1 | /*
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2 | * Copyright 2006-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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3 | *
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4 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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8 | */
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9 |
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10 | /*
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11 | * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
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12 | * internal use.
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13 | */
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14 | #include "internal/deprecated.h"
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15 |
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16 | #include "internal/constant_time.h"
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17 |
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18 | #include <stdio.h>
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19 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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20 | #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
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21 | #include <openssl/x509.h>
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22 | #include <openssl/rsa.h>
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23 | #include <openssl/bn.h>
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24 | #include <openssl/evp.h>
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25 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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26 | #include <openssl/cms.h>
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27 | #include "crypto/evp.h"
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28 | #include "crypto/rsa.h"
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29 | #include "rsa_local.h"
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30 |
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31 | /* RSA pkey context structure */
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32 |
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33 | typedef struct {
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34 | /* Key gen parameters */
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35 | int nbits;
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36 | BIGNUM *pub_exp;
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37 | int primes;
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38 | /* Keygen callback info */
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39 | int gentmp[2];
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40 | /* RSA padding mode */
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41 | int pad_mode;
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42 | /* message digest */
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43 | const EVP_MD *md;
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44 | /* message digest for MGF1 */
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45 | const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
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46 | /* PSS salt length */
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47 | int saltlen;
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48 | /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */
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49 | int min_saltlen;
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50 | /* Temp buffer */
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51 | unsigned char *tbuf;
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52 | /* OAEP label */
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53 | unsigned char *oaep_label;
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54 | size_t oaep_labellen;
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55 | } RSA_PKEY_CTX;
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56 |
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57 | /* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
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58 | #define rsa_pss_restricted(rctx) (rctx->min_saltlen != -1)
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59 |
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60 | static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
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61 | {
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62 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*rctx));
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63 |
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64 | if (rctx == NULL)
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65 | return 0;
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66 | rctx->nbits = 2048;
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67 | rctx->primes = RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM;
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68 | if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
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69 | rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
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70 | else
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71 | rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
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72 | /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
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73 | rctx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
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74 | rctx->min_saltlen = -1;
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75 | ctx->data = rctx;
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76 | ctx->keygen_info = rctx->gentmp;
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77 | ctx->keygen_info_count = 2;
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78 |
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79 | return 1;
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80 | }
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81 |
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82 | static int pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, const EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
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83 | {
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84 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx;
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85 |
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86 | if (!pkey_rsa_init(dst))
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87 | return 0;
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88 | sctx = src->data;
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89 | dctx = dst->data;
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90 | dctx->nbits = sctx->nbits;
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91 | if (sctx->pub_exp) {
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92 | dctx->pub_exp = BN_dup(sctx->pub_exp);
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93 | if (!dctx->pub_exp)
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94 | return 0;
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95 | }
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96 | dctx->pad_mode = sctx->pad_mode;
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97 | dctx->md = sctx->md;
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98 | dctx->mgf1md = sctx->mgf1md;
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99 | dctx->saltlen = sctx->saltlen;
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100 | if (sctx->oaep_label) {
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101 | OPENSSL_free(dctx->oaep_label);
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102 | dctx->oaep_label = OPENSSL_memdup(sctx->oaep_label, sctx->oaep_labellen);
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103 | if (!dctx->oaep_label)
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104 | return 0;
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105 | dctx->oaep_labellen = sctx->oaep_labellen;
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106 | }
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107 | return 1;
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108 | }
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109 |
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110 | static int setup_tbuf(RSA_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pk)
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111 | {
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112 | if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
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113 | return 1;
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114 | if ((ctx->tbuf =
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115 | OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pk->pkey)))) == NULL) {
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116 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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117 | return 0;
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118 | }
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119 | return 1;
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120 | }
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121 |
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122 | static void pkey_rsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
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123 | {
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124 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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125 | if (rctx) {
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126 | BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
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127 | OPENSSL_free(rctx->tbuf);
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128 | OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
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129 | OPENSSL_free(rctx);
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130 | }
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131 | }
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132 |
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133 | static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
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134 | size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
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135 | size_t tbslen)
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136 | {
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137 | int ret;
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138 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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139 | /*
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140 | * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
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141 | * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
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142 | * be reflected back in the "original" key.
