VirtualBox

source: vbox/trunk/src/libs/openssl-1.1.1l/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c@ 92824

最後變更 在這個檔案從92824是 91772,由 vboxsync 提交於 3 年 前

openssl-1.1.1l: Applied and adjusted our OpenSSL changes to 1.1.1l. bugref:10126
檔案大小: 66.7 KB
行 
1/*
2 * Copyright 2016-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11#include "../ssl_local.h"
12#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
13#include "statem_local.h"
14
15EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
16 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
17 size_t chainidx)
18{
19 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
20 if (!s->renegotiate)
21 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
22
23 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
24 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
25 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
26 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
27 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
28 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
29 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
30 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
31 }
32
33 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
34}
35
36EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
37 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
38 size_t chainidx)
39{
40 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL)
41 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
42
43 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
44 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
45 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
46 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
47 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
48 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
49 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
50 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.hostname,
51 strlen(s->ext.hostname))
52 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
53 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
54 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
55 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
56 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
57 }
58
59 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
60}
61
62/* Push a Max Fragment Len extension into ClientHello */
63EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
64 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
65 size_t chainidx)
66{
67 if (s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode == TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED)
68 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
69
70 /* Add Max Fragment Length extension if client enabled it. */
71 /*-
72 * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
73 * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
74 */
75 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length)
76 /* Sub-packet for Max Fragment Length extension (1 byte) */
77 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
78 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode)
79 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
80 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
81 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
82 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
83 }
84
85 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
86}
87
88#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
89EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
90 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
91{
92 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
93 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
94 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
95
96 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
97 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
98 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
99 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
100 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
101 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
102 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
103 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
104 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
105 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SRP,
107 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
108 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
109 }
110
111 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
112}
113#endif
114
115#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
116static int use_ecc(SSL *s)
117{
118 int i, end, ret = 0;
119 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
120 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = NULL;
121
122 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
123 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
124 return 0;
125
126 cipher_stack = SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(s);
127 end = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack);
128 for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
129 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
130
131 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
132 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
133 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
134 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
135 || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
136 ret = 1;
137 break;
138 }
139 }
140
141 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_stack);
142 return ret;
143}
144
145EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
146 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
147 size_t chainidx)
148{
149 const unsigned char *pformats;
150 size_t num_formats;
151
152 if (!use_ecc(s))
153 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
154
155 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
156 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
157
158 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
159 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
160 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
161 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
162 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
163 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
164 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
165 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
166 }
167
168 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
169}
170
171EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
172 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
173 size_t chainidx)
174{
175 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
176 size_t num_groups = 0, i;
177
178 if (!use_ecc(s))
179 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
180
181 /*
182 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
183 */
184 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
185 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
186
187 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
188 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
189 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
190 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
191 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
192 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
193 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
194 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
195 }
196 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
197 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
198 uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[i];
199
200 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
201 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, ctmp)) {
202 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
203 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
204 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
205 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
206 }
207 }
208 }
209 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
210 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
211 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
212 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
213 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
214 }
215
216 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
217}
218#endif
219
220EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
221 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
222 size_t chainidx)
223{
224 size_t ticklen;
225
226 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
227 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
228
229 if (!s->new_session && s->session != NULL
230 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
231 && s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
232 ticklen = s->session->ext.ticklen;
233 } else if (s->session && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL
234 && s->ext.session_ticket->data != NULL) {
235 ticklen = s->ext.session_ticket->length;
236 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
237 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
238 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
239 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET,
240 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
241 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
242 }
243 memcpy(s->session->ext.tick,
244 s->ext.session_ticket->data, ticklen);
245 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
246 } else {
247 ticklen = 0;
248 }
249
250 if (ticklen == 0 && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL &&
251 s->ext.session_ticket->data == NULL)
252 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
253
254 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
255 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
256 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
257 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
258 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
259 }
260
261 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
262}
263
264EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
265 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
266 size_t chainidx)
267{
268 size_t salglen;
269 const uint16_t *salg;
270
271 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s))
272 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
273
274 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg);
275 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
276 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
277 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
278 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
279 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
