t1_lib.c@ 106165

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openssl-3.1.5: Applied and adjusted our OpenSSL changes to 3.1.4. bugref:10638
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1	/*
2	* Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3	*
4	* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5	* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6	* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7	* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8	*/
9
10	#include <stdio.h>
11	#include "internal/e_os.h"
12	#include <stdlib.h>
13	#include <openssl/objects.h>
14	#include <openssl/evp.h>
15	#include <openssl/hmac.h>
16	#include <openssl/core_names.h>
17	#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
18	#include <openssl/conf.h>
19	#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
20	#include <openssl/dh.h>
21	#include <openssl/bn.h>
22	#include <openssl/provider.h>
23	#include <openssl/param_build.h>
24	#include "internal/nelem.h"
25	#include "internal/sizes.h"
26	#include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
27	#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
28	#include "ssl_local.h"
29	#include <openssl/ct.h>
30
31	static const SIGALG_LOOKUP find_sig_alg(SSL s, X509 x, EVP_PKEY pkey);
32	static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP lu);
33
34	SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
35	tls1_enc,
36	tls1_mac,
37	tls1_setup_key_block,
38	tls1_generate_master_secret,
39	tls1_change_cipher_state,
40	tls1_final_finish_mac,
41	TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
42	TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
43	tls1_alert_code,
44	tls1_export_keying_material,
45	0,
46	ssl3_set_handshake_header,
47	tls_close_construct_packet,
48	ssl3_handshake_write
49	};
50
51	SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
52	tls1_enc,
53	tls1_mac,
54	tls1_setup_key_block,
55	tls1_generate_master_secret,
56	tls1_change_cipher_state,
57	tls1_final_finish_mac,
58	TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
59	TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
60	tls1_alert_code,
61	tls1_export_keying_material,
62	SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
63	ssl3_set_handshake_header,
64	tls_close_construct_packet,
65	ssl3_handshake_write
66	};
67
68	SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
69	tls1_enc,
70	tls1_mac,
71	tls1_setup_key_block,
72	tls1_generate_master_secret,
73	tls1_change_cipher_state,
74	tls1_final_finish_mac,
75	TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
76	TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
77	tls1_alert_code,
78	tls1_export_keying_material,
79	SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV \| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS \| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
80	\| SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
81	ssl3_set_handshake_header,
82	tls_close_construct_packet,
83	ssl3_handshake_write
84	};
85
86	SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
87	tls13_enc,
88	tls1_mac,
89	tls13_setup_key_block,
90	tls13_generate_master_secret,
91	tls13_change_cipher_state,
92	tls13_final_finish_mac,
93	TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
94	TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
95	tls13_alert_code,
96	tls13_export_keying_material,
97	SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS \| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
98	ssl3_set_handshake_header,
99	tls_close_construct_packet,
100	ssl3_handshake_write
101	};
102
103	long tls1_default_timeout(void)
104	{
105	/*
106	* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
107	* http, the cache would over fill
108	*/
109	return (60 * 60 * 2);
110	}
111
112	int tls1_new(SSL *s)
113	{
114	if (!ssl3_new(s))
115	return 0;
116	if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
117	return 0;
118
119	return 1;
120	}
121
122	void tls1_free(SSL *s)
123	{
124	OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
125	ssl3_free(s);
126	}
127
128	int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
129	{
130	if (!ssl3_clear(s))
131	return 0;
132
133	if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
134	s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
135	else
136	s->version = s->method->version;
137
138	return 1;
139	}
140
141	/* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
142	static struct {
143	int nid;
144	uint16_t group_id;
145	} nid_to_group[] = {
146	{NID_sect163k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163k1},
147	{NID_sect163r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r1},
148	{NID_sect163r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r2},
149	{NID_sect193r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r1},
150	{NID_sect193r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r2},
151	{NID_sect233k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233k1},
152	{NID_sect233r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233r1},
153	{NID_sect239k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect239k1},
154	{NID_sect283k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283k1},
155	{NID_sect283r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283r1},
156	{NID_sect409k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409k1},
157	{NID_sect409r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409r1},
158	{NID_sect571k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571k1},
159	{NID_sect571r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571r1},
160	{NID_secp160k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160k1},
161	{NID_secp160r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r1},
162	{NID_secp160r2, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r2},
163	{NID_secp192k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192k1},
164	{NID_X9_62_prime192v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192r1},
165	{NID_secp224k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224k1},
166	{NID_secp224r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224r1},
167	{NID_secp256k1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256k1},
168	{NID_X9_62_prime256v1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1},
169	{NID_secp384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1},
170	{NID_secp521r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1},
171	{NID_brainpoolP256r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1},
172	{NID_brainpoolP384r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1},
173	{NID_brainpoolP512r1, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1},
174	{EVP_PKEY_X25519, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519},
175	{EVP_PKEY_X448, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448},
