/* * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #if defined(__TANDEM) && defined(_SPT_MODEL_) # include # include /* timeval */ #endif #include #include "e_os.h" #include #include #include "internal/refcount.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "ssl_local.h" #include "statem/statem_local.h" static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s); static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s); static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck); DEFINE_STACK_OF(SSL_SESSION) __owur static int sess_timedout(time_t t, SSL_SESSION *ss) { /* if timeout overflowed, it can never timeout! */ if (ss->timeout_ovf) return 0; return t > ss->calc_timeout; } /* * Returns -1/0/+1 as other XXXcmp-type functions * Takes overflow of calculated timeout into consideration */ __owur static int timeoutcmp(SSL_SESSION *a, SSL_SESSION *b) { /* if only one overflowed, then it is greater */ if (a->timeout_ovf && !b->timeout_ovf) return 1; if (!a->timeout_ovf && b->timeout_ovf) return -1; /* No overflow, or both overflowed, so straight compare is safe */ if (a->calc_timeout < b->calc_timeout) return -1; if (a->calc_timeout > b->calc_timeout) return 1; return 0; } /* * Calculates effective timeout, saving overflow state * Locking must be done by the caller of this function */ void ssl_session_calculate_timeout(SSL_SESSION *ss) { /* Force positive timeout */ if (ss->timeout < 0) ss->timeout = 0; ss->calc_timeout = ss->time + ss->timeout; /* * |timeout| is always zero or positive, so the check for * overflow only needs to consider if |time| is positive */ ss->timeout_ovf = ss->time > 0 && ss->calc_timeout < ss->time; /* * N.B. Realistic overflow can only occur in our lifetimes on a * 32-bit machine in January 2038. * However, There are no controls to limit the |timeout| * value, except to keep it positive. */ } /* * SSL_get_session() and SSL_get1_session() are problematic in TLS1.3 because, * unlike in earlier protocol versions, the session ticket may not have been * sent yet even though a handshake has finished. The session ticket data could * come in sometime later...or even change if multiple session ticket messages * are sent from the server. The preferred way for applications to obtain * a resumable session is to use SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(). */ SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl) /* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */ { return ssl->session; } SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl) /* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */ { SSL_SESSION *sess; /* * Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that * somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's non-null * and when we up the reference count. */ if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(ssl->lock)) return NULL; sess = ssl->session; if (sess) SSL_SESSION_up_ref(sess); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ssl->lock); return sess; } int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg) { return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg); } void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx) { return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx); } SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void) { SSL_SESSION *ss; if (!OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS, NULL)) return NULL; ss = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ss)); if (ss == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */ ss->references = 1; ss->timeout = 60 * 5 + 4; /* 5 minute timeout by default */ ss->time = time(NULL); ssl_session_calculate_timeout(ss); ss->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (ss->lock == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(ss); return NULL; } if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data)) { CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(ss->lock); OPENSSL_free(ss); return NULL; } return ss; } SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src) { return ssl_session_dup(src, 1); } /* * Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If * ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is. */ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) { SSL_SESSION *dest; dest = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*dest)); if (dest == NULL) { goto err; } memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(*dest)); /* * Set the various pointers to NULL so that we can call SSL_SESSION_free in * the case of an error whilst halfway through constructing dest */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK dest->psk_identity_hint = NULL; dest->psk_identity = NULL; #endif dest->ext.hostname = NULL; dest->ext.tick = NULL; dest->ext.alpn_selected = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP dest->srp_username = NULL; #endif dest->peer_chain = NULL; dest->peer = NULL; dest->ticket_appdata = NULL; memset(&dest->ex_data, 0, sizeof(dest->ex_data)); /* We deliberately don't copy the prev and next pointers */ dest->prev = NULL; dest->next = NULL; dest->references = 1; dest->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (dest->lock == NULL) goto err; if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, dest, &dest->ex_data)) goto err; if (src->peer != NULL) { if (!X509_up_ref(src->peer)) goto err; dest->peer = src->peer; } if (src->peer_chain != NULL) { dest->peer_chain = X509_chain_up_ref(src->peer_chain); if (dest->peer_chain == NULL) goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (src->psk_identity_hint) { dest->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(src->psk_identity_hint); if (dest->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { goto err; } } if (src->psk_identity) { dest->psk_identity = OPENSSL_strdup(src->psk_identity); if (dest->psk_identity == NULL) { goto err; } } #endif if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, &dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data)) { goto err; } if (src->ext.hostname) { dest->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(src->ext.hostname); if (dest->ext.hostname == NULL) { goto err; } } if (ticket != 0 && src->ext.tick != NULL) { dest->ext.tick = OPENSSL_memdup(src->ext.tick, src->ext.ticklen); if (dest->ext.tick == NULL) goto err; } else { dest->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = 0; dest->ext.ticklen = 0; } if (src->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) { dest->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(src->ext.alpn_selected, src->ext.alpn_selected_len); if (dest->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (src->srp_username) { dest->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(src->srp_username); if (dest->srp_username == NULL) { goto err; } } #endif if (src->ticket_appdata != NULL) { dest->ticket_appdata = OPENSSL_memdup(src->ticket_appdata, src->ticket_appdata_len); if (dest->ticket_appdata == NULL) goto err; } return dest; err: ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); SSL_SESSION_free(dest); return NULL; } const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len) { if (len) *len = (unsigned int)s->session_id_length; return s->session_id; } const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len) { if (len != NULL) *len = (unsigned int)s->sid_ctx_length; return s->sid_ctx; } unsigned int SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id(const SSL_SESSION *s) { return s->compress_meth; } /* * SSLv3/TLSv1 has 32 bytes (256 bits) of session ID space. As such, filling * the ID with random junk repeatedly until we have no conflict is going to * complete in one iteration pretty much "most" of the time (btw: * understatement). So, if it takes us 10 iterations and we still can't avoid * a conflict - well that's a reasonable point to call it quits. Either the * RAND code is broken or someone is trying to open roughly very close to * 2^256 SSL sessions to our server. How you might store that many sessions * is perhaps a more interesting question ... */ #define MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS 10 static int def_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, unsigned int *id_len) { unsigned int retry = 0; do if (RAND_bytes_ex(ssl->ctx->libctx, id, *id_len, 0) <= 0) return 0; while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) && (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)) ; if (retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS) return 1; /* else - woops a session_id match */ /* * XXX We should also check the external cache -- but the probability of * a collision is negligible, and we could not prevent the concurrent * creation of sessions with identical IDs since we currently don't have * means to atomically check whether a session ID already exists and make * a reservation for it if it does not (this problem applies to the * internal cache as well). */ return 0; } int ssl_generate_session_id(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *ss) { unsigned int tmp; GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id; switch (s->version) { case SSL3_VERSION: case TLS1_VERSION: case TLS1_1_VERSION: case TLS1_2_VERSION: case TLS1_3_VERSION: case DTLS1_BAD_VER: case DTLS1_VERSION: case DTLS1_2_VERSION: ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; break; default: SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION); return 0; } /*- * If RFC5077 ticket, use empty session ID (as server). * Note that: * (a) ssl_get_prev_session() does lookahead into the * ClientHello extensions to find the session ticket. * When ssl_get_prev_session() fails, statem_srvr.c calls * ssl_get_new_session() in tls_process_client_hello(). * At that point, it has not yet parsed the extensions, * however, because of the lookahead, it already knows * whether a ticket is expected or not. * * (b) statem_clnt.c calls ssl_get_new_session() before parsing * ServerHello extensions, and before recording the session * ID received from the server, so this block is a noop. */ if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { ss->session_id_length = 0; return 1; } /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */ if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(s->lock)) return 0; if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(s->session_ctx->lock)) { CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->lock); SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED); return 0; } if (s->generate_session_id) cb = s->generate_session_id; else if (s->session_ctx->generate_session_id) cb = s->session_ctx->generate_session_id; CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->session_ctx->lock); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->lock); /* Choose a session ID */ memset(ss->session_id, 0, ss->session_id_length); tmp = (int)ss->session_id_length; if (!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) { /* The callback failed */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED); return 0; } /* * Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero. nor * set it higher than it was. */ if (tmp == 0 || tmp > ss->session_id_length) { /* The callback set an illegal length */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH); return 0; } ss->session_id_length = tmp; /* Finally, check for a conflict */ if (SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id, (unsigned int)ss->session_id_length)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT); return 0; } return 1; } int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session) { /* This gets used by clients and servers. */ SSL_SESSION *ss = NULL; if ((ss = SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } /* If the context has a default timeout, use it */ if (s->session_ctx->session_timeout == 0) ss->timeout = SSL_get_default_timeout(s); else ss->timeout = s->session_ctx->session_timeout; ssl_session_calculate_timeout(ss); SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); s->session = NULL; if (session) { if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { /* * We generate the session id while constructing the * NewSessionTicket in TLSv1.3. */ ss->session_id_length = 0; } else if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, ss)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ SSL_SESSION_free(ss); return 0; } } else { ss->session_id_length = 0; } if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof(ss->sid_ctx)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); SSL_SESSION_free(ss); return 0; } memcpy(ss->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length); ss->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length; s->session = ss; ss->ssl_version = s->version; ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK; /* If client supports extended master secret set it in session */ if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) ss->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS; return 1; } SSL_SESSION *lookup_sess_in_cache(SSL *s, const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sess_id_len) { SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL; if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP) == 0) { SSL_SESSION data; data.ssl_version = s->version; if (!ossl_assert(sess_id_len <= SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) return NULL; memcpy(data.session_id, sess_id, sess_id_len); data.session_id_length = sess_id_len; if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(s->session_ctx->lock)) return NULL; ret = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->session_ctx->sessions, &data); if (ret != NULL) { /* don't allow other threads to steal it: */ SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ret); } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->session_ctx->lock); if (ret == NULL) ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss); } if (ret == NULL && s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) { int copy = 1; ret = s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s, sess_id, sess_id_len, ©); if (ret != NULL) { ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit); /* * Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us * to do so (note that if the session structures returned by the * callback are shared between threads, it must handle the * reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0], or things won't be * thread-safe). */ if (copy) SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ret); /* * Add the externally cached session to the internal cache as * well if and only if we are supposed to. */ if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) == 0) { /* * Either return value of SSL_CTX_add_session should not * interrupt the session resumption process. The return * value is intentionally ignored. */ (void)SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, ret); } } } return ret; } /*- * ssl_get_prev attempts to find an SSL_SESSION to be used to resume this * connection. It is only called by servers. * * hello: The parsed ClientHello data * * Returns: * -1: fatal error * 0: no session found * 1: a session may have been found. * * Side effects: * - If a session is found then s->session is pointed at it (after freeing an * existing session if need be) and s->verify_result is set from the session. * - Both for new and resumed sessions, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 1 * if the server should issue a new session ticket (to 0 otherwise). */ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) { /* This is used only by servers. */ SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL; int fatal = 0; int try_session_cache = 0; SSL_TICKET_STATUS r; if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { /* * By default we will send a new ticket. This can be overridden in the * ticket processing. */ s->ext.ticket_expected = 1; if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk_kex_modes, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, hello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0) || !tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, hello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) return -1; ret = s->session; } else { /* sets s->ext.ticket_expected */ r = tls_get_ticket_from_client(s, hello, &ret); switch (r) { case SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC: case SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER: fatal = 1; SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; case SSL_TICKET_NONE: case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY: if (hello->session_id_len > 0) { try_session_cache = 1; ret = lookup_sess_in_cache(s, hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len); } break; case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT: case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS: case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW: break; } } if (ret == NULL) goto err; /* Now ret is non-NULL and we own one of its reference counts. */ /* Check TLS version consistency */ if (ret->ssl_version != s->version) goto err; if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length || memcmp(ret->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, ret->sid_ctx_length)) { /* * We have the session requested by the client, but we don't want to * use it in this context. */ goto err; /* treat like cache miss */ } if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0) { /* * We can't be sure if this session is being used out of context, * which is especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER. The application * should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context. For this error * case, we generate an error instead of treating the event like a * cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for applications to * effectively disable the session cache by accident without anyone * noticing). */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED); fatal = 1; goto err; } if (sess_timedout(time(NULL), ret)) { ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_timeout); if (try_session_cache) { /* session was from the cache, so remove it */ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, ret); } goto err; } /* Check extended master secret extension consistency */ if (ret->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) { /* If old session includes extms, but new does not: abort handshake */ if (!