280 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
281 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
282 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
283 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SIG_ALGS,
284 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
285 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
286 }
287
288 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
289}
290
291#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
292EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
293 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
294 size_t chainidx)
295{
296 int i;
297
298 /* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */
299 if (x != NULL)
300 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
301
302 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
303 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
304
305 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
306 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
307 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
308 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
309 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
310 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
311 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
312 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
313 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
314 }
315 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->ext.ocsp.ids); i++) {
316 unsigned char *idbytes;
317 OCSP_RESPID *id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->ext.ocsp.ids, i);
318 int idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
319
320 if (idlen <= 0
321 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
322 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
323 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
324 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
325 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
326 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
327 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
328 }
329 }
330 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
331 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
332 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
333 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
334 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
335 }
336 if (s->ext.ocsp.exts) {
337 unsigned char *extbytes;
338 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, NULL);
339
340 if (extlen < 0) {
341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
342 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
343 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
344 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
345 }
346 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
347 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, &extbytes)
348 != extlen) {
349 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
350 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
351 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
352 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
353 }
354 }
355 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
356 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
357 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
358 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
359 }
360
361 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
362}
363#endif
364
365#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
366EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
367 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
368{
369 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
370 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
371
372 /*
373 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
374 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
375 */
376 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
377 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_NPN,
379 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
380 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
381 }
382
383 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
384}
385#endif
386
387EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
388 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
389{
390 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
391
392 if (s->ext.alpn == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
393 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
394
395 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
396 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
397 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
398 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
399 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)
400 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
401 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ALPN,
402 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
403 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
404 }
405 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
406
407 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
408}
409
410
411#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
412EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
413 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
414 size_t chainidx)
415{
416 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
417 int i, end;
418
419 if (clnt == NULL)
420 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
421
422 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
423 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
424 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
425 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
426 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
427 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
428 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
429 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
430 }
431
432 end = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
433 for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
434 const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof =
435 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
436
437 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
438 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
439 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
440 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
441 }
442 }
443 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
444 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
445 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
446 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
447 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
448 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
449 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
450 }
451
452 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
453}
454#endif
455
456EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
457 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
458{
459 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
460 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
461
462 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
463 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
464 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ETM,
465 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
466 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
467 }
468
469 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
470}
471
472#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
473EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
474 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
475{
476 if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL)
477 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
478
479 /* Not defined for client Certificates */
480 if (x != NULL)
481 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
482
483 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
484 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
485 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SCT,
486 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
487 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
488 }
489
490 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
491}
492#endif
493
494EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
495 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
496{
497 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
498 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
499 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EMS,
500 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
501 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
502 }
503
504 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
505}
506
507EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
508 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
509 size_t chainidx)
510{
511 int currv, min_version, max_version, reason;
512
513 reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
514 if (reason != 0) {
515 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
516 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, reason);
517 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
518 }
519
520 /*
521 * Don't include this if we can't negotiate TLSv1.3. We can do a straight
522 * comparison here because we will never be called in DTLS.
523 */
524 if (max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION)
525 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
526
527 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
528 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
529 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
530 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
531 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
532 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
533 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
534 }
535
536 for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
537 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
538 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
539 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
540 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
541 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
542 }
543 }
544 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
545 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
546 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
547 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
548 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
549 }
550
551 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
552}
553
554/*
555 * Construct a psk_kex_modes extension.
