1.1j: Applied and adjusted our OpenSSL changes to 1.1.1j. bugref:9963
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1/*
2 * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10#include <stdio.h>
11#include <time.h>
12#include <errno.h>
13#include <limits.h>
14
15#include "crypto/ctype.h"
16#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17#include <openssl/crypto.h>
18#include <openssl/buffer.h>
19#include <openssl/evp.h>
20#include <openssl/asn1.h>
21#include <openssl/x509.h>
22#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
23#include <openssl/objects.h>
24#include "internal/dane.h"
25#include "crypto/x509.h"
26#include "x509_local.h"
27
28/* CRL score values */
29
30/* No unhandled critical extensions */
31
32#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
33
34/* certificate is within CRL scope */
35
36#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
37
38/* CRL times valid */
39
40#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
41
42/* Issuer name matches certificate */
43
44#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
45
46/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
47
48#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
49
50/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
51
52#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
53
54/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
55
56#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
57
58/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
59
60#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
61
62/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
63
64#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
65
66static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
67static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
68static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
69static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
70static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
71static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
72static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
73static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
74static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
75static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted);
76static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
77static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
78static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
79static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
80static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
81static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
82static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
83static int check_curve(X509 *cert);
84
85static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
86 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
87static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
88 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
89static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
90 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
91 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
92static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
93 int *pcrl_score);
94static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
95 unsigned int *preasons);
96static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
97static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
98 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
99 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
100
101static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
102
103static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
104{
105 return ok;
106}
107
108/*
109 * Return 1 if given cert is considered self-signed, 0 if not or on error.
110 * This does not verify self-signedness but relies on x509v3_cache_extensions()
111 * matching issuer and subject names (i.e., the cert being self-issued) and any
112 * present authority key identifier matching the subject key identifier, etc.
113 */
114static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
115{
116 if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1)
117 return 0;
118 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
119 return 1;
120 else
121 return 0;
122}
123
124/* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
125
126static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
127{
128 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
129 X509 *xtmp = NULL;
130 int i;
131 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
132 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
133 if (certs == NULL)
134 return NULL;
135 /* Look for exact match */
136 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
137 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
138 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
139 break;
140 xtmp = NULL;
141 }
142 if (xtmp != NULL && !X509_up_ref(xtmp))
143 xtmp = NULL;
144 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
145 return xtmp;
146}
147
148/*-
149 * Inform the verify callback of an error.
150 * If B<x> is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert at
151 * B<depth>.
152 * If B<err> is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave
153 * unchanged (presumably set by the caller).
154 *
155 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
156 */
157static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err)
158{
159 ctx->error_depth = depth;
160 ctx->current_cert = (x != NULL) ? x : sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
161 if (err != X509_V_OK)
162 ctx->error = err;
163 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
164}
165
166/*-
167 * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant. Here, the
168 * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error
169 * number.
170 *
171 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
172 */
173static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
174{
175 ctx->error = err;
176 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
177}
178
179static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
180{
181 int i;
182 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
183
184 if (ctx->param->auth_level <= 0)
185 return 1;
186
187 for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
188 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
189
190 /*
191 * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only
192 * check the security of issuer keys.
193 */
194 if (i > 0 && !check_key_level(ctx, cert) &&
195 verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL) == 0)
196 return 0;
197 /*
198 * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates
199 * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1.
200 */
201 if (i < num - 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx, cert) &&
202 verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK) == 0)
203 return 0;
204 }
205 return 1;
206}
207
208static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
209{
210 int err;
211 int ok;
212
213 /*
214 * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks,
215 * instantiate chain public key parameters.
216 */
217 if ((ok = build_chain(ctx)) == 0 ||
218 (ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx)) == 0 ||
219 (ok = check_auth_level(ctx)) == 0 ||
220 (ok = check_id(ctx)) == 0 || 1)
221 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
222 if (ok == 0 || (ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx)) == 0)
223 return ok;
224
225 err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
226 ctx->param->flags);
227 if (err != X509_V_OK) {
228 if ((ok = verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, ctx->error_depth, err)) == 0)
229 return ok;
230 }
231
232 /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */
233 ok = (ctx->verify != NULL) ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx);
234 if (!ok)
235 return ok;
236
237 if ((ok = check_name_constraints(ctx)) == 0)
238 return ok;
239
240#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
241 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
242 if ((ok = X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
243 return ok;
244 if ((ok = X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
245 return ok;
246#endif
247
248 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
249 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)
250 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
251 return ok;
252}
253
254int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
255{
256 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
257 int ret;
258
259 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
260 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
261 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
262 return -1;
263 }
264
265 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
266 /*
267 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
268 * cannot do another one.
269 */
270 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
271 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
272 return -1;
273 }
274
275 if (!X509_up_ref(ctx->cert)) {
276 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
277 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
278 return -1;
279 }
280
281 /*
282 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
283 * the first entry is in place
284 */
285 if ((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
286 || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) {
287 X509_free(ctx->cert);
288 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
289 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
290 return -1;
291 }
292
293 ctx->num_untrusted = 1;
294
295 /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */
296 if (!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert) &&
297 !verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL))
298 return 0;
299
300 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
301 ret = dane_verify(ctx);
302 else
303 ret = verify_chain(ctx);
304
305 /*
306 * Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error,
307 * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored
308 * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE).
309 */
310 if (ret <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
311 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
312 return ret;
313}
314
315static int sk_X509_contains(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *cert)
316{
317 int i, n = sk_X509_num(sk);
318
319 for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
320 if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(sk, i), cert) == 0)
321 return 1;
322 return 0;
323}
324
325/*
326 * Find in given STACK_OF(X509) sk an issuer cert of given cert x.
327 * The issuer must not yet be in ctx->chain, where the exceptional case
328 * that x is self-issued and ctx->chain has just one element is allowed.
329 * Prefer the first one that is not expired, else take the last expired one.
330 */
331static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
332{
333 int i;
334 X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL;
335
336 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
337 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
338 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)
339 && (((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0 && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
340 || !sk_X509_contains(ctx->chain, issuer))) {
341 rv = issuer;
342 if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, -1))
343 break;
344 }
345 }
346 return rv;
347}
348
349/* Check that the given certificate 'x' is issued by the certificate 'issuer' */
350static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
351{
352 return x509_likely_issued(issuer, x) == X509_V_OK;
353}
354
355/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
356static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
357{
358 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
359
360 if (*issuer == NULL || !X509_up_ref(*issuer))
361 goto err;
362
363 return 1;
364
365 err:
366 *issuer = NULL;
367 return 0;
368}
369
370static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
371{
372 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
373 X509 *x;
374 int i;
375
376 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->other_ctx); i++) {
377 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->other_ctx, i);
378 if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0) {
379 if (!X509_up_ref(x)) {
380 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
381 X509err(X509_F_LOOKUP_CERTS_SK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
382 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
383 return NULL;
384 }
385 if (sk == NULL)
386 sk = sk_X509_new_null();
387 if (sk == NULL || !sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
388 X509_free(x);
389 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
390 X509err(X509_F_LOOKUP_CERTS_SK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
391 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
392 return NULL;
393 }
394 }
395 }
396 return sk;
397}
398
399/*
400 * Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local
401 * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions.
402 */
403static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int purpose, int depth,
404 int must_be_ca)
405{
406 int tr_ok = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
407
408 /*
409 * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust
410 * settings trump the purpose constraints.
411 *
412 * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in
413 * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in
414 * ctx->param->purpose!
415 *
416 * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from
417 * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets
418 * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose. It is however
419 * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value
420 * via the X509_PURPOSE API.