176	{NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA, 0x0022},
177	{NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB, 0x0023},
178	{NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC, 0x0024},
179	{NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD, 0x0025},
180	{NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA, 0x0026},
181	{NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB, 0x0027},
182	{NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC, 0x0028},
183	{NID_ffdhe2048, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048},
184	{NID_ffdhe3072, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072},
185	{NID_ffdhe4096, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096},
186	{NID_ffdhe6144, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144},
187	{NID_ffdhe8192, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192}
188	};
189
190	static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
191	TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
192	TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
193	TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
194	};
195
196	/* The default curves */
197	static const uint16_t supported_groups_default[] = {
198	29, /* X25519 (29) */
199	23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
200	30, /* X448 (30) */
201	25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
202	24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
203	34, /* GC256A (34) */
204	35, /* GC256B (35) */
205	36, /* GC256C (36) */
206	37, /* GC256D (37) */
207	38, /* GC512A (38) */
208	39, /* GC512B (39) */
209	40, /* GC512C (40) */
210	0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
211	0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
212	0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
213	0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
214	0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
215	};
216
217	static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
218	TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
219	TLSEXT_curve_P_384
220	};
221
222	struct provider_group_data_st {
223	SSL_CTX *ctx;
224	OSSL_PROVIDER *provider;
225	};
226
227	#define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
228	static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups;
229	static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *data)
230	{
231	struct provider_group_data_st *pgd = data;
232	SSL_CTX *ctx = pgd->ctx;
233	OSSL_PROVIDER *provider = pgd->provider;
234	const OSSL_PARAM *p;
235	TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = NULL;
236	EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt;
237	unsigned int gid;
238	unsigned int is_kem = 0;
239	int ret = 0;
240
241	if (ctx->group_list_max_len == ctx->group_list_len) {
242	TLS_GROUP_INFO *tmp = NULL;
243
244	if (ctx->group_list_max_len == 0)
245	tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO)
246	* TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
247	else
248	tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->group_list,
249	(ctx->group_list_max_len
250	+ TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE)
251	* sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO));
252	if (tmp == NULL) {
253	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
254	return 0;
255	}
256	ctx->group_list = tmp;
257	memset(tmp + ctx->group_list_max_len,
258	0,
259	sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE);
260	ctx->group_list_max_len += TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE;
261	}
262
263	ginf = &ctx->group_list[ctx->group_list_len];
264
265	p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME);
266	if (p == NULL \|\| p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
267	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
268	goto err;
269	}
270	ginf->tlsname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
271	if (ginf->tlsname == NULL) {
272	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
273	goto err;
274	}
275
276	p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL);
277	if (p == NULL \|\| p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
278	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
279	goto err;
280	}
281	ginf->realname = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
282	if (ginf->realname == NULL) {
283	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
284	goto err;
285	}
286
287	p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID);
288	if (p == NULL \|\| !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &gid) \|\| gid > UINT16_MAX) {
289	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
290	goto err;
291	}
292	ginf->group_id = (uint16_t)gid;
293
294	p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG);
295	if (p == NULL \|\| p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
296	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
297	goto err;
298	}
299	ginf->algorithm = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data);
300	if (ginf->algorithm == NULL) {
301	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
302	goto err;
303	}
304
305	p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS);
306	if (p == NULL \|\| !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &ginf->secbits)) {
307	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
308	goto err;
309	}
310
311	p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_IS_KEM);
312	if (p != NULL && (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &is_kem) \|\| is_kem > 1)) {
313	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
314	goto err;
315	}
316	ginf->is_kem = 1 & is_kem;
317
318	p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS);
319	if (p == NULL \|\| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mintls)) {
320	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
321	goto err;
322	}
323
324	p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS);
325	if (p == NULL \|\| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxtls)) {
326	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
327	goto err;
328	}
329
330	p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS);
331	if (p == NULL \|\| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->mindtls)) {
332	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
333	goto err;
334	}
335
336	p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS);
337	if (p == NULL \|\| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ginf->maxdtls)) {
338	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
339	goto err;
340	}
341	/*
342	* Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
343	* string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
344	* successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
345	* it.