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143 | */
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144 | RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
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145 |
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146 | if (rctx->md) {
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147 | if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md)) {
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148 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
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149 | return -1;
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150 | }
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151 |
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152 | if (EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md) == NID_mdc2) {
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153 | unsigned int sltmp;
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154 | if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
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155 | return -1;
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156 | ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
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157 |
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158 | if (ret <= 0)
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159 | return ret;
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160 | ret = sltmp;
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161 | } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
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162 | if ((size_t)RSA_size(rsa) < tbslen + 1) {
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163 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
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164 | return -1;
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165 | }
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166 | if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) {
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167 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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168 | return -1;
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169 | }
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170 | memcpy(rctx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
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171 | rctx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md));
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172 | ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, rctx->tbuf,
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173 | sig, rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
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174 | } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
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175 | unsigned int sltmp;
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176 | ret = RSA_sign(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md),
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177 | tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
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178 | if (ret <= 0)
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179 | return ret;
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180 | ret = sltmp;
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181 | } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
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182 | if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
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183 | return -1;
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184 | if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa,
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185 | rctx->tbuf, tbs,
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186 | rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
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187 | rctx->saltlen))
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188 | return -1;
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189 | ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(rsa), rctx->tbuf,
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190 | sig, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
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191 | } else {
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192 | return -1;
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193 | }
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194 | } else {
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195 | ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
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196 | }
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197 | if (ret < 0)
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198 | return ret;
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199 | *siglen = ret;
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200 | return 1;
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201 | }
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202 |
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203 | static int pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
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204 | unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen,
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205 | const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen)
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206 | {
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207 | int ret;
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208 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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209 | /*
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210 | * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
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211 | * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
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212 | * be reflected back in the "original" key.
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213 | */
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214 | RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
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215 |
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216 | if (rctx->md) {
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217 | if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
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218 | if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
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219 | return -1;
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220 | ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf, rsa,
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221 | RSA_X931_PADDING);
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222 | if (ret < 1)
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223 | return 0;
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224 | ret--;
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225 | if (rctx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md))) {
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226 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
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227 | return 0;
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228 | }
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229 | if (ret != EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md)) {
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230 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
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231 | return 0;
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232 | }
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233 | if (rout)
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234 | memcpy(rout, rctx->tbuf, ret);
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235 | } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
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236 | size_t sltmp;
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237 | ret = ossl_rsa_verify(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md),
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238 | NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
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239 | sig, siglen, rsa);
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240 | if (ret <= 0)
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241 | return 0;
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242 | ret = sltmp;
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243 | } else {
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244 | return -1;
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245 | }
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246 | } else {
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247 | ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
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248 | }
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249 | if (ret < 0)
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250 | return ret;
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251 | *routlen = ret;
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252 | return 1;
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253 | }
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254 |
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255 | static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
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256 | const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
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257 | const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
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258 | {
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259 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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260 | /*
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261 | * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
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262 | * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
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263 | * be reflected back in the "original" key.
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264 | */
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265 | RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
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266 | size_t rslen;
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267 |
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268 | if (rctx->md) {
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269 | if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
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270 | return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen,
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271 | sig, siglen, rsa);
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272 | if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md)) {
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273 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
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274 | return -1;
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275 | }
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276 | if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
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277 | if (pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(ctx, NULL, &rslen, sig, siglen) <= 0)
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278 | return 0;
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279 | } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
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280 | int ret;
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281 | if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
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282 | return -1;
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283 | ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
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284 | rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
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285 | if (ret <= 0)
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286 | return 0;
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287 | ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs,
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288 | rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
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289 | rctx->tbuf, rctx->saltlen);
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290 | if (ret <= 0)
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291 | return 0;
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292 | return 1;
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293 | } else {
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294 | return -1;
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295 | }
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296 | } else {
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297 | if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
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298 | return -1;
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299 | rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
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300 | rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
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301 | if (rslen == 0)
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302 | return 0;
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303 | }
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304 |
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305 | if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, rctx->tbuf, rslen))
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306 | return 0;
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307 |
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308 | return 1;
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309 |
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310 | }
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311 |
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312 | static int pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
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313 | unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
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314 | const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
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315 | {
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316 | int ret;
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317 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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318 | /*
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319 | * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
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320 | * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
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321 | * be reflected back in the "original" key.