421 *
422 * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're
423 * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is
424 * also set.
425 */
426 if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted && purpose == ctx->param->purpose)
427 tr_ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT);
428
429 switch (tr_ok) {
430 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
431 return 1;
432 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
433 break;
434 default:
435 switch (X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0)) {
436 case 1:
437 return 1;
438 case 0:
439 break;
440 default:
441 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) == 0)
442 return 1;
443 }
444 break;
445 }
446
447 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE);
448}
449
450/*
451 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
452 * purpose
453 */
454
455static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
456{
457 int i, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
458 X509 *x;
459 int proxy_path_length = 0;
460 int purpose;
461 int allow_proxy_certs;
462 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
463
464 /*-
465 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
466 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
467 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
468 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
469 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
470 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
471 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
472 */
473 must_be_ca = -1;
474
475 /* CRL path validation */
476 if (ctx->parent) {
477 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
478 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
479 } else {
480 allow_proxy_certs =
481 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
482 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
483 }
484
485 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
486 int ret;
487 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
488 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
489 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
490 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
491 X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION))
492 return 0;
493 }
494 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
495 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
496 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED))
497 return 0;
498 }
499 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
500 switch (must_be_ca) {
501 case -1:
502 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
503 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
504 ret = 0;
505 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
506 } else
507 ret = 1;
508 break;
509 case 0:
510 if (ret != 0) {
511 ret = 0;
512 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
513 } else
514 ret = 1;
515 break;
516 default:
517 /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */
518 if ((ret == 0)
519 || ((i + 1 < num || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
520 && (ret != 1))) {
521 ret = 0;
522 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
523 } else
524 ret = 1;
525 break;
526 }
527 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) && num > 1) {
528 /* Check for presence of explicit elliptic curve parameters */
529 ret = check_curve(x);
530 if (ret < 0)
531 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
532 else if (ret == 0)
533 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS;
534 }
535 if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0
536 && x->ex_pathlen != -1
537 && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)) {
538 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
539 ret = 0;
540 }
541 if (ret == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_OK))
542 return 0;
543 /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */
544 if (purpose > 0 && !check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca))
545 return 0;
546 /* Check pathlen */
547 if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
548 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length))) {
549 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED))
550 return 0;
551 }
552 /* Increment path length if not a self issued intermediate CA */
553 if (i > 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) == 0)
554 plen++;
555 /*
556 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
557 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
558 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
559 */
560 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
561 /*
562 * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint
563 * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to
564 * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length
565 * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it.
566 *
567 * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start
568 * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC,
569 * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally,
570 * increment proxy_path_length.
571 */
572 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) {
573 if (proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
574 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
575 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED))
576 return 0;
577 }
578 proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen;
579 }
580 proxy_path_length++;
581 must_be_ca = 0;
582 } else
583 must_be_ca = 1;
584 }
585 return 1;
586}
587
588static int has_san_id(X509 *x, int gtype)
589{
590 int i;
591 int ret = 0;
592 GENERAL_NAMES *gs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
593
594 if (gs == NULL)
595 return 0;
596
597 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gs); i++) {
598 GENERAL_NAME *g = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gs, i);
599
600 if (g->type == gtype) {
601 ret = 1;
602 break;
603 }
604 }
605 GENERAL_NAMES_free(gs);
606 return ret;
607}
608
609static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
610{
611 int i;
612
613 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
614 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
615 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
616 int j;
617
618 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
619 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
620 continue;
621
622 /*
623 * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the
624 * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry
625 * added.
626 * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
627 */
628 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
629 X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x);
630 X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
631 X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL;
632 int last_object_nid = 0;
633 int err = X509_V_OK;
634 int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1;
635
636 /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
637 if (last_object_loc < 1) {
638 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
639 goto proxy_name_done;
640 }
641
642 /*
643 * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as
644 * there is in issuer.
645 */
646 if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject)
647 != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) {
648 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
649 goto proxy_name_done;
650 }
651
652 /*
653 * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
654 * multivalued RDN
655 */
656 if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject,
657 last_object_loc))
658 == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject,
659 last_object_loc - 1))) {
660 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
661 goto proxy_name_done;
662 }
663
664 /*
665 * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that
666 * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly
667 */
668 tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject);
669 if (tmpsubject == NULL) {
670 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
671 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
672 return 0;
673 }
674
675 tmpentry =
676 X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc);
677 last_object_nid =
678 OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry));
679
680 if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName
681 || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) {
682 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
683 }
684
685 X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry);
686 X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject);
687
688 proxy_name_done:
689 if (err != X509_V_OK
690 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, err))
691 return 0;
692 }
693
694 /*
695 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
696 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
697 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
698 * to be obeyed.
699 */
700 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
701 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
702
703 if (nc) {
704 int rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
705
706 /* If EE certificate check commonName too */
707 if (rv == X509_V_OK && i == 0
708 && (ctx->param->hostflags
709 & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT) == 0
710 && ((ctx->param->hostflags
711 & X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT) != 0
712 || !has_san_id(x, GEN_DNS)))
713 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(x, nc);
714
715 switch (rv) {
716 case X509_V_OK:
717 break;
718 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
719 return 0;
720 default:
721 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, rv))
722 return 0;
723 break;
724 }
725 }
726 }
727 }
728 return 1;
729}
730
731static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
732{
733 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, errcode);
734}
735
736static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
737{
738 int i;
739 int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm->hosts);
740 char *name;
741
742 if (vpm->peername != NULL) {
743 OPENSSL_free(vpm->peername);
744 vpm->peername = NULL;
745 }
746 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
747 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm->hosts, i);
748 if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, vpm->hostflags, &vpm->peername) > 0)
749 return 1;
750 }
751 return n == 0;
752}
753
754static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
755{
756 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
757 X509 *x = ctx->cert;
758 if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) {
759 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
760 return 0;
761 }
762 if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
763 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
764 return 0;
765 }
766 if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
767 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
768 return 0;
769 }
770 return 1;
771}
772
773static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
774{
775 int i;
776 X509 *x = NULL;
777 X509 *mx;
778 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
779 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
780 int trust;
781
782 /*
783 * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2)
784 * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth.
785 */
786 if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && num_untrusted > 0 && num_untrusted < num) {
787 switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, num_untrusted)) {
788 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
789 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
790 return trust;
791 }
792 }
793
794 /*
795 * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up.
796 * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted
797 * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those,
798 * and wants to incrementally check just any added since.
799 */
800 for (i = num_untrusted; i < num; i++) {
801 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
802 trust = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
803 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
804 if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
805 goto trusted;
806 if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
807 goto rejected;
808 }
809
810 /*
811 * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains,
812 * the chain is PKIX trusted.
813 */
814 if (num_untrusted < num) {
815 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
816 goto trusted;
817 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
818 }
819
820 if (num_untrusted == num && ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
821 /*
822 * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf
823 * for a direct trust store match.
824 */
825 i = 0;
826 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
827 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
828 if (!mx)
829 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
830
831 /*
832 * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set,
833 * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed.