556 */
557EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
558 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
559 size_t chainidx)
560{
561#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
562 int nodhe = s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX;
563
564 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes)
565 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
566 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
567 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
568 || (nodhe && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE))
569 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
570 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
571 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
572 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
573 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
574 }
575
576 s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
577 if (nodhe)
578 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
579#endif
580
581 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
582}
583
584#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
585static int add_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int curve_id)
586{
587 unsigned char *encoded_point = NULL;
588 EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
589 size_t encodedlen;
590
591 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
592 if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)) {
593 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE,
594 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
595 return 0;
596 }
597 /*
598 * Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share
599 */
600 key_share_key = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
601 } else {
602 key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
603 if (key_share_key == NULL) {
604 /* SSLfatal() already called */
605 return 0;
606 }
607 }
608
609 /* Encode the public key. */
610 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
611 &encoded_point);
612 if (encodedlen == 0) {
613 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
614 goto err;
615 }
616
617 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
618 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
619 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_point, encodedlen)) {
620 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE,
621 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
622 goto err;
623 }
624
625 /*
626 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
627 * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
628 * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
629 */
630 s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
631 s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
632 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
633
634 return 1;
635 err:
636 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL)
637 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
638 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
639 return 0;
640}
641#endif
642
643EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
644 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
645 size_t chainidx)
646{
647#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
648 size_t i, num_groups = 0;
649 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
650 uint16_t curve_id = 0;
651
652 /* key_share extension */
653 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
654 /* Extension data sub-packet */
655 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
656 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
657 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
658 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
659 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
660 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
661 }
662
663 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
664
665 /*
666 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
667 * now, just send one
668 */
669 if (s->s3->group_id != 0) {
670 curve_id = s->s3->group_id;
671 } else {
672 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
673
674 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pgroups[i], SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
675 continue;
676
677 curve_id = pgroups[i];
678 break;
679 }
680 }
681
682 if (curve_id == 0) {
683 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
684 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
685 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
686 }
687
688 if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, curve_id)) {
689 /* SSLfatal() already called */
690 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
691 }
692
693 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
694 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
695 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
696 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
697 }
698 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
699#else
700 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
701#endif
702}
703
704EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
705 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
706{
707 EXT_RETURN ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
708
709 /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */
710 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0)
711 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
712
713 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
714 /* Extension data sub-packet */
715 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
716 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.tls13_cookie,
717 s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)
718 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
719 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_COOKIE,
720 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
721 goto end;
722 }
723
724 ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
725 end:
726 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie);
727 s->ext.tls13_cookie = NULL;
728 s->ext.tls13_cookie_len = 0;
729
730 return ret;
731}
732
733EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
734 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
735 size_t chainidx)
736{
737#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
738 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
739#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
740 const unsigned char *id = NULL;
741 size_t idlen = 0;
742 SSL_SESSION *psksess = NULL;
743 SSL_SESSION *edsess = NULL;
744 const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL;
745
746 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
747 handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
748
749 if (s->psk_use_session_cb != NULL
750 && (!s->psk_use_session_cb(s, handmd, &id, &idlen, &psksess)
751 || (psksess != NULL
752 && psksess->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
753 SSL_SESSION_free(psksess);
754 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
755 SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
756 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
757 }
758
759#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
760 if (psksess == NULL && s->psk_client_callback != NULL) {
761 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
762 size_t psklen = 0;
763
764 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
765 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, NULL, identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
766 psk, sizeof(psk));
767
768 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
769 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
770 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
771 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
772 } else if (psklen > 0) {
773 const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
774 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
775
776 idlen = strlen(identity);
777 if (idlen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
778 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
779 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
780 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
781 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
782 }
783 id = (unsigned char *)identity;
784
785 /*
786 * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
787 * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
788 */
789 cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id);
790 if (cipher == NULL) {
791 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
792 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
793 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
794 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
795 }
796
797 psksess = SSL_SESSION_new();
798 if (psksess == NULL
799 || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(psksess, psk, psklen)
800 || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(psksess, cipher)
801 || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(psksess, TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
802 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
803 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
804 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
805 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
806 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
807 }
808 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
809 }
810 }
811#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
812
813 SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
814 s->psksession = psksess;
815 if (psksess != NULL) {
816 OPENSSL_free(s->psksession_id);
817 s->psksession_id = OPENSSL_memdup(id, idlen);
818 if (s->psksession_id == NULL) {
819 s->psksession_id_len = 0;
820 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
821 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
822 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
823 }
824 s->psksession_id_len = idlen;
825 }
826
827 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
828 || (s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0
829 && (psksess == NULL || psksess->ext.max_early_data == 0))) {
830 s->max_early_data = 0;
831 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
832 }
833 edsess = s->session->ext.max_early_data != 0 ? s->session : psksess;
834 s->max_early_data = edsess->ext.max_early_data;
835
836 if (edsess->ext.hostname != NULL) {
837 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL
838 || (s->ext.hostname != NULL
839 && strcmp(s->ext.hostname, edsess->ext.hostname) != 0)) {
840 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
841 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
842 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_SNI);
843 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
844 }
845 }
846
847 if ((s->ext.alpn == NULL && edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL)) {
848 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
849 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
850 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
851 }
852
853 /*
854 * Verify that we are offering an ALPN protocol consistent with the early
855 * data.
856 */
857 if (edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
858 PACKET prots, alpnpkt;
859 int found = 0;
860
861 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&prots, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
862 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
863 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
864 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
865 }
866 while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&prots, &alpnpkt)) {
867 if (PACKET_equal(&alpnpkt, edsess->ext.alpn_selected,
868 edsess->ext.alpn_selected_len)) {
869 found = 1;
870 break;
871 }
872 }
873 if (!found) {
874 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
875 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
876 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
877 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
878 }
879 }
880
881 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
882 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
883 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
884 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
885 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
886 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
887 }
888
889 /*
890 * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the
891 * extension, we set it to accepted.