(s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS); fatal = 1; goto err; } } else if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) { /* If new session includes extms, but old does not: do not resume */ goto err; } if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { /* We already did this for TLS1.3 */ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); s->session = ret; } ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit); s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result; return 1; err: if (ret != NULL) { SSL_SESSION_free(ret); /* In TLSv1.3 s->session was already set to ret, so we NULL it out */ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) s->session = NULL; if (!try_session_cache) { /* * The session was from a ticket, so we should issue a ticket for * the new session */ s->ext.ticket_expected = 1; } } if (fatal) return -1; return 0; } int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c) { int ret = 0; SSL_SESSION *s; /* * add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache even though * it has two ways of access: each session is in a doubly linked list and * an lhash */ SSL_SESSION_up_ref(c); /* * if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later */ if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock)) { SSL_SESSION_free(c); return 0; } s = lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, c); /* * s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID. In this * case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify * ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble. */ if (s != NULL && s != c) { /* We *are* in trouble ... */ SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s); SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* * ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache (we cannot * handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical session ID in the * same cache, which could happen e.g. when two threads concurrently * obtain the same session from an external cache) */ s = NULL; } else if (s == NULL && lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c) == NULL) { /* s == NULL can also mean OOM error in lh_SSL_SESSION_insert ... */ /* * ... so take back the extra reference and also don't add * the session to the SSL_SESSION_list at this time */ s = c; } /* Adjust last used time, and add back into the cache at the appropriate spot */ if (ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_UPDATE_TIME) { c->time = time(NULL); ssl_session_calculate_timeout(c); } SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx, c); if (s != NULL) { /* * existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference * count because it already takes into account the cache */ SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */ ret = 0; } else { /* * new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large */ ret = 1; if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) { while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) > SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) { if (!remove_session_lock(ctx, ctx->session_cache_tail, 0)) break; else ssl_tsan_counter(ctx, &ctx->stats.sess_cache_full); } } } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock); return ret; } int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c) { return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1); } static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck) { SSL_SESSION *r; int ret = 0; if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0)) { if (lck) { if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock)) return 0; } if ((r = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c)) != NULL) { ret = 1; r = lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions, r); SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, r); } c->not_resumable = 1; if (lck) CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock); if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx, c); if (ret) SSL_SESSION_free(r); } return ret; } void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss) { int i; if (ss == NULL) return; CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&ss->references, &i, ss->lock); REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_SESSION", ss); if (i > 0) return; REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data); OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->master_key, sizeof(ss->master_key)); OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->session_id, sizeof(ss->session_id)); X509_free(ss->peer); sk_X509_pop_free(ss->peer_chain, X509_free); OPENSSL_free(ss->ext.hostname); OPENSSL_free(ss->ext.tick); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity_hint); OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP OPENSSL_free(ss->srp_username); #endif OPENSSL_free(ss->ext.alpn_selected); OPENSSL_free(ss->ticket_appdata); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(ss->lock); OPENSSL_clear_free(ss, sizeof(*ss)); } int SSL_SESSION_up_ref(SSL_SESSION *ss) { int i; if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&ss->references, &i, ss->lock) <= 0) return 0; REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_SESSION", ss); REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0); } int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session) { ssl_clear_bad_session(s); if (s->ctx->method != s->method) { if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s, s->ctx->method)) return 0; } if (session != NULL) { SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session); s->verify_result = session->verify_result; } SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); s->session = session; return 1; } int SSL_SESSION_set1_id(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid, unsigned int sid_len) { if (sid_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); return 0; } s->session_id_length = sid_len; if (sid != s->session_id) memcpy(s->session_id, sid, sid_len); return 1; } long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t) { time_t new_timeout = (time_t)t; if (s == NULL || t < 0) return 0; if (s->owner != NULL) { if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(s->owner->lock)) return 0; s->timeout = new_timeout; ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s); SSL_SESSION_list_add(s->owner, s); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->owner->lock); } else { s->timeout = new_timeout; ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s); } return 1; } long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s) { if (s == NULL) return 0; return (long)s->timeout; } long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s) { if (s == NULL) return 0; return (long)s->time; } long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t) { time_t new_time = (time_t)t; if (s == NULL) return 0; if (s->owner != NULL) { if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(s->owner->lock)) return 0; s->time = new_time; ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s); SSL_SESSION_list_add(s->owner, s); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->owner->lock); } else { s->time = new_time; ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s); } return t; } int SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version(const SSL_SESSION *s) { return s->ssl_version; } int SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(SSL_SESSION *s, int version) { s->ssl_version = version; return 1; } const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(const SSL_SESSION *s) { return s->cipher; } int SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(SSL_SESSION *s, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) { s->cipher = cipher; return 1; } const char *SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname(const SSL_SESSION *s) { return s->ext.hostname; } int SSL_SESSION_set1_hostname(SSL_SESSION *s, const char *hostname) { OPENSSL_free(s->ext.hostname); if (hostname == NULL) { s->ext.hostname = NULL; return 1; } s->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(hostname); return s->ext.hostname != NULL; } int SSL_SESSION_has_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *s) { return (s->ext.ticklen > 0) ? 1 : 0; } unsigned long SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint(const SSL_SESSION *s) { return s->ext.tick_lifetime_hint; } void SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char **tick, size_t *len) { *len = s->ext.ticklen; if (tick != NULL) *tick = s->ext.tick; } uint32_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_early_data(const SSL_SESSION *s) { return s->ext.max_early_data; } int SSL_SESSION_set_max_early_data(SSL_SESSION *s, uint32_t max_early_data) { s->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data; return 1; } void SSL_SESSION_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char **alpn, size_t *len) { *alpn = s->ext.alpn_selected; *len = s->ext.alpn_selected_len; } int SSL_SESSION_set1_alpn_selected(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *alpn, size_t len) { OPENSSL_free(s->ext.alpn_selected); if (alpn == NULL || len == 0) { s->ext.alpn_selected = NULL; s->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0; return 1; } s->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(alpn, len); if (s->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { s->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0; return 0; } s->ext.alpn_selected_len = len; return 1; } X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s) { return s->peer; } int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len) { if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); return 0; } s->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; if (sid_ctx != s->sid_ctx) memcpy(s->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); return 1; } int SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(const SSL_SESSION *s) { /* * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared "ticket" without a * session ID. */ return !s->not_resumable && (s->session_id_length > 0 || s->ext.ticklen > 0); } long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t) { long l; if (s == NULL) return 0; l = s->session_timeout; s->session_timeout = t; return l; } long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *s) { if (s == NULL) return 0; return s->session_timeout; } int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_secret_cb_fn tls_session_secret_cb, void *arg) { if (s == NULL) return 0; s->ext.session_secret_cb = tls_session_secret_cb; s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg = arg; return 1; } int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn cb, void *arg) { if (s == NULL) return 0; s->ext.session_ticket_cb = cb; s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg = arg; return 1; } int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(SSL *s, void *ext_data, int ext_len) { if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) { OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket); s->ext.session_ticket = NULL; s->ext.session_ticket = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT) + ext_len); if (s->ext.session_ticket == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (ext_data != NULL) { s->ext.session_ticket->length = ext_len; s->ext.session_ticket->data = s->ext.session_ticket + 1; memcpy(s->ext.session_ticket->data, ext_data, ext_len); } else { s->ext.session_ticket->length = 0; s->ext.session_ticket->data = NULL; } return 1; } return 0; } void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t) { STACK_OF(SSL_SESSION) *sk; SSL_SESSION *current; unsigned long