834 */
835 trust = X509_check_trust(mx, ctx->param->trust, 0);
836 if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
837 X509_free(mx);
838 goto rejected;
839 }
840
841 /* Replace leaf with trusted match */
842 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
843 X509_free(x);
844 ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
845 goto trusted;
846 }
847
848 /*
849 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
850 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
851 */
852 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
853
854 rejected:
855 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED))
856 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
857 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
858
859 trusted:
860 if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
861 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
862 if (dane->pdpth < 0)
863 dane->pdpth = num_untrusted;
864 /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */
865 if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
866 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
867 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
868}
869
870static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
871{
872 int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0;
873 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
874 return 1;
875 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
876 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
877 else {
878 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
879 if (ctx->parent)
880 return 1;
881 last = 0;
882 }
883 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
884 ctx->error_depth = i;
885 ok = check_cert(ctx);
886 if (!ok)
887 return ok;
888 }
889 return 1;
890}
891
892static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
893{
894 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
895 int ok = 0;
896 int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
897 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
898
899 ctx->current_cert = x;
900 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
901 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
902 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
903
904 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
905 return 1;
906
907 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
908 unsigned int last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
909
910 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
911 if (ctx->get_crl)
912 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
913 else
914 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
915 /*
916 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
917 */
918 if (!ok) {
919 ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
920 goto done;
921 }
922 ctx->current_crl = crl;
923 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
924 if (!ok)
925 goto done;
926
927 if (dcrl) {
928 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
929 if (!ok)
930 goto done;
931 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
932 if (!ok)
933 goto done;
934 } else
935 ok = 1;
936
937 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
938 if (ok != 2) {
939 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
940 if (!ok)
941 goto done;
942 }
943
944 X509_CRL_free(crl);
945 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
946 crl = NULL;
947 dcrl = NULL;
948 /*
949 * If reasons not updated we won't get anywhere by another iteration,
950 * so exit loop.
951 */
952 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
953 ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
954 goto done;
955 }
956 }
957 done:
958 X509_CRL_free(crl);
959 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
960
961 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
962 return ok;
963}
964
965/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
966
967static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
968{
969 time_t *ptime;
970 int i;
971
972 if (notify)
973 ctx->current_crl = crl;
974 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
975 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
976 else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
977 return 1;
978 else
979 ptime = NULL;
980
981 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
982 if (i == 0) {
983 if (!notify)
984 return 0;
985 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD))
986 return 0;
987 }
988
989 if (i > 0) {
990 if (!notify)
991 return 0;
992 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID))
993 return 0;
994 }
995
996 if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl)) {
997 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
998
999 if (i == 0) {
1000 if (!notify)
1001 return 0;
1002 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD))
1003 return 0;
1004 }
1005 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
1006 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
1007 if (!notify)
1008 return 0;
1009 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED))
1010 return 0;
1011 }
1012 }
1013
1014 if (notify)
1015 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
1016
1017 return 1;
1018}
1019
1020static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
1021 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
1022 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1023{
1024 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
1025 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
1026 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
1027 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
1028 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
1029
1030 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1031 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1032 reasons = *preasons;
1033 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
1034 if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0)
1035 continue;
1036 /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
1037 if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
1038 int day, sec;
1039 if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl),
1040 X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
1041 continue;
1042 /*
1043 * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
1044 * and |sec|.
1045 */
1046 if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
1047 continue;
1048 }
1049 best_crl = crl;
1050 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
1051 best_score = crl_score;
1052 best_reasons = reasons;
1053 }
1054
1055 if (best_crl) {
1056 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1057 *pcrl = best_crl;
1058 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1059 *pscore = best_score;
1060 *preasons = best_reasons;
1061 X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
1062 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1063 *pdcrl = NULL;
1064 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1065 }
1066
1067 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1068 return 1;
1069
1070 return 0;
1071}
1072
1073/*
1074 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1075 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1076 */
1077
1078static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1079{
1080 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1081 int i;
1082 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1083 if (i >= 0) {
1084 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1085 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1086 return 0;
1087 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1088 } else
1089 exta = NULL;
1090
1091 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1092
1093 if (i >= 0) {
1094
1095 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1096 return 0;
1097 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1098 } else
1099 extb = NULL;
1100
1101 if (!exta && !extb)
1102 return 1;
1103
1104 if (!exta || !extb)
1105 return 0;
1106
1107 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1108 return 0;
1109
1110 return 1;
1111}
1112
1113/* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1114
1115static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1116{
1117 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1118 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1119 return 0;
1120 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1121 if (!base->crl_number)
1122 return 0;
1123 /* Issuer names must match */
1124 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1125 return 0;
1126 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1127 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1128 return 0;
1129 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1130 return 0;
1131 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1132 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1133 return 0;
1134 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1135 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1136 return 1;
1137 return 0;
1138}
1139
1140/*
1141 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1142 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1143 */
1144
1145static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1146 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1147{
1148 X509_CRL *delta;
1149 int i;
1150 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1151 return;
1152 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1153 return;
1154 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1155 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1156 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1157 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1158 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1159 X509_CRL_up_ref(delta);
1160 *dcrl = delta;
1161 return;
1162 }
1163 }
1164 *dcrl = NULL;
1165}
1166
1167/*
1168 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1169 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1170 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1171 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1172 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1173 */
1174
1175static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1176 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1177{
1178
1179 int crl_score = 0;
1180 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1181
1182 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1183
1184 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1185 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1186 return 0;
1187 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1188 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1189 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1190 return 0;
1191 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1192 /* If no new reasons reject */
1193 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1194 return 0;
1195 }
1196 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1197 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1198 return 0;
1199 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1200 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1201 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1202 return 0;
1203 } else
1204 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1205
1206 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1207 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1208
1209 /* Check expiry */
1210 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1211 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1212
1213 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1214 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1215
1216 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1217
1218 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1219 return 0;
1220
1221 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1222
1223 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1224 /* If no new reasons reject */
1225 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1226 return 0;
1227 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1228 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1229 }
1230
1231 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1232
1233 return crl_score;
1234
1235}
1236
1237static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1238 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1239{
1240 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1241 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1242 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1243 int i;
1244
1245 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1246 cidx++;
1247
1248 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1249
1250 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1251 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1252 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1253 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1254 return;
1255 }
1256 }
1257
1258 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1259 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1260 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1261 continue;
1262 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1263 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1264 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1265 return;
1266 }
1267 }
1268
1269 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1270
1271 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1272 return;
1273
1274 /*
1275 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1276 * untrusted certificates.