346	*/
347	ret = 1;
348	ERR_set_mark();
349	keymgmt = EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx->libctx, ginf->algorithm, ctx->propq);
350	if (keymgmt != NULL) {
351	/*
352	* We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
353	* doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
354	*
355	* Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
356	* is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
357	* implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
358	* different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
359	* same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
360	* assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
361	* behaviour)?
362	*/
363	if (EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_provider(keymgmt) == provider) {
364	/* We have a match - so we will use this group */
365	ctx->group_list_len++;
366	ginf = NULL;
367	}
368	EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt);
369	}
370	ERR_pop_to_mark();
371	err:
372	if (ginf != NULL) {
373	OPENSSL_free(ginf->tlsname);
374	OPENSSL_free(ginf->realname);
375	OPENSSL_free(ginf->algorithm);
376	ginf->algorithm = ginf->tlsname = ginf->realname = NULL;
377	}
378	return ret;
379	}
380
381	static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER provider, void vctx)
382	{
383	struct provider_group_data_st pgd;
384
385	pgd.ctx = vctx;
386	pgd.provider = provider;
387	return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider, "TLS-GROUP",
388	add_provider_groups, &pgd);
389	}
390
391	int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX *ctx)
392	{
393	size_t i, j, num_deflt_grps = 0;
394	uint16_t tmp_supp_groups[OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default)];
395
396	if (!OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx->libctx, discover_provider_groups, ctx))
397	return 0;
398
399	for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default); i++) {
400	for (j = 0; j < ctx->group_list_len; j++) {
401	if (ctx->group_list[j].group_id == supported_groups_default[i]) {
402	tmp_supp_groups[num_deflt_grps++] = ctx->group_list[j].group_id;
403	break;
404	}
405	}
406	}
407
408	if (num_deflt_grps == 0)
409	return 1;
410
411	ctx->ext.supported_groups_default
412	= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_deflt_grps);
413
414	if (ctx->ext.supported_groups_default == NULL) {
415	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
416	return 0;
417	}
418
419	memcpy(ctx->ext.supported_groups_default,
420	tmp_supp_groups,
421	num_deflt_grps * sizeof(tmp_supp_groups[0]));
422	ctx->ext.supported_groups_default_len = num_deflt_grps;
423
424	return 1;
425	}
426
427	static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX ctx, const char name)
428	{
429	size_t i;
430
431	for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
432	if (strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].tlsname, name) == 0
433	\|\| strcmp(ctx->group_list[i].realname, name) == 0)
434	return ctx->group_list[i].group_id;
435	}
436
437	return 0;
438	}
439
440	const TLS_GROUP_INFO tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX ctx, uint16_t group_id)
441	{
442	size_t i;
443
444	for (i = 0; i < ctx->group_list_len; i++) {
445	if (ctx->group_list[i].group_id == group_id)
446	return &ctx->group_list[i];
447	}
448
449	return NULL;
450	}
451
452	int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id, int include_unknown)
453	{
454	size_t i;
455
456	if (group_id == 0)
457	return NID_undef;
458
459	/*
460	* Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
461	* work for groups we don't know about.
462	*/
463	for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
464	{
465	if (nid_to_group[i].group_id == group_id)
466	return nid_to_group[i].nid;
467	}
468	if (!include_unknown)
469	return NID_undef;
470	return TLSEXT_nid_unknown \| (int)group_id;
471	}
472
473	uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
474	{
475	size_t i;
476
477	/*
478	* Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
479	* work for groups we don't know about.