892 */
893 s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
894 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
895
896 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
897}
898
899#define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff
900#define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200
901
902/*
903 * PSK pre binder overhead =
904 * 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
905 * 2 bytes for extension length
906 * 2 bytes for identities list length
907 * 2 bytes for identity length
908 * 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age
909 * 2 bytes for binder list length
910 * 1 byte for binder length
911 * The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the
912 * subsequent binder bytes
913 */
914#define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1)
915
916EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
917 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
918 size_t chainidx)
919{
920 unsigned char *padbytes;
921 size_t hlen;
922
923 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) == 0)
924 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
925
926 /*
927 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685.
928 * This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but
929 * excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore
930 * this extension MUST always appear second to last.
931 */
932 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
933 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING,
934 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
935 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
936 }
937
938 /*
939 * If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this
940 * extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be.
941 */
942 if (s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION
943 && s->session->ext.ticklen != 0
944 && s->session->cipher != NULL) {
945 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
946
947 if (md != NULL) {
948 /*
949 * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder
950 * length.
951 */
952 hlen += PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD + s->session->ext.ticklen
953 + EVP_MD_size(md);
954 }
955 }
956
957 if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) {
958 /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */
959 hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen;
960
961 /*
962 * Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and
963 * 2 bytes for length bytes), but ensure that the extension is at least
964 * 1 byte long so as not to have an empty extension last (WebSphere 7.x,
965 * 8.x are intolerant of that condition)
966 */
967 if (hlen > 4)
968 hlen -= 4;
969 else
970 hlen = 1;
971
972 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
973 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
974 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING,
975 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
976 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
977 }
978 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
979 }
980
981 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
982}
983
984/*
985 * Construct the pre_shared_key extension
986 */
987EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
988 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
989{
990#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
991 uint32_t now, agesec, agems = 0;
992 size_t reshashsize = 0, pskhashsize = 0, binderoffset, msglen;
993 unsigned char *resbinder = NULL, *pskbinder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL;
994 const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL, *mdres = NULL, *mdpsk = NULL;
995 int dores = 0;
996
997 s->ext.tick_identity = 0;
998
999 /*
1000 * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single
1001 * resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length
1002 * calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted.
1003 */
1004
1005 /*
1006 * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume
1007 * so don't add this extension.
1008 */
1009 if (s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION
1010 || (s->session->ext.ticklen == 0 && s->psksession == NULL))
1011 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1012
1013 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
1014 handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
1015
1016 if (s->session->ext.ticklen != 0) {
1017 /* Get the digest associated with the ciphersuite in the session */
1018 if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
1019 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1020 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1021 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1022 }
1023 mdres = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
1024 if (mdres == NULL) {
1025 /*
1026 * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
1027 * Ignore it
1028 */
1029 goto dopsksess;
1030 }
1031
1032 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdres != handmd) {
1033 /*
1034 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session
1035 * so we can't use it.
1036 */
1037 goto dopsksess;
1038 }
1039
1040 /*
1041 * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says
1042 * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most
1043 * implementations follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in
1044 * seconds since epoch. We've already made the assumption that we can do
1045 * this in multiple places in the code, so portability shouldn't be an
1046 * issue.
1047 */
1048 now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
1049 agesec = now - (uint32_t)s->session->time;
1050 /*
1051 * We calculate the age in seconds but the server may work in ms. Due to
1052 * rounding errors we could overestimate the age by up to 1s. It is
1053 * better to underestimate it. Otherwise, if the RTT is very short, when
1054 * the server calculates the age reported by the client it could be
1055 * bigger than the age calculated on the server - which should never
1056 * happen.
1057 */
1058 if (agesec > 0)
1059 agesec--;
1060
1061 if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) {
1062 /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */
1063 goto dopsksess;
1064 }
1065
1066 /*
1067 * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be
1068 * good enough.
1069 */
1070 agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
1071
1072 if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) {
1073 /*
1074 * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session.
1075 * If so we just ignore it.
1076 */
1077 goto dopsksess;
1078 }
1079
1080 /*
1081 * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed
1082 * to be mod 2^32.