i; if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(s->lock)) return; sk = sk_SSL_SESSION_new_null(); i = lh_SSL_SESSION_get_down_load(s->sessions); lh_SSL_SESSION_set_down_load(s->sessions, 0); /* * Iterate over the list from the back (oldest), and stop * when a session can no longer be removed. * Add the session to a temporary list to be freed outside * the SSL_CTX lock. * But still do the remove_session_cb() within the lock. */ while (s->session_cache_tail != NULL) { current = s->session_cache_tail; if (t == 0 || sess_timedout((time_t)t, current)) { lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(s->sessions, current); SSL_SESSION_list_remove(s, current); current->not_resumable = 1; if (s->remove_session_cb != NULL) s->remove_session_cb(s, current); /* * Throw the session on a stack, it's entirely plausible * that while freeing outside the critical section, the * session could be re-added, so avoid using the next/prev * pointers. If the stack failed to create, or the session * couldn't be put on the stack, just free it here */ if (sk == NULL || !sk_SSL_SESSION_push(sk, current)) SSL_SESSION_free(current); } else { break; } } lh_SSL_SESSION_set_down_load(s->sessions, i); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->lock); sk_SSL_SESSION_pop_free(sk, SSL_SESSION_free); } int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s) { if ((s->session != NULL) && !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) && !(SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))) { SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); return 1; } else return 0; } /* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */ static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s) { if ((s->next == NULL) || (s->prev == NULL)) return; if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail)) { /* last element in list */ if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) { /* only one element in list */ ctx->session_cache_head = NULL; ctx->session_cache_tail = NULL; } else { ctx->session_cache_tail = s->prev; s->prev->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail); } } else { if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) { /* first element in list */ ctx->session_cache_head = s->next; s->next->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); } else { /* middle of list */ s->next->prev = s->prev; s->prev->next = s->next; } } s->prev = s->next = NULL; s->owner = NULL; } static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s) { SSL_SESSION *next; if ((s->next != NULL) && (s->prev != NULL)) SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s); if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL) { ctx->session_cache_head = s; ctx->session_cache_tail = s; s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); s->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail); } else { if (timeoutcmp(s, ctx->session_cache_head) >= 0) { /* * if we timeout after (or the same time as) the first * session, put us first - usual case */ s->next = ctx->session_cache_head; s->next->prev = s; s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); ctx->session_cache_head = s; } else if (timeoutcmp(s, ctx->session_cache_tail) < 0) { /* if we timeout before the last session, put us last */ s->prev = ctx->session_cache_tail; s->prev->next = s; s->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail); ctx->session_cache_tail = s; } else { /* * we timeout somewhere in-between - if there is only * one session in the cache it will be caught above */ next = ctx->session_cache_head->next; while (next != (SSL_SESSION*)&(ctx->session_cache_tail)) { if (timeoutcmp(s, next) >= 0) { s->next = next; s->prev = next->prev; next->prev->next = s; next->prev = s; break; } next = next->next; } } } s->owner = ctx; } void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)) { ctx->new_session_cb = cb; } int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess) { return ctx->new_session_cb; } void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb) (SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess)) { ctx->remove_session_cb = cb; } void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess) { return ctx->remove_session_cb; } void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *(*cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, const unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy)) { ctx->get_session_cb = cb; } SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy) { return ctx->get_session_cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)) { ctx->info_callback = cb; } void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) { return ctx->info_callback; } void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey)) { ctx->client_cert_cb = cb; } int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey) { return ctx->client_cert_cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len)) { ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len)) { ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb = cb; } int SSL_SESSION_set1_ticket_appdata(SSL_SESSION *ss, const void *data, size_t len) { OPENSSL_free(ss->ticket_appdata); ss->ticket_appdata_len = 0; if (data == NULL || len == 0) { ss->ticket_appdata = NULL; return 1; } ss->ticket_appdata = OPENSSL_memdup(data, len); if (ss->ticket_appdata != NULL) { ss->ticket_appdata_len = len; return 1; } return 0; } int SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket_appdata(SSL_SESSION *ss, void **data, size_t *len) { *data = ss->ticket_appdata; *len = ss->ticket_appdata_len; return 1; } void SSL_CTX_set_stateless_cookie_generate_cb( SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, size_t *cookie_len)) { ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_stateless_cookie_verify_cb( SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *cookie, size_t cookie_len)) { ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb = cb; } IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION, PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)