480	*/
481	for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group); i++)
482	{
483	if (nid_to_group[i].nid == nid)
484	return nid_to_group[i].group_id;
485	}
486
487	return 0;
488	}
489
490	/*
491	* Set pgroups to the supported groups list and pgroupslen to
492	* the number of groups supported.
493	*/
494	void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL s, const uint16_t *pgroups,
495	size_t *pgroupslen)
496	{
497	/* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
498	switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
499	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
500	*pgroups = suiteb_curves;
501	*pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
502	break;
503
504	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
505	*pgroups = suiteb_curves;
506	*pgroupslen = 1;
507	break;
508
509	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
510	*pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
511	*pgroupslen = 1;
512	break;
513
514	default:
515	if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
516	*pgroups = s->ctx->ext.supported_groups_default;
517	*pgroupslen = s->ctx->ext.supported_groups_default_len;
518	} else {
519	*pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
520	*pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
521	}
522	break;
523	}
524	}
525
526	int tls_valid_group(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int minversion, int maxversion,
527	int isec, int *okfortls13)
528	{
529	const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group_id);
530	int ret;
531
532	if (okfortls13 != NULL)
533	*okfortls13 = 0;
534
535	if (ginfo == NULL)
536	return 0;
537
538	if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
539	if (ginfo->mindtls < 0 \|\| ginfo->maxdtls < 0)
540	return 0;
541	if (ginfo->maxdtls == 0)
542	ret = 1;
543	else
544	ret = DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion, ginfo->maxdtls);
545	if (ginfo->mindtls > 0)
546	ret &= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion, ginfo->mindtls);
547	} else {
548	if (ginfo->mintls < 0 \|\| ginfo->maxtls < 0)
549	return 0;
550	if (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
551	ret = 1;
552	else
553	ret = (minversion <= ginfo->maxtls);
554	if (ginfo->mintls > 0)
555	ret &= (maxversion >= ginfo->mintls);
556	if (ret && okfortls13 != NULL && maxversion == TLS1_3_VERSION)
557	*okfortls13 = (ginfo->maxtls == 0)
558	\|\| (ginfo->maxtls >= TLS1_3_VERSION);
559	}
560	ret &= !isec
561	\|\| strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "EC") == 0
562	\|\| strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "X25519") == 0
563	\|\| strcmp(ginfo->algorithm, "X448") == 0;
564
565	return ret;
566	}
567
568	/* See if group is allowed by security callback */
569	int tls_group_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t group, int op)
570	{
571	const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group);
572	unsigned char gtmp[2];
573
574	if (ginfo == NULL)
575	return 0;
576
577	gtmp[0] = group >> 8;
578	gtmp[1] = group & 0xff;
579	return ssl_security(s, op, ginfo->secbits,
580	tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo->group_id, 0), (void *)gtmp);
581	}
582
583	/* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
584	static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
585	{
586	size_t i;
587	for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
588	if (list[i] == id)
589	return 1;
590	return 0;
591	}
592
593	/*-
594	* For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the \|nmatch\|th shared group or 0
595	* if there is no match.
596	* For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
597	* For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
598	* a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
599	*/
600	uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
601	{
602	const uint16_t pref, supp;
603	size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
604	int k;
605	SSL_CTX *ctx = s->ctx;
606
607	/* Can't do anything on client side */
608	if (s->server == 0)
609	return 0;
610	if (nmatch == -2) {
611	if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
612	/*
613	* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
614	* these are acceptable due to previous checks.
615	*/
616	unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
617
618	if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
619	return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
620	if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
621	return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
622	/* Should never happen */
623	return 0;
624	}
625	/* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
626	nmatch = 0;
627	}
628	/*
629	* If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
630	* otherwise peer decides.