1083 */
1084 agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add;
1085
1086 reshashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdres);
1087 s->ext.tick_identity++;
1088 dores = 1;
1089 }
1090
1091 dopsksess:
1092 if (!dores && s->psksession == NULL)
1093 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1094
1095 if (s->psksession != NULL) {
1096 mdpsk = ssl_md(s->psksession->cipher->algorithm2);
1097 if (mdpsk == NULL) {
1098 /*
1099 * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
1100 * If this happens it's an application bug.
1101 */
1102 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1103 SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
1104 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1105 }
1106
1107 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdpsk != handmd) {
1108 /*
1109 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the PSK
1110 * session. This is an application bug.
1111 */
1112 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1113 SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
1114 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1115 }
1116
1117 pskhashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdpsk);
1118 }
1119
1120 /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */
1121 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
1122 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1123 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1124 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1125 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1126 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1127 }
1128
1129 if (dores) {
1130 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick,
1131 s->session->ext.ticklen)
1132 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems)) {
1133 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1134 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1135 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1136 }
1137 }
1138
1139 if (s->psksession != NULL) {
1140 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->psksession_id,
1141 s->psksession_id_len)
1142 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)) {
1143 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1144 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1145 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1146 }
1147 s->ext.tick_identity++;
1148 }
1149
1150 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1151 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &binderoffset)
1152 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1153 || (dores
1154 && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, reshashsize, &resbinder))
1155 || (s->psksession != NULL
1156 && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, pskhashsize, &pskbinder))
1157 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1158 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1159 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &msglen)
1160 /*
1161 * We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can
1162 * calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders
1163 */
1164 || !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt)) {
1165 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1166 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1167 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1168 }
1169
1170 msgstart = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - msglen;
1171
1172 if (dores
1173 && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdres, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
1174 resbinder, s->session, 1, 0) != 1) {
1175 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1176 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1177 }
1178
1179 if (s->psksession != NULL
1180 && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdpsk, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
1181 pskbinder, s->psksession, 1, 1) != 1) {
1182 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1183 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1184 }
1185
1186 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1187#else
1188 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1189#endif
1190}
1191
1192EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1193 unsigned int context,
1194 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1195{
1196#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1197 if (!s->pha_enabled)
1198 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1199
1200 /* construct extension - 0 length, no contents */
1201 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth)
1202 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1203 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1204 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1205 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH,
1206 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1207 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1208 }
1209
1210 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
1211
1212 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1213#else
1214 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1215#endif
1216}
1217
1218
1219/*
1220 * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
1221 */
1222int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1223 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1224{
1225 size_t expected_len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len
1226 + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
1227 size_t ilen;
1228 const unsigned char *data;
1229
1230 /* Check for logic errors */
1231 if (!ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
1232 || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0)
1233 || !ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
1234 || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0)) {
1235 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1236 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1237 return 0;
1238 }
1239
1240 /* Parse the length byte */
1241 if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &ilen)) {
1242 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1243 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
1244 return 0;
1245 }
1246
1247 /* Consistency check */
1248 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ilen) {
1249 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1250 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
1251 return 0;
1252 }
1253
1254 /* Check that the extension matches */
1255 if (ilen != expected_len) {
1256 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1257 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1258 return 0;
1259 }
1260
1261 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1262 || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1263 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) != 0) {
1264 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1265 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1266 return 0;
1267 }
1268
1269 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)
1270 || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
1271 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) != 0) {
1272 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1273 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1274 return 0;
1275 }
1276 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1277
1278 return 1;
1279}
1280
1281/* Parse the server's max fragment len extension packet */
1282int tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1283 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1284{
1285 unsigned int value;
1286
1287 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) {
1288 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
1289 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1290 return 0;
1291 }
1292
1293 /* |value| should contains a valid max-fragment-length code. */
1294 if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) {
1295 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1296 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
1297 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
1298 return 0;
1299 }
1300
1301 /* Must be the same value as client-configured one who was sent to server */
1302 /*-
1303 * RFC 6066: if a client receives a maximum fragment length negotiation
1304 * response that differs from the length it requested, ...
1305 * It must abort with SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER alert
1306 */
1307 if (value != s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) {
1308 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1309 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
1310 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
1311 return 0;
1312 }
1313
1314 /*
1315 * Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation succeeded.