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322 | */
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323 | RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
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324 |
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325 | if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
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326 | int klen = RSA_size(rsa);
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327 | if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
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328 | return -1;
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329 | if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(rctx->tbuf, klen,
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330 | in, inlen,
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331 | rctx->oaep_label,
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332 | rctx->oaep_labellen,
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333 | rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md))
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334 | return -1;
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335 | ret = RSA_public_encrypt(klen, rctx->tbuf, out, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
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336 | } else {
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337 | ret = RSA_public_encrypt(inlen, in, out, rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
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338 | }
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339 | if (ret < 0)
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340 | return ret;
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341 | *outlen = ret;
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342 | return 1;
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343 | }
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344 |
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345 | static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
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346 | unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
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347 | const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
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348 | {
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349 | int ret;
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350 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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351 | /*
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352 | * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
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353 | * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
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354 | * be reflected back in the "original" key.
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355 | */
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356 | RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
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357 |
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358 | if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
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359 | if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
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360 | return -1;
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361 | ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, rctx->tbuf, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
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362 | if (ret <= 0)
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363 | return ret;
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364 | ret = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(out, ret, rctx->tbuf,
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365 | ret, ret,
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366 | rctx->oaep_label,
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367 | rctx->oaep_labellen,
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368 | rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md);
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369 | } else {
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370 | ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
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371 | }
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372 | *outlen = constant_time_select_s(constant_time_msb_s(ret), *outlen, ret);
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373 | ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_msb(ret), ret, 1);
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374 | return ret;
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375 | }
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376 |
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377 | static int check_padding_md(const EVP_MD *md, int padding)
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378 | {
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379 | int mdnid;
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380 |
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381 | if (!md)
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382 | return 1;
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383 |
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384 | mdnid = EVP_MD_get_type(md);
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385 |
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386 | if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
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387 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
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388 | return 0;
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389 | }
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390 |
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391 | if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
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392 | if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