631	*/
632	if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
633	tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
634	tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
635	} else {
636	tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
637	tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
638	}
639
640	for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
641	uint16_t id = pref[i];
642	const TLS_GROUP_INFO *inf;
643
644	if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
645	\|\| !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
646	continue;
647	inf = tls1_group_id_lookup(ctx, id);
648	if (!ossl_assert(inf != NULL))
649	return 0;
650	if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
651	if (inf->maxdtls == -1)
652	continue;
653	if ((inf->mindtls != 0 && DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, inf->mindtls))
654	\|\| (inf->maxdtls != 0
655	&& DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, inf->maxdtls)))
656	continue;
657	} else {
658	if (inf->maxtls == -1)
659	continue;
660	if ((inf->mintls != 0 && s->version < inf->mintls)
661	\|\| (inf->maxtls != 0 && s->version > inf->maxtls))
662	continue;
663	}
664
665	if (nmatch == k)
666	return id;
667	k++;
668	}
669	if (nmatch == -1)
670	return k;
671	/* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
672	return 0;
673	}
674
675	int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t *pext, size_t pextlen,
676	int *groups, size_t ngroups)
677	{
678	uint16_t *glist;
679	size_t i;
680	/*
681	* Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
682	* to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
683	*/
684	unsigned long *dup_list = NULL;
685	unsigned long dup_list_egrp = 0;
686	unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp = 0;
687
688	if (ngroups == 0) {
689	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
690	return 0;
691	}
692	if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
693	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
694	return 0;
695	}
696	for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
697	unsigned long idmask;
698	uint16_t id;
699	id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
700	if ((id & 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
701	goto err;
702	idmask = 1L << (id & 0x00FF);
703	dup_list = (id < 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp : &dup_list_dhgrp;
704	if (!id \|\| ((*dup_list) & idmask))
705	goto err;
706	*dup_list \|= idmask;
707	glist[i] = id;
708	}
709	OPENSSL_free(*pext);
710	*pext = glist;
711	*pextlen = ngroups;
712	return 1;
713	err:
714	OPENSSL_free(glist);
715	return 0;
716	}
717
718	# define GROUPLIST_INCREMENT 40
719	# define GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH 64
720	typedef struct {
721	SSL_CTX *ctx;
722	size_t gidcnt;
723	size_t gidmax;
724	uint16_t *gid_arr;
725	} gid_cb_st;
726
727	static int gid_cb(const char elem, int len, void arg)
728	{
729	gid_cb_st *garg = arg;
730	size_t i;
731	uint16_t gid = 0;
732	char etmp[GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH];
733
734	if (elem == NULL)
735	return 0;
736	if (garg->gidcnt == garg->gidmax) {
737	uint16_t *tmp =
738	OPENSSL_realloc(garg->gid_arr, garg->gidmax + GROUPLIST_INCREMENT);
739	if (tmp == NULL)
740	return 0;
741	garg->gidmax += GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
742	garg->gid_arr = tmp;
743	}
744	if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
745	return 0;
746	memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
747	etmp[len] = 0;
748
749	gid = tls1_group_name2id(garg->ctx, etmp);
750	if (gid == 0) {
751	ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT,
752	"group '%s' cannot be set", etmp);
753	return 0;
754	}
755	for (i = 0; i < garg->gidcnt; i++)
756	if (garg->gid_arr[i] == gid)
757	return 0;
758	garg->gid_arr[garg->gidcnt++] = gid;
759	return 1;
760	}
761
762	/* Set groups based on a colon separated list */
763	int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX ctx, uint16_t pext, size_t pextlen,
764	const char *str)
765	{
766	gid_cb_st gcb;
767	uint16_t *tmparr;
768	int ret = 0;
769
770	gcb.gidcnt = 0;
771	gcb.gidmax = GROUPLIST_INCREMENT;
772	gcb.gid_arr = OPENSSL_malloc(gcb.gidmax * sizeof(*gcb.gid_arr));
773	if (gcb.gid_arr == NULL)
774	return 0;
775	gcb.ctx = ctx;
776	if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, gid_cb, &gcb))
777	goto end;
778	if (pext == NULL) {
779	ret = 1;
780	goto end;
781	}
782
783	/*
784	* gid_cb ensurse there are no duplicates so we can just go ahead and set
785	* the result
786	*/
787	tmparr = OPENSSL_memdup(gcb.gid_arr, gcb.gidcnt * sizeof(*tmparr));
788	if (tmparr == NULL)
789	goto end;
790	OPENSSL_free(*pext);
791	*pext = tmparr;
792	*pextlen = gcb.gidcnt;
793	ret = 1;
794	end:
795	OPENSSL_free(gcb.gid_arr);
796	return ret;
797	}
798
799	/* Check a group id matches preferences */
800	int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_groups)
801	{
802	const uint16_t *groups;
803	size_t groups_len;
804
805	if (group_id == 0)
806	return 0;
807
808	/* Check for Suite B compliance */
809	if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
810	unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
811
812	if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
813	if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
814	return 0;
815	} else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
816	if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
817	return 0;
818	} else {
819	/* Should never happen */
820	return 0;