1316 * The negotiated Maximum Fragment Length is binding now.
1317 */
1318 s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value;
1319
1320 return 1;
1321}
1322
1323int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1324 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1325{
1326 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) {
1327 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1328 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1329 return 0;
1330 }
1331
1332 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1333 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1334 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1335 return 0;
1336 }
1337
1338 if (!s->hit) {
1339 if (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) {
1340 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1341 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1342 return 0;
1343 }
1344 s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname);
1345 if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) {
1346 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1347 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1348 return 0;
1349 }
1350 }
1351
1352 return 1;
1353}
1354
1355#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1356int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1357 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1358{
1359 size_t ecpointformats_len;
1360 PACKET ecptformatlist;
1361
1362 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ecptformatlist)) {
1363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS,
1364 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1365 return 0;
1366 }
1367 if (!s->hit) {
1368 ecpointformats_len = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist);
1369 if (ecpointformats_len == 0) {
1370 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1371 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1372 return 0;
1373 }
1374
1375 s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0;
1376 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats);
1377 s->ext.peer_ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len);
1378 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL) {
1379 s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0;
1380 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1381 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1382 return 0;
1383 }
1384
1385 s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len;
1386
1387 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist,
1388 s->ext.peer_ecpointformats,
1389 ecpointformats_len)) {
1390 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1391 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1392 return 0;
1393 }
1394 }
1395
1396 return 1;
1397}
1398#endif
1399
1400int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1401 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1402{
1403 if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb != NULL &&
1404 !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
1405 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1406 s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
1407 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1408 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1409 return 0;
1410 }
1411
1412 if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1413 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION,
1414 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1415 return 0;
1416 }
1417 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1418 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1419 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1420 return 0;
1421 }
1422
1423 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1424
1425 return 1;
1426}
1427
1428#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1429int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1430 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1431{
1432 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
1433 /* We ignore this if the server sends a CertificateRequest */
1434 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */
1435 return 1;
1436 }
1437
1438 /*
1439 * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status
1440 * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty.
1441 */
1442 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1443 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION,
1444 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1445 return 0;
1446 }
1447 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1448 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1449 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1450 return 0;
1451 }
1452
1453 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1454 /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in
1455 * the chain. We ignore any other responses.
1456 */
1457 if (chainidx != 0)
1458 return 1;
1459
1460 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1461 return tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt);
1462 }
1463
1464 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1465 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
1466
1467 return 1;
1468}
1469#endif
1470
1471
1472#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1473int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1474 size_t chainidx)
1475{
1476 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
1477 /* We ignore this if the server sends it in a CertificateRequest */
1478 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */
1479 return 1;
1480 }
1481
1482 /*
1483 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
1484 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
1485 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
1486 */
1487 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1488 size_t size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1489
1490 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
1491 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts);
1492 s->ext.scts = NULL;
1493
1494 s->ext.scts_len = (uint16_t)size;
1495 if (size > 0) {
1496 s->ext.scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
1497 if (s->ext.scts == NULL) {
1498 s->ext.scts_len = 0;
1499 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT,
1500 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1501 return 0;
1502 }
1503 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.scts, size)) {
1504 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT,
1505 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1506 return 0;
1507 }
1508 }
1509 } else {
1510 ENDPOINT role = (context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0
1511 ? ENDPOINT_CLIENT : ENDPOINT_BOTH;
1512
1513 /*
1514 * If we didn't ask for it then there must be a custom extension,
1515 * otherwise this is unsolicited.