1277 */
1278 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1279 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1280 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1281 continue;
1282 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1283 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1284 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1285 return;
1286 }
1287 }
1288}
1289
1290/*
1291 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1292 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1293 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1294 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1295 */
1296
1297static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1298{
1299 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1300 int ret;
1301
1302 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1303 if (ctx->parent)
1304 return 0;
1305 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1306 return -1;
1307
1308 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1309 /* Copy verify params across */
1310 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1311
1312 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1313 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1314
1315 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1316 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1317 if (ret <= 0)
1318 goto err;
1319
1320 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1321 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1322 err:
1323 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1324 return ret;
1325}
1326
1327/*
1328 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1329 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1330 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1331 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1332 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1333 * RFC5280 version
1334 */
1335
1336static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1337 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1338 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1339{
1340 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1341 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1342 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1343 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1344 return 1;
1345 return 0;
1346}
1347
1348/*-
1349 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1350 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1351 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1352 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1353 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1354 */
1355
1356static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1357{
1358 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1359 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1360 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1361 int i, j;
1362 if (!a || !b)
1363 return 1;
1364 if (a->type == 1) {
1365 if (!a->dpname)
1366 return 0;
1367 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1368 if (b->type == 1) {
1369 if (!b->dpname)
1370 return 0;
1371 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1372 return 1;
1373 else
1374 return 0;
1375 }
1376 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1377 nm = a->dpname;
1378 gens = b->name.fullname;
1379 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1380 if (!b->dpname)
1381 return 0;
1382 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1383 gens = a->name.fullname;
1384 nm = b->dpname;
1385 }
1386
1387 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1388 if (nm) {
1389 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1390 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1391 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1392 continue;
1393 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1394 return 1;
1395 }
1396 return 0;
1397 }
1398
1399 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1400
1401 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1402 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1403 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1404 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1405 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1406 return 1;
1407 }
1408 }
1409
1410 return 0;
1411
1412}
1413
1414static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1415{
1416 int i;
1417 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1418 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1419 if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1420 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1421 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1422 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1423 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1424 continue;
1425 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1426 return 1;
1427 }
1428 return 0;
1429}
1430
1431/* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1432
1433static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1434 unsigned int *preasons)
1435{
1436 int i;
1437 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1438 return 0;
1439 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1440 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1441 return 0;
1442 } else {
1443 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1444 return 0;
1445 }
1446 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1447 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1448 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1449 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1450 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1451 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1452 return 1;
1453 }
1454 }
1455 }
1456 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1457 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1458 return 1;
1459 return 0;
1460}
1461
1462/*
1463 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1464 * to find a delta CRL too
1465 */
1466
1467static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1468 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1469{
1470 int ok;
1471 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1472 int crl_score = 0;
1473 unsigned int reasons;
1474 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1475 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1476 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1477
1478 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1479 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1480 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1481 if (ok)
1482 goto done;
1483
1484 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1485
1486 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1487
1488 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1489 if (!skcrl && crl)
1490 goto done;
1491
1492 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1493
1494 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1495
1496 done:
1497 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1498 if (crl) {
1499 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1500 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1501 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1502 *pcrl = crl;
1503 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1504 return 1;
1505 }
1506 return 0;
1507}
1508
1509/* Check CRL validity */
1510static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1511{
1512 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1513 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1514 int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1515 int chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1516
1517 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1518 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1519 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1520 /*
1521 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1522 * certificate in chain.
1523 */
1524 else if (cnum < chnum)
1525 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1526 else {
1527 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1528 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1529 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer) &&
1530 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER))
1531 return 0;
1532 }
1533
1534 if (issuer == NULL)
1535 return 1;
1536
1537 /*
1538 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1539 */
1540 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1541 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1542 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1543 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) &&
1544 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN))
1545 return 0;
1546
1547 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) &&
1548 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE))
1549 return 0;
1550
1551 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH) &&
1552 check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0 &&
1553 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR))
1554 return 0;
1555
1556 if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) &&
1557 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION))
1558 return 0;
1559 }
1560
1561 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME) &&
1562 !check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1))
1563 return 0;
1564
1565 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1566 ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer);
1567
1568 if (!ikey &&
1569 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY))
1570 return 0;
1571
1572 if (ikey) {
1573 int rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1574
1575 if (rv != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, rv))
1576 return 0;
1577 /* Verify CRL signature */
1578 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0 &&
1579 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE))
1580 return 0;
1581 }
1582 return 1;
1583}
1584
1585/* Check certificate against CRL */
1586static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1587{
1588 X509_REVOKED *rev;
1589
1590 /*
1591 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1592 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1593 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can
1594 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1595 */
1596 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1597 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) &&
1598 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION))
1599 return 0;
1600 /*
1601 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL. If found, make sure
1602 * reason is not removeFromCRL.
1603 */
1604 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1605 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1606 return 2;
1607 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED))
1608 return 0;
1609 }
1610
1611 return 1;
1612}
1613
1614static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1615{
1616 int ret;
1617
1618 if (ctx->parent)
1619 return 1;
1620 /*
1621 * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a
1622 * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor
1623 * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280
1624 * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the
1625 * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look
1626 * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain
1627 * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it
1628 * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the
1629 * X509_policy_check() call.
1630 */
1631 if (ctx->bare_ta_signed && !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, NULL)) {
1632 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1633 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
1634 return 0;
1635 }
1636 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1637 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1638 if (ctx->bare_ta_signed)
1639 sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
1640
1641 if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL) {
1642 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1643 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
1644 return 0;
1645 }
1646 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1647 if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) {
1648 int i;
1649
1650 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
1651 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1652 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1653
1654 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1655 continue;
1656 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
1657 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION))
1658 return 0;
1659 }
1660 return 1;
1661 }
1662 if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) {
1663 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1664 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1665 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1666 }
1667 if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) {
1668 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1669 return 0;
1670 }
1671
1672 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1673 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1674 /*
1675 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1676 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1677 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1678 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1679 */
1680 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1681 return 0;
1682 }
1683
1684 return 1;
1685}
1686
1687/*-
1688 * Check certificate validity times.
1689 * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return
1690 * the validation status.
1691 *
1692 * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
1693 */
1694int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth)
1695{
1696 time_t *ptime;
1697 int i;
1698
1699 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1700 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1701 else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
1702 return 1;
1703 else
1704 ptime = NULL;
1705
1706 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notBefore(x), ptime);
1707 if (i >= 0 && depth < 0)
1708 return 0;
1709 if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
1710 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD))
1711 return 0;
1712 if (i > 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID))
1713 return 0;
1714
1715 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x), ptime);
1716 if (i <= 0 && depth < 0)
1717 return 0;
1718 if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
1719 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD))
1720 return 0;
1721 if (i < 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED))
1722 return 0;
1723 return 1;
1724}
1725
1726/* verify the issuer signatures and cert times of ctx->chain */
1727static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1728{
1729 int n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1730 X509 *xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1731 X509 *xs;
1732
1733 /*
1734 * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to
1735 * check the timestamps of the top certificate. We report the issuer as
1736 * NULL, since all we have is a bare key.
1737 */
1738 if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) {
1739 xs = xi;
1740 xi = NULL;
1741 goto check_cert_time;
1742 }
1743
1744 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1745 xs = xi; /* the typical case: last cert in the chain is self-issued */
1746 else {
1747 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
1748 xs = xi;
1749 goto check_cert_time;
1750 }
1751 if (n <= 0) {
1752 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, 0,
1753 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE))
1754 return 0;
1755
1756 xs = xi;
1757 goto check_cert_time;
1758 }
1759
1760 n--;
1761 ctx->error_depth = n;
1762 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1763 }
1764
1765 /*
1766 * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback
1767 * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
1768 */
1769 while (n >= 0) {
1770 /*
1771 * For each iteration of this loop:
1772 * n is the subject depth
1773 * xs is the subject cert, for which the signature is to be checked
1774 * xi is the supposed issuer cert containing the public key to use
1775 * Initially xs == xi if the last cert in the chain is self-issued.
1776 *
1777 * Skip signature check for self-signed certificates unless explicitly
1778 * asked for because it does not add any security and just wastes time.
1779 */
1780 if (xs != xi || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)
1781 && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)) {
1782 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1783 /*
1784 * If the issuer's public key is not available or its key usage
1785 * does not support issuing the subject cert, report the issuer
1786 * cert and its depth (rather than n, the depth of the subject).
1787 */
1788 int issuer_depth = n + (xs == xi ? 0 : 1);
1789 /*
1790 * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.4
1791 * step (n) we must check any given key usage extension in a CA cert
1792 * when preparing the verification of a certificate issued by it.
1793 * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3
1794 * we must not verify a certifiate signature if the key usage of the
1795 * CA certificate that issued the certificate prohibits signing.
1796 * In case the 'issuing' certificate is the last in the chain and is
1797 * not a CA certificate but a 'self-issued' end-entity cert (i.e.,
1798 * xs == xi && !(xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)) RFC 5280 does not apply
1799 * (see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6818#section-2) and thus
1800 * we are free to ignore any key usage restrictions on such certs.