821	}
822	}
823
824	if (check_own_groups) {
825	/* Check group is one of our preferences */
826	tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
827	if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
828	return 0;
829	}
830
831	if (!tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
832	return 0;
833
834	/* For clients, nothing more to check */
835	if (!s->server)
836	return 1;
837
838	/* Check group is one of peers preferences */
839	tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
840
841	/*
842	* RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
843	* so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
844	* It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
845	* extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
846	*/
847	if (groups_len == 0)
848	return 1;
849	return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
850	}
851
852	void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL s, const unsigned char *pformats,
853	size_t *num_formats)
854	{
855	/*
856	* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
857	*/
858	if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
859	*pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
860	*num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
861	} else {
862	*pformats = ecformats_default;
863	/* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
864	if (tls1_suiteb(s))
865	*num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
866	else
867	*num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
868	}
869	}
870
871	/* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
872	static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL s, EVP_PKEY pkey)
873	{
874	unsigned char comp_id;
875	size_t i;
876	int point_conv;
877
878	/* If not an EC key nothing to check */
879	if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
880	return 1;
881
882
883	/* Get required compression id */
884	point_conv = EVP_PKEY_get_ec_point_conv_form(pkey);
885	if (point_conv == 0)
886	return 0;
887	if (point_conv == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
888	comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
889	} else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
890	/*
891	* ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
892	* this check.
893	*/
894	return 1;
895	} else {
896	int field_type = EVP_PKEY_get_field_type(pkey);
897
898	if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
899	comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
900	else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
901	comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
902	else
903	return 0;
904	}
905	/*
906	* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
907	* supported (see RFC4492).
908	*/
909	if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
910	return 1;
911
912	for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
913	if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
914	return 1;
915	}
916	return 0;
917	}
918
919	/* Return group id of a key */
920	static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
921	{
922	int curve_nid = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey);
923
924	if (curve_nid == NID_undef)
925	return 0;
926	return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid);
927	}
928
929	/*
930	* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
931	* certificates have compatible curves and compression.
932	*/
933	static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL s, X509 x, int check_ee_md)
934	{
935	uint16_t group_id;
936	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
937	pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
938	if (pkey == NULL)
939	return 0;
940	/* If not EC nothing to do */
941	if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
942	return 1;
943	/* Check compression */
944	if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
945	return 0;
946	group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
947	/*
948	* For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
949	* groups.
950	*/
951	if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
952	return 0;
953	/*
954	* Special case for suite B. We MUST sign using SHA256+P-256 or
955	* SHA384+P-384.
956	*/
957	if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
958	int check_md;
959	size_t i;
960
961	/* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
962	if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
963	check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
964	else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
965	check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
966	else
967	return 0; /* Should never happen */
968	for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
969	if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
970	return 1;;
971	}
972	return 0;
973	}
974	return 1;
975	}
976
977	/*
978	* tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
979	* @s: SSL connection
980	* @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
981	*
982	* Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
983	* is compatible with the client extensions.
984	*
985	* Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
986	*/
987	int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
988	{
989	/* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
990	if (!tls1_suiteb(s))
991	return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
992	/*
993	* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
994	* curves permitted.