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393 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
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394 | return 0;
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395 | }
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396 | } else {
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397 | switch(mdnid) {
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398 | /* List of all supported RSA digests */
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399 | case NID_sha1:
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400 | case NID_sha224:
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401 | case NID_sha256:
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402 | case NID_sha384:
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403 | case NID_sha512:
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404 | case NID_sha512_224:
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405 | case NID_sha512_256:
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406 | case NID_md5:
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407 | case NID_md5_sha1:
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408 | case NID_md2:
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409 | case NID_md4:
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410 | case NID_mdc2:
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411 | case NID_ripemd160:
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412 | case NID_sha3_224:
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413 | case NID_sha3_256:
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414 | case NID_sha3_384:
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415 | case NID_sha3_512:
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416 | return 1;
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417 |
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418 | default:
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419 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
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420 | return 0;
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421 |
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422 | }
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423 | }
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424 |
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425 | return 1;
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426 | }
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427 |
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428 | static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
|
---|
429 | {
|
---|
430 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
|
---|
431 |
|
---|
432 | switch (type) {
|
---|
433 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING:
|
---|
434 | if ((p1 >= RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) && (p1 <= RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)) {
|
---|
435 | if (!check_padding_md(rctx->md, p1))
|
---|
436 | return 0;
|
---|
437 | if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
|
---|
438 | if (!(ctx->operation &
|
---|
439 | (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)))
|
---|
440 | goto bad_pad;
|
---|
441 | if (!rctx->md)
|
---|
442 | rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
|
---|
443 | } else if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) {
|
---|
444 | goto bad_pad;
|
---|
445 | }
|
---|
446 | if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
|
---|
447 | if (!(ctx->operation & EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT))
|
---|
448 | goto bad_pad;
|
---|
449 | if (!rctx->md)
|
---|
450 | rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
|
---|
451 | }
|
---|
452 | rctx->pad_mode = p1;
|
---|
453 | return 1;
|
---|
454 | }
|
---|
455 | bad_pad:
|
---|
456 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
|
---|
457 | return -2;
|
---|
458 |
|
---|
459 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING:
|
---|
460 | *(int *)p2 = rctx->pad_mode;
|
---|
461 | return 1;
|
---|
462 |
|
---|
463 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
|
---|
464 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
|
---|
465 | if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
|
---|
466 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
|
---|
467 | return -2;
|
---|
468 | }
|
---|
469 | if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN) {
|
---|
470 | *(int *)p2 = rctx->saltlen;
|
---|
471 | } else {
|
---|
472 | if (p1 < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX)
|
---|
473 | return -2;
|
---|
474 | if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
|
---|
475 | if (p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO
|
---|
476 | && ctx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
|
---|
477 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
|
---|
478 | return -2;
|
---|
479 | }
|
---|
480 | if ((p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
|
---|
481 | && rctx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md))
|
---|
482 | || (p1 >= 0 && p1 < rctx->min_saltlen)) {
|
---|
483 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
|
---|
484 | return 0;
|
---|
485 | }
|
---|
486 | }
|
---|
487 | rctx->saltlen = p1;
|
---|
488 | }
|
---|
489 | return 1;
|
---|
490 |
|
---|
491 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS:
|
---|
492 | if (p1 < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
|
---|
493 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
|
---|
494 | return -2;
|
---|
495 | }
|
---|
496 | rctx->nbits = p1;
|
---|
497 | return 1;
|
---|
498 |
|
---|
499 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP:
|
---|
500 | if (p2 == NULL || !BN_is_odd((BIGNUM *)p2) || BN_is_one((BIGNUM *)p2)) {
|
---|
501 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
|
---|
502 | return -2;
|
---|
503 | }
|
---|
504 | BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
|
---|
505 | rctx->pub_exp = p2;
|
---|
506 | return 1;
|
---|
507 |
|
---|
508 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PRIMES:
|
---|