1801 */
1802 int ret = xs == xi && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0
1803 ? X509_V_OK : x509_signing_allowed(xi, xs);
1804
1805 if (ret != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, issuer_depth, ret))
1806 return 0;
1807 if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1808 ret = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1809 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, issuer_depth, ret))
1810 return 0;
1811 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1812 ret = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1813 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xs, n, ret))
1814 return 0;
1815 }
1816 }
1817
1818 check_cert_time: /* in addition to RFC 5280, do also for trusted (root) cert */
1819 /* Calls verify callback as needed */
1820 if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n))
1821 return 0;
1822
1823 /*
1824 * Signal success at this depth. However, the previous error (if any)
1825 * is retained.
1826 */
1827 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1828 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1829 ctx->error_depth = n;
1830 if (!ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx))
1831 return 0;
1832
1833 if (--n >= 0) {
1834 xi = xs;
1835 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1836 }
1837 }
1838 return 1;
1839}
1840
1841int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1842{
1843 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1844}
1845
1846int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1847{
1848 static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1849 static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1850 ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL;
1851 int i, day, sec, ret = 0;
1852#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
1853 const char upper_z = 0x5A;
1854#else
1855 const char upper_z = 'Z';
1856#endif
1857 /*
1858 * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280.
1859 * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1860 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1861 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1862 *
1863 * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement:
1864 * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate
1865 * validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity
1866 * dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime."
1867 */
1868 switch (ctm->type) {
1869 case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
1870 if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length))
1871 return 0;
1872 break;
1873 case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
1874 if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length))
1875 return 0;
1876 break;
1877 default:
1878 return 0;
1879 }
1880
1881 /**
1882 * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more
1883 * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280.
1884 * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods.
1885 */
1886 for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) {
1887 if (!ascii_isdigit(ctm->data[i]))
1888 return 0;
1889 }
1890 if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != upper_z)
1891 return 0;
1892
1893 /*
1894 * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no
1895 * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t,
1896 * so we go through ASN.1
1897 */
1898 asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time);
1899 if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL)
1900 goto err;
1901 if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time))
1902 goto err;
1903
1904 /*
1905 * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=.
1906 * The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
1907 */
1908 ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1;
1909
1910 err:
1911 ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time);
1912 return ret;
1913}
1914
1915ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1916{
1917 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1918}
1919
1920ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1921{
1922 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1923}
1924
1925ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1926 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1927{
1928 time_t t;
1929
1930 if (in_tm)
1931 t = *in_tm;
1932 else
1933 time(&t);
1934
1935 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
1936 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1937 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1938 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1939 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1940 }
1941 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1942}
1943
1944int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1945{
1946 EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
1947 int i, j;
1948
1949 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
1950 return 1;
1951
1952 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
1953 ktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
1954 if (ktmp == NULL) {
1955 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1956 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1957 return 0;
1958 }
1959 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1960 break;
1961 }
1962 if (ktmp == NULL) {
1963 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1964 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1965 return 0;
1966 }
1967
1968 /* first, populate the other certs */
1969 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
1970 ktmp2 = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
1971 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
1972 }
1973
1974 if (pkey != NULL)
1975 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
1976 return 1;
1977}
1978
1979/* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1980
1981X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
1982 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
1983{
1984 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1985 int i;
1986 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
1987 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1988 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
1989 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
1990 return NULL;
1991 }
1992 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1993 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
1994 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
1995 return NULL;
1996 }
1997 /* Issuer names must match */
1998 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
1999 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
2000 return NULL;
2001 }
2002 /* AKID and IDP must match */
2003 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
2004 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
2005 return NULL;
2006 }
2007 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
2008 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
2009 return NULL;
2010 }
2011 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2012 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
2013 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
2014 return NULL;
2015 }
2016 /* CRLs must verify */
2017 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
2018 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
2019 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
2020 return NULL;
2021 }
2022 /* Create new CRL */
2023 crl = X509_CRL_new();
2024 if (crl == NULL || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
2025 goto memerr;
2026 /* Set issuer name */
2027 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2028 goto memerr;
2029
2030 if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer)))
2031 goto memerr;
2032 if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer)))
2033 goto memerr;
2034
2035 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2036
2037 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
2038 goto memerr;
2039
2040 /*
2041 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2042 * number to correct value too.
2043 */
2044
2045 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
2046 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2047 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2048 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2049 goto memerr;
2050 }
2051
2052 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2053
2054 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2055
2056 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
2057 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2058 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2059 /*
2060 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2061 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2062 */
2063 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, &rvn->serialNumber)) {
2064 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2065 if (!rvtmp)
2066 goto memerr;
2067 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
2068 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2069 goto memerr;
2070 }
2071 }
2072 }
2073 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2074
2075 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2076 goto memerr;
2077
2078 return crl;
2079
2080 memerr:
2081 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2082 X509_CRL_free(crl);
2083 return NULL;
2084}
2085
2086int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2087{
2088 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
2089}
2090
2091void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2092{
2093 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
2094}
2095
2096int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2097{
2098 return ctx->error;
2099}
2100
2101void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2102{
2103 ctx->error = err;
2104}
2105
2106int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2107{
2108 return ctx->error_depth;
2109}
2110
2111void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2112{
2113 ctx->error_depth = depth;
2114}
2115
2116X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2117{
2118 return ctx->current_cert;
2119}
2120
2121void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2122{
2123 ctx->current_cert = x;
2124}
2125
2126STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2127{
2128 return ctx->chain;
2129}
2130
2131STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2132{
2133 if (!ctx->chain)
2134 return NULL;
2135 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2136}
2137
2138X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2139{
2140 return ctx->current_issuer;
2141}
2142
2143X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2144{
2145 return ctx->current_crl;
2146}
2147
2148X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2149{
2150 return ctx->parent;
2151}
2152
2153void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2154{
2155 ctx->cert = x;
2156}
2157
2158void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2159{
2160 ctx->crls = sk;
2161}
2162
2163int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2164{
2165 /*
2166 * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust?
2167 * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all? Or should the trust
2168 * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init().
2169 */
2170 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2171}
2172
2173int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2174{
2175 /*
2176 * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default
2177 * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case.
2178 */
2179 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2180}
2181
2182/*
2183 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2184 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2185 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2186 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2187 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2188 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2189 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2190 * client/server.
2191 */
2192
2193int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2194 int purpose, int trust)
2195{
2196 int idx;
2197 /* If purpose not set use default */
2198 if (!purpose)
2199 purpose = def_purpose;
2200 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2201 if (purpose) {
2202 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
2203 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2204 if (idx == -1) {
2205 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2206 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2207 return 0;
2208 }
2209 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2210 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2211 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2212 /*
2213 * XXX: In the two callers above def_purpose is always 0, which is
2214 * not a known value, so idx will always be -1. How is the
2215 * X509_TRUST_DEFAULT case actually supposed to be handled?