995	*/
996	if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
997	return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 1);
998	if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
999	return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384, 1);
1000
1001	return 0;
1002	}
1003
1004	/* Default sigalg schemes */
1005	static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
1006	TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1007	TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
1008	TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
1009	TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
1010	TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
1011
1012	TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
1013	TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
1014	TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
1015	TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
1016	TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
1017	TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
1018
1019	TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
1020	TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
1021	TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
1022
1023	TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
1024	TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
1025
1026	TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
1027	TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1028
1029	TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1030	TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1031
1032	TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1033	TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1034	TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1035
1036	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1037	TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1038	TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1039	TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1040	TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1041	TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1042	#endif
1043	};
1044
1045
1046	static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1047	TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1048	TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
1049	};
1050
1051	static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
1052	{"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
1053	NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1054	NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1},
1055	{"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
1056	NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1057	NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1, 1},
1058	{"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
1059	NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1060	NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1, 1},
1061	{"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
1062	NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
1063	NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1064	{"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
1065	NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
1066	NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1067	{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
1068	NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1069	NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef, 1},
1070	{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
1071	NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
1072	NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1073	{"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
1074	NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1075	NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1076	{"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
1077	NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1078	NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1079	{"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
1080	NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1081	NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1082	{"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
1083	NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1084	NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1085	{"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
1086	NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1087	NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1088	{"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
1089	NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
1090	NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1091	{"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
1092	NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1093	NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1094	{"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
1095	NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1096	NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1097	{"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
1098	NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1099	NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1100	{"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
1101	NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1102	NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1103	{"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
1104	NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1105	NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef, 1},
1106	{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
1107	NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1108	NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef, 1},
1109	{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
1110	NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1111	NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1112	{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
1113	NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1114	NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1115	{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
1116	NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1117	NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1118	{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
1119	NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
1120	NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef, 1},
1121	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1122	{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
1123	NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1124	NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1125	NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1126	{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
1127	NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1128	NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1129	NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1130	{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
1131	NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1132	NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
1133	NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1134	{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
1135	NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1136	NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
1137	NID_undef, NID_undef, 1},
1138	{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
1139	NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
1140	NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
1141	NID_undef, NID_undef, 1}
1142	#endif
1143	};
1144	/* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
1145	static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
1146	"rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
1147	NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
1148	EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
1149	NID_undef, NID_undef, 1
1150	};
1151
1152	/*
1153	* Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
1154	* From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
1155	*/
1156	static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
1157	TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
1158	0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
1159	TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
1160	TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
1161	TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
1162	TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
1163	TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
1164	0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
1165	0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
1166	};
1167
1168	int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
1169	{
1170	size_t i;
1171	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1172	SIGALG_LOOKUP *cache
1173	= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(lu) OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl));
1174	EVP_PKEY *tmpkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
1175	int ret = 0;
1176
1177	if (cache == NULL \|\| tmpkey == NULL)
1178	goto err;
1179
1180	ERR_set_mark();
1181	for (i = 0, lu = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
1182	i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); lu++, i++) {
1183	EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
1184
1185	cache[i] = *lu;
1186
1187	/*
1188	* Check hash is available.
1189	* This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
1190	* for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
1191	* could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
1192	* could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
1193	* independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
1194	*/
1195	if (lu->hash != NID_undef
1196	&& ctx->ssl_digest_methods[lu->hash_idx] == NULL) {
1197	cache[i].enabled = 0;
1198	continue;
1199	}
1200
1201	if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey, lu->sig)) {
1202	cache[i].enabled = 0;
1203	continue;
1204	}
1205	pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx->libctx, tmpkey, ctx->propq);
1206	/* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
1207	if (pctx == NULL)
1208	cache[i].enabled = 0;
1209	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1210	}
1211	ERR_pop_to_mark();
1212	ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache = cache;
1213	cache = NULL;
1214
1215	ret = 1;
1216	err:
1217	OPENSSL_free(cache);
1218	EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey);
1219	return ret;
1220	}
1221
1222	/* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
1223	static const SIGALG_LOOKUP tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL s, uint16_t sigalg)
1224	{
1225	size_t i;
1226	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1227
1228	for (i = 0, lu = s->ctx->sigalg_lookup_cache;
1229	/* cache should have the same number of elements as sigalg_lookup_tbl */
1230	i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1231	lu++, i++) {
1232	if (lu->sigalg == sigalg) {
1233	if (!lu->enabled)
1234	return NULL;
1235	return lu;
1236	}
1237	}
1238	return NULL;
1239	}
1240	/* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
1241	int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
1242	{
1243	const EVP_MD *md;
1244	if (lu == NULL)
1245	return 0;
1246	/* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
1247	if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
1248	md = NULL;
1249	} else {
1250	md = ssl_md(ctx, lu->hash_idx);
1251	if (md == NULL)
1252	return 0;
1253	}
1254	if (pmd)
1255	*pmd = md;
1256	return 1;
1257	}
1258
1259	/*
1260	* Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
1261	*
1262	* The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
1263	* SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
1264	* with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
1265	*/
1266	#define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_get_size(md) + 2)
1267	static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX ctx, const EVP_PKEY pkey,
1268	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1269	{
1270	const EVP_MD *md;
1271
1272	if (pkey == NULL)
1273	return 0;
1274	if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md) \|\| md == NULL)
1275	return 0;
1276	if (EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
1277	return 0;
1278	return 1;
1279	}
1280
1281	/*
1282	* Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
1283	* signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
1284	* type. \|idx\| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When \|idx\| is -1 the
1285	* certificate type from \|s\| will be used.