509 | if (p1 < RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM || p1 > RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM) {
|
---|
510 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID);
|
---|
511 | return -2;
|
---|
512 | }
|
---|
513 | rctx->primes = p1;
|
---|
514 | return 1;
|
---|
515 |
|
---|
516 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD:
|
---|
517 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD:
|
---|
518 | if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
|
---|
519 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
|
---|
520 | return -2;
|
---|
521 | }
|
---|
522 | if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD)
|
---|
523 | *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
|
---|
524 | else
|
---|
525 | rctx->md = p2;
|
---|
526 | return 1;
|
---|
527 |
|
---|
528 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
|
---|
529 | if (!check_padding_md(p2, rctx->pad_mode))
|
---|
530 | return 0;
|
---|
531 | if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
|
---|
532 | if (EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md) == EVP_MD_get_type(p2))
|
---|
533 | return 1;
|
---|
534 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
|
---|
535 | return 0;
|
---|
536 | }
|
---|
537 | rctx->md = p2;
|
---|
538 | return 1;
|
---|
539 |
|
---|
540 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD:
|
---|
541 | *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
|
---|
542 | return 1;
|
---|
543 |
|
---|
544 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD:
|
---|
545 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD:
|
---|
546 | if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
|
---|
547 | && rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
|
---|
548 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
|
---|
549 | return -2;
|
---|
550 | }
|
---|
551 | if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD) {
|
---|
552 | if (rctx->mgf1md)
|
---|
553 | *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->mgf1md;
|
---|
554 | else
|
---|
555 | *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
|
---|
556 | } else {
|
---|
557 | if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
|
---|
558 | if (EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->mgf1md) == EVP_MD_get_type(p2))
|
---|
559 | return 1;
|
---|
560 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_MGF1_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
|
---|
561 | return 0;
|
---|
562 | }
|
---|
563 | rctx->mgf1md = p2;
|
---|
564 | }
|
---|
565 | return 1;
|
---|
566 |
|
---|
567 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
|
---|
568 | if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
|
---|
569 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
|
---|
570 | return -2;
|
---|
571 | }
|
---|
572 | OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
|
---|
573 | if (p2 && p1 > 0) {
|
---|
574 | rctx->oaep_label = p2;
|
---|
575 | rctx->oaep_labellen = p1;
|
---|
576 | } else {
|
---|
577 | rctx->oaep_label = NULL;
|
---|
578 | rctx->oaep_labellen = 0;
|
---|
579 | }
|
---|
580 | return 1;
|
---|
581 |
|
---|
582 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
|
---|
583 | if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
|
---|
584 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
|
---|
585 | return -2;
|
---|
586 | }
|
---|
587 | *(unsigned char **)p2 = rctx->oaep_label;
|
---|
588 | return rctx->oaep_labellen;
|
---|
589 |
|
---|
590 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
|
---|
591 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
|
---|
592 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
|
---|
593 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
|
---|
594 | #endif
|
---|
595 | return 1;
|
---|
596 |
|
---|
597 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
|
---|
598 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT:
|
---|
599 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
|
---|
600 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT:
|
---|
601 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT:
|
---|
602 | #endif
|
---|
603 | if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
|
---|
604 | return 1;
|
---|
605 | /* fall through */
|
---|
606 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY:
|
---|
607 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
|
---|
608 | return -2;
|
---|
609 |
|
---|
610 | default:
|
---|
611 | return -2;
|
---|
612 |
|
---|
613 | }
|
---|
614 | }
|
---|
615 |
|
---|
616 | static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
|
---|
617 | const char *type, const char *value)
|
---|
618 | {
|
---|
619 | if (value == NULL) {
|
---|
620 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
|
---|
621 | return 0;
|
---|
622 | }
|
---|
623 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_padding_mode") == 0) {
|
---|
624 | int pm;
|
---|
625 |
|
---|
626 | if (strcmp(value, "pkcs1") == 0) {
|
---|
627 | pm = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
|
---|
628 | } else if (strcmp(value, "none") == 0) {
|
---|
629 | pm = RSA_NO_PADDING;
|
---|
630 | } else if (strcmp(value, "oeap") == 0) {
|
---|
631 | pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
|
---|
632 | } else if (strcmp(value, "oaep") == 0) {
|
---|
633 | pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
|
---|
634 | } else if (strcmp(value, "x931") == 0) {
|
---|
635 | pm = RSA_X931_PADDING;
|
---|
636 | } else if (strcmp(value, "pss") == 0) {
|
---|
637 | pm = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
|
---|
638 | } else {
|
---|
639 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
|
---|
640 | return -2;
|
---|
641 | }
|
---|
642 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, pm);
|
---|
643 | }
|
---|
644 |
|
---|
645 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_saltlen") == 0) {
|
---|
646 | int saltlen;
|
---|
647 |
|
---|
648 | if (!strcmp(value, "digest"))
|
---|
649 | saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
|
---|
650 | else if (!strcmp(value, "max"))
|
---|
651 | saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
|
---|
652 | else if (!strcmp(value, "auto"))
|
---|