2216 */
2217 if (idx == -1) {
2218 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2219 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2220 return 0;
2221 }
2222 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2223 }
2224 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2225 if (!trust)
2226 trust = ptmp->trust;
2227 }
2228 if (trust) {
2229 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2230 if (idx == -1) {
2231 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2232 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2233 return 0;
2234 }
2235 }
2236
2237 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2238 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2239 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2240 ctx->param->trust = trust;
2241 return 1;
2242}
2243
2244X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2245{
2246 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
2247
2248 if (ctx == NULL) {
2249 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2250 return NULL;
2251 }
2252 return ctx;
2253}
2254
2255void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2256{
2257 if (ctx == NULL)
2258 return;
2259
2260 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2261 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2262}
2263
2264int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2265 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2266{
2267 int ret = 1;
2268
2269 ctx->ctx = store;
2270 ctx->cert = x509;
2271 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2272 ctx->crls = NULL;
2273 ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
2274 ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
2275 ctx->valid = 0;
2276 ctx->chain = NULL;
2277 ctx->error = 0;
2278 ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
2279 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2280 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
2281 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
2282 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
2283 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
2284 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
2285 ctx->tree = NULL;
2286 ctx->parent = NULL;
2287 ctx->dane = NULL;
2288 ctx->bare_ta_signed = 0;
2289 /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
2290 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
2291
2292 /* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */
2293 if (store)
2294 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2295 else
2296 ctx->cleanup = 0;
2297
2298 if (store && store->check_issued)
2299 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2300 else
2301 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2302
2303 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2304 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2305 else
2306 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2307
2308 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2309 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2310 else
2311 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2312
2313 if (store && store->verify)
2314 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2315 else
2316 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2317
2318 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2319 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2320 else
2321 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2322
2323 if (store && store->get_crl)
2324 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2325 else
2326 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2327
2328 if (store && store->check_crl)
2329 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2330 else
2331 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2332
2333 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2334 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2335 else
2336 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2337
2338 if (store && store->check_policy)
2339 ctx->check_policy = store->check_policy;
2340 else
2341 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2342
2343 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2344 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2345 else
2346 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs;
2347
2348 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2349 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2350 else
2351 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls;
2352
2353 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2354 if (ctx->param == NULL) {
2355 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2356 goto err;
2357 }
2358
2359 /*
2360 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2361 */
2362 if (store)
2363 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2364 else
2365 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2366
2367 if (ret)
2368 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2369 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2370
2371 if (ret == 0) {
2372 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2373 goto err;
2374 }
2375
2376 /*
2377 * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the
2378 * purpose if this still yields the default value.
2379 */
2380 if (ctx->param->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2381 int idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx->param->purpose);
2382 X509_PURPOSE *xp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2383
2384 if (xp != NULL)
2385 ctx->param->trust = X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp);
2386 }
2387
2388 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2389 &ctx->ex_data))
2390 return 1;
2391 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2392
2393 err:
2394 /*
2395 * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
2396 * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
2397 */
2398 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2399 return 0;
2400}
2401
2402/*
2403 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2404 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2405 */
2406void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2407{
2408 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2409 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2410 ctx->lookup_certs = lookup_certs_sk;
2411}
2412
2413void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2414{
2415 /*
2416 * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
2417 * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
2418 * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
2419 * pointers below after they're freed!
2420 */
2421 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
2422 if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
2423 ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2424 ctx->cleanup = NULL;
2425 }
2426 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2427 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2428 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2429 ctx->param = NULL;
2430 }
2431 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2432 ctx->tree = NULL;
2433 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2434 ctx->chain = NULL;
2435 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2436 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
2437}
2438
2439void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2440{
2441 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2442}
2443
2444void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2445{
2446 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2447}
2448
2449void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2450 time_t t)
2451{
2452 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2453}
2454
2455X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2456{
2457 return ctx->cert;
2458}
2459
2460STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2461{
2462 return ctx->untrusted;
2463}
2464
2465void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2466{
2467 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2468}
2469
2470void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2471{
2472 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2473 ctx->chain = sk;
2474}
2475
2476void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2477 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb)
2478{
2479 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2480}
2481
2482X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2483{
2484 return ctx->verify_cb;
2485}
2486
2487void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2488 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify)
2489{
2490 ctx->verify = verify;
2491}
2492
2493X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2494{
2495 return ctx->verify;
2496}
2497
2498X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2499{
2500 return ctx->get_issuer;
2501}
2502
2503X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2504{
2505 return ctx->check_issued;
2506}
2507
2508X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2509{
2510 return ctx->check_revocation;
2511}
2512
2513X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2514{
2515 return ctx->get_crl;
2516}
2517
2518X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2519{
2520 return ctx->check_crl;
2521}
2522
2523X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2524{
2525 return ctx->cert_crl;
2526}
2527
2528X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2529{
2530 return ctx->check_policy;
2531}
2532
2533X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2534{
2535 return ctx->lookup_certs;
2536}
2537
2538X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2539{
2540 return ctx->lookup_crls;
2541}
2542
2543X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2544{
2545 return ctx->cleanup;
2546}
2547
2548X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2549{
2550 return ctx->tree;
2551}
2552
2553int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2554{
2555 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2556}
2557
2558int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2559{
2560 return ctx->num_untrusted;
2561}
2562
2563int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2564{
2565 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2566 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2567 if (!param)
2568 return 0;
2569 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2570}
2571
2572X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2573{
2574 return ctx->param;
2575}
2576
2577void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2578{
2579 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2580 ctx->param = param;
2581}
2582
2583void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane)
2584{
2585 ctx->dane = dane;
2586}
2587
2588static unsigned char *dane_i2d(
2589 X509 *cert,
2590 uint8_t selector,
2591 unsigned int *i2dlen)
2592{
2593 unsigned char *buf = NULL;
2594 int len;
2595
2596 /*
2597 * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key.
2598 */
2599 switch (selector) {
2600 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT:
2601 len = i2d_X509(cert, &buf);
2602 break;
2603 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI:
2604 len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf);
2605 break;
2606 default:
2607 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR);
2608 return NULL;
2609 }
2610
2611 if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) {
2612 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2613 return NULL;
2614 }
2615
2616 *i2dlen = (unsigned int)len;
2617 return buf;
2618}
2619
2620#define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */
2621
2622static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth)
2623{
2624 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2625 unsigned usage = DANETLS_NONE;
2626 unsigned selector = DANETLS_NONE;
2627 unsigned ordinal = DANETLS_NONE;
2628 unsigned mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2629 unsigned char *i2dbuf = NULL;
2630 unsigned int i2dlen = 0;
2631 unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2632 unsigned char *cmpbuf = NULL;
2633 unsigned int cmplen = 0;
2634 int i;
2635 int recnum;
2636 int matched = 0;
2637 danetls_record *t = NULL;
2638 uint32_t mask;
2639
2640 mask = (depth == 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK : DANETLS_TA_MASK;
2641
2642 /*
2643 * The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2)
2644 */
2645 if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
2646 mask &= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
2647
2648 /*
2649 * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
2650 * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
2651 * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
2652 */
2653 if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
2654 mask &= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
2655
2656 /*-
2657 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1
2658 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2
2659 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3
2660 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4
2661 *
2662 * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building
2663 * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with
2664 * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which
2665 * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1).
2666 *
2667 * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX
2668 * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest
2669 * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c.
2670 *
2671 * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we
2672 * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers
2673 * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch
2674 * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1",
2675 * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public
2676 * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1"
2677 * or multiple "3 0 1" records.
2678 *
2679 * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either
2680 * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after
2681 * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
2682 * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation.
2683 */
2684 recnum = (dane->umask & mask) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0;
2685 for (i = 0; matched == 0 && i < recnum; ++i) {
2686 t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
2687 if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t->usage) & mask) == 0)
2688 continue;
2689 if (t->usage != usage) {
2690 usage = t->usage;
2691
2692 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2693 mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2694 ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
2695 }
2696 if (t->selector != selector) {
2697 selector = t->selector;
2698
2699 /* Update per-selector state */
2700 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
2701 i2dbuf = dane_i2d(cert, selector, &i2dlen);
2702 if (i2dbuf == NULL)
2703 return -1;
2704
2705 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2706 mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2707 ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
2708 } else if (t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) {
2709 /*-
2710 * Digest agility:
2711 *
2712 * <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9>
2713 *
2714 * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the
2715 * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals
2716 * other than "Full".