1516 */
1517 if (custom_ext_find(&s->cert->custext, role,
1518 TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
1519 NULL) == NULL) {
1520 SSLfatal(s, TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT,
1521 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1522 return 0;
1523 }
1524
1525 if (!custom_ext_parse(s, context,
1526 TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
1527 PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1528 x, chainidx)) {
1529 /* SSLfatal already called */
1530 return 0;
1531 }
1532 }
1533
1534 return 1;
1535}
1536#endif
1537
1538
1539#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1540/*
1541 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1542 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
1543 * fill the length of the block. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1544 */
1545static int ssl_next_proto_validate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1546{
1547 PACKET tmp_protocol;
1548
1549 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1550 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
1551 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0) {
1552 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_NEXT_PROTO_VALIDATE,
1553 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1554 return 0;
1555 }
1556 }
1557
1558 return 1;
1559}
1560
1561int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1562 size_t chainidx)
1563{
1564 unsigned char *selected;
1565 unsigned char selected_len;
1566 PACKET tmppkt;
1567
1568 /* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */
1569 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
1570 return 1;
1571
1572 /* We must have requested it. */
1573 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL) {
1574 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
1575 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1576 return 0;
1577 }
1578
1579 /* The data must be valid */
1580 tmppkt = *pkt;
1581 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(s, &tmppkt)) {
1582 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1583 return 0;
1584 }
1585 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1586 PACKET_data(pkt),
1587 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1588 s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) !=
1589 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1590 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
1591 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1592 return 0;
1593 }
1594
1595 /*
1596 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
1597 * a single Serverhello
1598 */
1599 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn);
1600 s->ext.npn = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1601 if (s->ext.npn == NULL) {
1602 s->ext.npn_len = 0;
1603 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
1604 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1605 return 0;
1606 }
1607
1608 memcpy(s->ext.npn, selected, selected_len);
1609 s->ext.npn_len = selected_len;
1610 s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
1611
1612 return 1;
1613}
1614#endif
1615
1616int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1617 size_t chainidx)
1618{
1619 size_t len;
1620
1621 /* We must have requested it. */
1622 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
1623 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1624 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1625 return 0;
1626 }
1627 /*-
1628 * The extension data consists of:
1629 * uint16 list_length
1630 * uint8 proto_length;
1631 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
1632 */
1633 if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(pkt, &len)
1634 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &len)
1635 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len) {
1636 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1637 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1638 return 0;
1639 }
1640 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1641 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
1642 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1643 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1644 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1645 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1646 return 0;
1647 }
1648 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
1649 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1650 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1651 return 0;
1652 }
1653 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
1654
1655 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
1656 || s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len != len
1657 || memcmp(s->session->ext.alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)
1658 != 0) {
1659 /* ALPN not consistent with the old session so cannot use early_data */
1660 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
1661 }
1662 if (!s->hit) {
1663 /*
1664 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have been
1665 * initialised to NULL. We should update it with the selected ALPN.
1666 */
1667 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
1668 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1669 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1670 return 0;
1671 }
1672 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
1673 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
1674 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
1675 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0;
1676 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1677 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1678 return 0;
1679 }
1680 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1681 }
1682
1683 return 1;
1684}
1685
1686#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1687int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1688 size_t chainidx)
1689{
1690 unsigned int id, ct, mki;
1691 int i;
1692 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt;
1693 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1694
1695 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || ct != 2
1696 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id)
1697 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki)
1698 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1699 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1700 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
1701 return 0;
1702 }
1703
1704 if (mki != 0) {
1705 /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
1706 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1707 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
1708 return 0;
1709 }
1710
1711 /* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */
1712 clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1713 if (clnt == NULL) {
1714 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1715 SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES);
1716 return 0;
1717 }
1718
1719 /*
1720 * Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and
1721 * presumably offered)
1722 */
1723 for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); i++) {
1724 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1725
1726 if (prof->id == id) {
1727 s->srtp_profile = prof;
1728 return 1;
1729 }
1730 }
1731
1732 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1733 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
1734 return 0;
1735}
1736#endif
1737
1738int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1739 size_t chainidx)
1740{
1741 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
1742 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1743 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
1744 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
1745 s->ext.use_etm = 1;
1746
1747 return 1;
1748}
1749
1750int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1751 size_t chainidx)
1752{
1753 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
1754 if (!s->hit)
1755 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
1756
1757 return 1;
1758}
1759
1760int tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1761 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1762{
1763 unsigned int version;
1764
1765 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)
1766 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1767 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1768 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1769 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1770 return 0;
1771 }
1772
1773 /*
1774 * The only protocol version we support which is valid in this extension in
1775 * a ServerHello is TLSv1.3 therefore we shouldn't be getting anything else.