653 | saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
|
---|
654 | else
|
---|
655 | saltlen = atoi(value);
|
---|
656 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, saltlen);
|
---|
657 | }
|
---|
658 |
|
---|
659 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_bits") == 0) {
|
---|
660 | int nbits = atoi(value);
|
---|
661 |
|
---|
662 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, nbits);
|
---|
663 | }
|
---|
664 |
|
---|
665 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_pubexp") == 0) {
|
---|
666 | int ret;
|
---|
667 |
|
---|
668 | BIGNUM *pubexp = NULL;
|
---|
669 | if (!BN_asc2bn(&pubexp, value))
|
---|
670 | return 0;
|
---|
671 | ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, pubexp);
|
---|
672 | BN_free(pubexp);
|
---|
673 | return ret;
|
---|
674 | }
|
---|
675 |
|
---|
676 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_primes") == 0) {
|
---|
677 | int nprimes = atoi(value);
|
---|
678 |
|
---|
679 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_primes(ctx, nprimes);
|
---|
680 | }
|
---|
681 |
|
---|
682 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_mgf1_md") == 0)
|
---|
683 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx,
|
---|
684 | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
|
---|
685 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, value);
|
---|
686 |
|
---|
687 | if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) {
|
---|
688 |
|
---|
689 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md") == 0)
|
---|
690 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
|
---|
691 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, value);
|
---|
692 |
|
---|
693 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_md") == 0)
|
---|
694 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
|
---|
695 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD, value);
|
---|
696 |
|
---|
697 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen") == 0) {
|
---|
698 | int saltlen = atoi(value);
|
---|
699 |
|
---|
700 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen(ctx, saltlen);
|
---|
701 | }
|
---|
702 | }
|
---|
703 |
|
---|
704 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_md") == 0)
|
---|
705 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
|
---|
706 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, value);
|
---|
707 |
|
---|
708 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_label") == 0) {
|
---|
709 | unsigned char *lab;
|
---|
710 | long lablen;
|
---|
711 | int ret;
|
---|
712 |
|
---|
713 | lab = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(value, &lablen);
|
---|
714 | if (!lab)
|
---|
715 | return 0;
|
---|
716 | ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, lab, lablen);
|
---|
717 | if (ret <= 0)
|
---|
718 | OPENSSL_free(lab);
|
---|
719 | return ret;
|
---|
720 | }
|
---|
721 |
|
---|
722 | return -2;
|
---|
723 | }
|
---|
724 |
|
---|
725 | /* Set PSS parameters when generating a key, if necessary */
|
---|
726 | static int rsa_set_pss_param(RSA *rsa, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
|
---|
727 | {
|
---|
728 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
|
---|
729 |
|
---|
730 | if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
|
---|
731 | return 1;
|
---|
732 | /* If all parameters are default values don't set pss */
|
---|
733 | if (rctx->md == NULL && rctx->mgf1md == NULL && rctx->saltlen == -2)
|
---|
734 | return 1;
|
---|
735 | rsa->pss = ossl_rsa_pss_params_create(rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
|
---|
736 | rctx->saltlen == -2
|
---|
737 | ? 0 : rctx->saltlen);
|
---|
738 | if (rsa->pss == NULL)
|
---|
739 | return 0;
|
---|
740 | return 1;
|
---|
741 | }
|
---|
742 |
|
---|
743 | static int pkey_rsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
---|
744 | {
|
---|
745 | RSA *rsa = NULL;
|
---|
746 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
|
---|
747 | BN_GENCB *pcb;
|
---|
748 | int ret;
|
---|
749 |
|
---|
750 | if (rctx->pub_exp == NULL) {
|
---|
751 | rctx->pub_exp = BN_new();
|
---|
752 | if (rctx->pub_exp == NULL || !BN_set_word(rctx->pub_exp, RSA_F4))
|
---|
753 | return 0;
|
---|
754 | }
|
---|
755 | rsa = RSA_new();
|
---|
756 | if (rsa == NULL)
|
---|
757 | return 0;
|
---|
758 | if (ctx->pkey_gencb) {
|
---|
759 | pcb = BN_GENCB_new();
|
---|
760 | if (pcb == NULL) {
|
---|
761 | RSA_free(rsa);
|
---|
762 | return 0;
|
---|
763 | }
|
---|
764 | evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(pcb, ctx);
|
---|
765 | } else {
|
---|
766 | pcb = NULL;
|
---|
767 | }
|
---|
768 | ret = RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(rsa, rctx->nbits, rctx->primes,
|
---|
769 | rctx->pub_exp, pcb);
|
---|
770 | BN_GENCB_free(pcb);
|
---|
771 | if (ret > 0 && !rsa_set_pss_param(rsa, ctx)) {
|
---|
772 | RSA_free(rsa);
|
---|
773 | return 0;
|
---|
774 | }
|
---|
775 | if (ret > 0)
|
---|
776 | EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, ctx->pmeth->pkey_id, rsa);
|
---|
777 | else
|
---|
778 | RSA_free(rsa);
|
---|
779 | return ret;
|
---|
780 | }
|
---|
781 |
|
---|
782 | static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pkey_meth = {
|
---|
783 | EVP_PKEY_RSA,
|
---|
784 | EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN,
|
---|
785 | pkey_rsa_init,
|
---|
786 | pkey_rsa_copy,
|
---|
787 | pkey_rsa_cleanup,
|
---|
788 |
|
---|
789 | 0, 0,
|
---|
790 |
|
---|
791 | 0,
|
---|
792 | pkey_rsa_keygen,
|
---|
793 |
|
---|
794 | 0,
|
---|
795 | pkey_rsa_sign,
|
---|
796 |
|
---|
797 | 0,
|
---|
798 | pkey_rsa_verify,
|
---|
799 |
|
---|
800 | 0,
|
---|
801 | pkey_rsa_verifyrecover,
|
---|
802 |
|
---|
803 | 0, 0, 0, 0,
|
---|
804 |
|
---|
805 | 0,
|
---|
806 | pkey_rsa_encrypt,
|
---|
807 |
|
---|
808 | 0,
|
---|
809 | pkey_rsa_decrypt,
|
---|
810 |
|
---|
811 | 0, 0,
|
---|
812 |
|
---|
813 | pkey_rsa_ctrl,
|
---|
814 | pkey_rsa_ctrl_str
|
---|
815 | };
|
---|
816 |
|
---|
817 | const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_rsa_pkey_method(void)
|
---|
818 | {
|
---|
819 | return &rsa_pkey_meth;
|
---|
820 | }
|
---|
821 |
|
---|
822 | /*
|
---|
823 | * Called for PSS sign or verify initialisation: checks PSS parameter
|
---|
824 | * sanity and sets any restrictions on key usage.