2717 */
2718 if (dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype] < ordinal)
2719 continue;
2720 }
2721
2722 /*
2723 * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant
2724 * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space.
2725 */
2726 if (t->mtype != mtype) {
2727 const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype];
2728 cmpbuf = i2dbuf;
2729 cmplen = i2dlen;
2730
2731 if (md != NULL) {
2732 cmpbuf = mdbuf;
2733 if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf, i2dlen, cmpbuf, &cmplen, md, 0)) {
2734 matched = -1;
2735 break;
2736 }
2737 }
2738 }
2739
2740 /*
2741 * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any
2742 * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a
2743 * full chain.
2744 */
2745 if (cmplen == t->dlen &&
2746 memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) {
2747 if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK)
2748 matched = 1;
2749 if (matched || dane->mdpth < 0) {
2750 dane->mdpth = depth;
2751 dane->mtlsa = t;
2752 OPENSSL_free(dane->mcert);
2753 dane->mcert = cert;
2754 X509_up_ref(cert);
2755 }
2756 break;
2757 }
2758 }
2759
2760 /* Clear the one-element DER cache */
2761 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
2762 return matched;
2763}
2764
2765static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2766{
2767 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2768 int matched = 0;
2769 X509 *cert;
2770
2771 if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) || depth == 0)
2772 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2773
2774 /*
2775 * Record any DANE trust-anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if
2776 * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking
2777 * for an exact match for the leaf certificate).
2778 */
2779 cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
2780 if (cert != NULL && (matched = dane_match(ctx, cert, depth)) < 0)
2781 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
2782 if (matched > 0) {
2783 ctx->num_untrusted = depth - 1;
2784 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
2785 }
2786
2787 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2788}
2789
2790static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2791{
2792 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2793 danetls_record *t;
2794 int num = ctx->num_untrusted;
2795 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
2796 int recnum = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs);
2797 int i;
2798
2799 for (i = 0; i < recnum; ++i) {
2800 t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
2801 if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA ||
2802 t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI ||
2803 t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL ||
2804 X509_verify(cert, t->spki) <= 0)
2805 continue;
2806
2807 /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */
2808 X509_free(dane->mcert);
2809 dane->mcert = NULL;
2810
2811 /* Record match via a bare TA public key */
2812 ctx->bare_ta_signed = 1;
2813 dane->mdpth = num - 1;
2814 dane->mtlsa = t;
2815
2816 /* Prune any excess chain certificates */
2817 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
2818 for (; num > ctx->num_untrusted; --num)
2819 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
2820
2821 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
2822 }
2823
2824 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2825}
2826
2827static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE *dane)
2828{
2829 /*
2830 * Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure.
2831 */
2832 X509_free(dane->mcert);
2833 dane->mcert = NULL;
2834 dane->mtlsa = NULL;
2835 dane->mdpth = -1;
2836 dane->pdpth = -1;
2837}
2838
2839static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
2840{
2841 int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, cert, NULL, ctx->param->flags);
2842
2843 if (err == X509_V_OK)
2844 return 1;
2845 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, err);
2846}
2847
2848static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2849{
2850 X509 *cert = ctx->cert;
2851 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2852 int matched;
2853 int done;
2854
2855 dane_reset(dane);
2856
2857 /*-
2858 * When testing the leaf certificate, if we match a DANE-EE(3) record,
2859 * dane_match() returns 1 and we're done. If however we match a PKIX-EE(1)
2860 * record, the match depth and matching TLSA record are recorded, but the
2861 * return value is 0, because we still need to find a PKIX trust-anchor.
2862 * Therefore, when DANE authentication is enabled (required), we're done
2863 * if:
2864 * + matched < 0, internal error.
2865 * + matched == 1, we matched a DANE-EE(3) record
2866 * + matched == 0, mdepth < 0 (no PKIX-EE match) and there are no
2867 * DANE-TA(2) or PKIX-TA(0) to test.
2868 */
2869 matched = dane_match(ctx, ctx->cert, 0);
2870 done = matched != 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && dane->mdpth < 0);
2871
2872 if (done)
2873 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
2874
2875 if (matched > 0) {
2876 /* Callback invoked as needed */
2877 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
2878 return 0;
2879 /* Callback invoked as needed */
2880 if ((dane->flags & DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS) == 0 &&
2881 !check_id(ctx))
2882 return 0;
2883 /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */
2884 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2885 ctx->current_cert = cert;
2886 return ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx);
2887 }
2888
2889 if (matched < 0) {
2890 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2891 ctx->current_cert = cert;
2892 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2893 return -1;
2894 }
2895
2896 if (done) {
2897 /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */
2898 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
2899 return 0;
2900 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
2901 }
2902
2903 /*
2904 * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0
2905 * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain.
2906 */
2907 return verify_chain(ctx);
2908}
2909
2910/* Get issuer, without duplicate suppression */
2911static int get_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
2912{
2913 STACK_OF(X509) *saved_chain = ctx->chain;
2914 int ok;
2915
2916 ctx->chain = NULL;
2917 ok = ctx->get_issuer(issuer, ctx, cert);
2918 ctx->chain = saved_chain;
2919
2920 return ok;
2921}
2922
2923static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2924{
2925 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2926 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
2927 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
2928 int ss = cert_self_signed(cert);
2929 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
2930 unsigned int search;
2931 int may_trusted = 0;
2932 int may_alternate = 0;
2933 int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2934 int alt_untrusted = 0;
2935 int depth;
2936 int ok = 0;
2937 int i;
2938
2939 /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */
2940 if (!ossl_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num)) {
2941 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2942 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
2943 return 0;
2944 }
2945
2946#define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */
2947#define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */
2948#define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
2949 /*
2950 * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled.
2951 * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the
2952 * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first,
2953 * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain
2954 * if no luck with untrusted first.
2955 */
2956 search = (ctx->untrusted != NULL) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0;
2957 if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane)) {
2958 if (search == 0 || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
2959 search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
2960 else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS))
2961 may_alternate = 1;
2962 may_trusted = 1;
2963 }
2964
2965 /*
2966 * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is
2967 * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make
2968 * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go.
2969 */
2970 if (ctx->untrusted && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
2971 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2972 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2973 return 0;
2974 }
2975
2976 /*
2977 * If we got any "DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) Full(0)" trust-anchors from DNS, add
2978 * them to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack. Since the
2979 * caller of X509_STORE_CTX_init() may have provided only a leaf cert with
2980 * no corresponding stack of untrusted certificates, we may need to create
2981 * an empty stack first. [ At present only the ssl library provides DANE
2982 * support, and ssl_verify_cert_chain() always provides a non-null stack
2983 * containing at least the leaf certificate, but we must be prepared for
2984 * this to change. ]
2985 */
2986 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->certs != NULL) {
2987 if (sktmp == NULL && (sktmp = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2988 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2989 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2990 return 0;
2991 }
2992 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(dane->certs); ++i) {
2993 if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp, sk_X509_value(dane->certs, i))) {
2994 sk_X509_free(sktmp);
2995 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2996 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2997 return 0;
2998 }
2999 }
3000 }
3001
3002 /*
3003 * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound
3004 * might be reasonable.
3005 */
3006 if (ctx->param->depth > INT_MAX/2)
3007 ctx->param->depth = INT_MAX/2;
3008
3009 /*
3010 * Try to Extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer.
3011 * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit,
3012 * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code.
3013 */
3014 depth = ctx->param->depth + 1;
3015
3016 while (search != 0) {
3017 X509 *x;
3018 X509 *xtmp = NULL;
3019
3020 /*
3021 * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run
3022 * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When we
3023 * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point
3024 * we've not found a trust-anchor, any trusted chain would be too long.