1776 */
1777 if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1778 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1779 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1780 SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
1781 return 0;
1782 }
1783
1784 /* We ignore this extension for HRRs except to sanity check it */
1785 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST)
1786 return 1;
1787
1788 /* We just set it here. We validate it in ssl_choose_client_version */
1789 s->version = version;
1790
1791 return 1;
1792}
1793
1794int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1795 size_t chainidx)
1796{
1797#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1798 unsigned int group_id;
1799 PACKET encoded_pt;
1800 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
1801
1802 /* Sanity check */
1803 if (ckey == NULL || s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
1804 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1805 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1806 return 0;
1807 }
1808
1809 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &group_id)) {
1810 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1811 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1812 return 0;
1813 }
1814
1815 if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) {
1816 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
1817 size_t i, num_groups;
1818
1819 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1820 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1821 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1822 return 0;
1823 }
1824
1825 /*
1826 * It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we
1827 * already sent in the first ClientHello
1828 */
1829 if (group_id == s->s3->group_id) {
1830 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1831 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1832 return 0;
1833 }
1834
1835 /* Validate the selected group is one we support */
1836 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
1837 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
1838 if (group_id == pgroups[i])
1839 break;
1840 }
1841 if (i >= num_groups
1842 || !tls_curve_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1843 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1844 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1845 return 0;
1846 }
1847
1848 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
1849 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
1850 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
1851 return 1;
1852 }
1853
1854 if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
1855 /*
1856 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
1857 * key_share!
1858 */
1859 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1860 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1861 return 0;
1862 }
1863
1864 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &encoded_pt)
1865 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
1866 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1867 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1868 return 0;
1869 }
1870
1871 skey = EVP_PKEY_new();
1872 if (skey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(skey, ckey) <= 0) {
1873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1874 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1875 return 0;
1876 }
1877 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1878 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
1879 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1880 SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1881 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1882 return 0;
1883 }
1884
1885 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
1886 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1887 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1888 return 0;
1889 }
1890 s->s3->peer_tmp = skey;
1891#endif
1892
1893 return 1;
1894}
1895
1896int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1897 size_t chainidx)
1898{
1899 PACKET cookie;
1900
1901 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)
1902 || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie, &s->ext.tls13_cookie,
1903 &s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)) {
1904 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_COOKIE,
1905 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1906 return 0;
1907 }
1908
1909 return 1;
1910}
1911
1912int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1913 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1914{
1915 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
1916 unsigned long max_early_data;
1917
1918 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data)
1919 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1920 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1921 SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA);
1922 return 0;
1923 }
1924
1925 s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data;
1926
1927 return 1;
1928 }
1929
1930 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1931 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1932 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1933 return 0;
1934 }
1935
1936 if (!s->ext.early_data_ok
1937 || !s->hit) {
1938 /*
1939 * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume
1940 * using the first identity, or the SNI/ALPN is not consistent so the
1941 * server should not be accepting it.
1942 */
1943 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1944 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1945 return 0;
1946 }
1947
1948 s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
1949
1950 return 1;
1951}
1952
1953int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1954 size_t chainidx)
1955{
1956#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1957 unsigned int identity;
1958
1959 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &identity) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1960 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
1961 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1962 return 0;
1963 }
1964
1965 if (identity >= (unsigned int)s->ext.tick_identity) {
1966 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
1967 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY);
1968 return 0;
1969 }
1970
1971 /*
1972 * Session resumption tickets are always sent before PSK tickets. If the
1973 * ticket index is 0 then it must be for a session resumption ticket if we
1974 * sent two tickets, or if we didn't send a PSK ticket.
1975 */
1976 if (identity == 0 && (s->psksession == NULL || s->ext.tick_identity == 2)) {
1977 s->hit = 1;
1978 SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
1979 s->psksession = NULL;
1980 return 1;
1981 }
1982
1983 if (s->psksession == NULL) {
1984 /* Should never happen */
1985 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
1986 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1987 return 0;
1988 }
1989
1990 /*
1991 * If we used the external PSK for sending early_data then s->early_secret
1992 * is already set up, so don't overwrite it. Otherwise we copy the
1993 * early_secret across that we generated earlier.
1994 */
1995 if ((s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
1996 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
1997 || s->session->ext.max_early_data > 0
1998 || s->psksession->ext.max_early_data == 0)
1999 memcpy(s->early_secret, s->psksession->early_secret, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
2000
2001 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2002 s->session = s->psksession;
2003 s->psksession = NULL;
2004 s->hit = 1;
2005 /* Early data is only allowed if we used the first ticket */
2006 if (identity != 0)
2007 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2008#endif
2009
2010 return 1;
2011}
注意: 瀏覽 TracBrowser 來幫助您使用儲存庫瀏覽器

© 2024 Oracle Support Privacy / Do Not Sell My Info Terms of Use Trademark Policy Automated Access Etiquette