|
---|
825 | */
|
---|
826 |
|
---|
827 | static int pkey_pss_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
|
---|
828 | {
|
---|
829 | const RSA *rsa;
|
---|
830 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
|
---|
831 | const EVP_MD *md;
|
---|
832 | const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
|
---|
833 | int min_saltlen, max_saltlen;
|
---|
834 |
|
---|
835 | /* Should never happen */
|
---|
836 | if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
|
---|
837 | return 0;
|
---|
838 | rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
|
---|
839 | /* If no restrictions just return */
|
---|
840 | if (rsa->pss == NULL)
|
---|
841 | return 1;
|
---|
842 | /* Get and check parameters */
|
---|
843 | if (!ossl_rsa_pss_get_param(rsa->pss, &md, &mgf1md, &min_saltlen))
|
---|
844 | return 0;
|
---|
845 |
|
---|
846 | /* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */
|
---|
847 | max_saltlen = RSA_size(rsa) - EVP_MD_get_size(md);
|
---|
848 | if ((RSA_bits(rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
|
---|
849 | max_saltlen--;
|
---|
850 | if (min_saltlen > max_saltlen) {
|
---|
851 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
|
---|
852 | return 0;
|
---|
853 | }
|
---|
854 |
|
---|
855 | rctx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen;
|
---|
856 |
|
---|
857 | /*
|
---|
858 | * Set PSS restrictions as defaults: we can then block any attempt to
|
---|
859 | * use invalid values in pkey_rsa_ctrl
|
---|
860 | */
|
---|
861 |
|
---|
862 | rctx->md = md;
|
---|
863 | rctx->mgf1md = mgf1md;
|
---|
864 | rctx->saltlen = min_saltlen;
|
---|
865 |
|
---|
866 | return 1;
|
---|
867 | }
|
---|
868 |
|
---|
869 | static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pss_pkey_meth = {
|
---|
870 | EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS,
|
---|
871 | EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN,
|
---|
872 | pkey_rsa_init,
|
---|
873 | pkey_rsa_copy,
|
---|
874 | pkey_rsa_cleanup,
|
---|
875 |
|
---|
876 | 0, 0,
|
---|
877 |
|
---|
878 | 0,
|
---|
879 | pkey_rsa_keygen,
|
---|
880 |
|
---|
881 | pkey_pss_init,
|
---|
882 | pkey_rsa_sign,
|
---|
883 |
|
---|
884 | pkey_pss_init,
|
---|
885 | pkey_rsa_verify,
|
---|
886 |
|
---|
887 | 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
|
---|
888 |
|
---|
889 | pkey_rsa_ctrl,
|
---|
890 | pkey_rsa_ctrl_str
|
---|
891 | };
|
---|
892 |
|
---|
893 | const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_rsa_pss_pkey_method(void)
|
---|
894 | {
|
---|
895 | return &rsa_pss_pkey_meth;
|
---|
896 | }
|
---|