3025 *
3026 * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the
3027 * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last
3028 * not ultimately-trusted issuer. For example, with verify_depth = 0,
3029 * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer
3030 * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor. No attempt will be
3031 * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain
3032 * would be a-priori too long.
3033 */
3034 if ((search & S_DOTRUSTED) != 0) {
3035 i = num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3036 if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
3037 /*
3038 * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative
3039 * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently
3040 * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable
3041 * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It
3042 * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain
3043 * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of
3044 * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a
3045 * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor
3046 * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or
3047 * ctx->num_untrusted.
3048 *
3049 * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of
3050 * untrusted certificates, not a "depth".
3051 */
3052 i = alt_untrusted;
3053 }
3054 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i-1);
3055
3056 ok = (depth < num) ? 0 : get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
3057
3058 if (ok < 0) {
3059 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3060 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
3061 search = 0;
3062 continue;
3063 }
3064
3065 if (ok > 0) {
3066 /*
3067 * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert?
3068 * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now
3069 * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note
3070 * that despite the current trust-store match we might still
3071 * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust-anchor, in which
3072 * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try
3073 * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on
3074 * again with an even shorter untrusted chain!
3075 *
3076 * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust
3077 * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted
3078 * certificate among the ones from the trust store.
3079 */
3080 if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
3081 if (!ossl_assert(num > i && i > 0 && ss == 0)) {
3082 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3083 X509_free(xtmp);
3084 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3085 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
3086 search = 0;
3087 continue;
3088 }
3089 search &= ~S_DOALTERNATE;
3090 for (; num > i; --num)
3091 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
3092 ctx->num_untrusted = num;
3093
3094 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
3095 dane->mdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) {
3096 dane->mdpth = -1;
3097 X509_free(dane->mcert);
3098 dane->mcert = NULL;
3099 }
3100 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
3101 dane->pdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
3102 dane->pdpth = -1;
3103 }
3104
3105 /*
3106 * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their
3107 * trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain.
3108 */
3109 if (ss == 0) {
3110 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x = xtmp)) {
3111 X509_free(xtmp);
3112 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3113 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3114 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
3115 search = 0;
3116 continue;
3117 }
3118 ss = cert_self_signed(x);
3119 } else if (num == ctx->num_untrusted) {
3120 /*
3121 * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same
3122 * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as
3123 * a trust-anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid
3124 * possible impersonation via key substitution etc.
3125 */
3126 if (X509_cmp(x, xtmp) != 0) {
3127 /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */
3128 X509_free(xtmp);
3129 ok = 0;
3130 } else {
3131 X509_free(x);
3132 ctx->num_untrusted = --num;
3133 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, num, x = xtmp);
3134 }
3135 }
3136
3137 /*
3138 * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, recheck
3139 * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper.
3140 * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer
3141 * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain.
3142 *
3143 * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the
3144 * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE
3145 * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from
3146 * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the
3147 * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted
3148 * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num.
3149 */
3150 if (ok) {
3151 if (!ossl_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num)) {
3152 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3153 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3154 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
3155 search = 0;
3156 continue;
3157 }
3158 search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
3159 switch (trust = check_trust(ctx, num)) {
3160 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
3161 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
3162 search = 0;
3163 continue;
3164 }
3165 if (ss == 0)
3166 continue;
3167 }
3168 }
3169
3170 /*
3171 * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if
3172 * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled,
3173 * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time,
3174 * and trying to extend the shorted chain.
3175 */
3176 if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) == 0) {
3177 /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */
3178 if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 && --alt_untrusted > 0)
3179 continue;
3180 /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */
3181 if (!may_alternate || (search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 ||
3182 ctx->num_untrusted < 2)
3183 break;
3184 /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */
3185 search |= S_DOALTERNATE;
3186 alt_untrusted = ctx->num_untrusted - 1;
3187 ss = 0;
3188 }
3189 }
3190
3191 /*
3192 * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates
3193 */
3194 if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) != 0) {
3195 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3196 if (!ossl_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted)) {
3197 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3198 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3199 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
3200 search = 0;
3201 continue;
3202 }
3203 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num-1);
3204
3205 /*
3206 * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more
3207 * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled.
3208 */
3209 xtmp = (ss || depth < num) ? NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
3210 if (xtmp == NULL) {
3211 search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
3212 if (may_trusted)
3213 search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
3214 continue;
3215 }
3216
3217 /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */
3218 (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
3219
3220 if (!X509_up_ref(xtmp)) {
3221 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3222 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3223 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
3224 search = 0;
3225 continue;
3226 }
3227
3228 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
3229 X509_free(xtmp);
3230 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3231 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3232 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
3233 search = 0;
3234 continue;
3235 }
3236
3237 x = xtmp;
3238 ++ctx->num_untrusted;
3239 ss = cert_self_signed(xtmp);
3240
3241 /*
3242 * Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate.
3243 */
3244 switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1)) {
3245 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
3246 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
3247 search = 0;
3248 continue;
3249 }
3250 }
3251 }
3252 sk_X509_free(sktmp);
3253
3254 /*
3255 * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key
3256 * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust.
3257 */
3258 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3259 if (num <= depth) {
3260 if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane))
3261 trust = check_dane_pkeys(ctx);
3262 if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && num == ctx->num_untrusted)
3263 trust = check_trust(ctx, num);
3264 }
3265
3266 switch (trust) {
3267 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
3268 return 1;
3269 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
3270 /* Callback already issued */
3271 return 0;
3272 case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED:
3273 default:
3274 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3275 if (num > depth)
3276 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3277 X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG);
3278 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
3279 (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0))
3280 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
3281 if (ss && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
3282 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3283 X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT);
3284 if (ss)
3285 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3286 X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN);
3287 if (ctx->num_untrusted < num)
3288 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3289 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT);
3290 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3291 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY);
3292 }
3293}
3294
3295static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
3296static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS = OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table);
3297
3298/*
3299 * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` meets the security level of
3300 * ``ctx``.
3301 *
3302 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3303 */
3304static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
3305{
3306 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert);
3307 int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
3308
3309 /*
3310 * At security level zero, return without checking for a supported public
3311 * key type. Some engines support key types not understood outside the
3312 * engine, and we only need to understand the key when enforcing a security
3313 * floor.
3314 */
3315 if (level <= 0)
3316 return 1;
3317
3318 /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */
3319 if (pkey == NULL)
3320 return 0;
3321
3322 if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
3323 level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
3324
3325 return EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey) >= minbits_table[level - 1];
3326}
3327
3328/*
3329 * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` does not use explicit params
3330 * for an elliptic curve.
3331 *
3332 * Returns 1 on success, 0 if check fails, -1 for other errors.
3333 */
3334static int check_curve(X509 *cert)
3335{
3336#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3337 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert);
3338
3339 /* Unsupported or malformed key */
3340 if (pkey == NULL)
3341 return -1;
3342
3343 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3344 int ret;
3345
3346 ret = EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
3347 return ret < 0 ? ret : !ret;
3348 }
3349#endif
3350
3351 return 1;
3352}
3353
3354/*
3355 * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security
3356 * level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether
3357 * self-signed or otherwise).
3358 *
3359 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3360 */
3361static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
3362{
3363 int secbits = -1;
3364 int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
3365
3366 if (level <= 0)
3367 return 1;
3368 if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
3369 level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
3370
3371 if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, NULL, NULL, &secbits, NULL))
3372 return 0;
3373
3374 return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1];
3375}
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