1286	* Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
1287	*/
1288	static const SIGALG_LOOKUP tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL s, int idx)
1289	{
1290	if (idx == -1) {
1291	if (s->server) {
1292	size_t i;
1293
1294	/* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
1295	for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1296	const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
1297
1298	if (clu == NULL)
1299	continue;
1300	if (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
1301	idx = i;
1302	break;
1303	}
1304	}
1305
1306	/*
1307	* Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
1308	* */
1309	if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
1310	int real_idx;
1311
1312	for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1313	real_idx--) {
1314	if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1315	idx = real_idx;
1316	break;
1317	}
1318	}
1319	}
1320	/*
1321	* As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
1322	* with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
1323	*/
1324	else if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256) {
1325	int real_idx;
1326
1327	for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1328	real_idx--) {
1329	if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
1330	idx = real_idx;
1331	break;
1332	}
1333	}
1334	}
1335	} else {
1336	idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
1337	}
1338	}
1339	if (idx < 0 \|\| idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
1340	return NULL;
1341	if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) \|\| idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
1342	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
1343
1344	if (lu == NULL)
1345	return NULL;
1346	if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
1347	return NULL;
1348	if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1349	return NULL;
1350	return lu;
1351	}
1352	if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
1353	return NULL;
1354	return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
1355	}
1356	/* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1357	int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL s, const EVP_PKEY pkey)
1358	{
1359	size_t idx;
1360	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1361
1362	if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
1363	return 0;
1364	lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
1365	if (lu == NULL)
1366	return 0;
1367	s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1368	return 1;
1369	}
1370
1371	size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL s, int sent, const uint16_t *psigs)
1372	{
1373	/*
1374	* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1375	* preferences.
1376	*/
1377	switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1378	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1379	*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1380	return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
1381
1382	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1383	*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1384	return 1;
1385
1386	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1387	*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
1388	return 1;
1389	}
1390	/*
1391	* We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1392	* and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1393	* determining which shared algorithm to use.
1394	*/
1395	if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
1396	*psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1397	return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1398	} else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1399	*psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1400	return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1401	} else {
1402	*psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1403	return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1404	}
1405	}
1406
1407	/*
1408	* Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1409	* specified EC curve.
1410	*/
1411	int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve)
1412	{
1413	const uint16_t *sigs;
1414	size_t siglen, i;
1415
1416	if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1417	sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1418	siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1419	} else {
1420	sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1421	siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1422	}
1423
1424	for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
1425	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sigs[i]);
1426
1427	if (lu == NULL)
1428	continue;
1429	if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
1430	&& lu->curve != NID_undef
1431	&& curve == lu->curve)
1432	return 1;
1433	}
1434
1435	return 0;
1436	}
1437
1438	/*
1439	* Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1440	* error.
1441	*/
1442	static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP lu)
1443	{
1444	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1445	int secbits = 0;
1446
1447	if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md))
1448	return 0;
1449	if (md != NULL)
1450	{
1451	int md_type = EVP_MD_get_type(md);
1452
1453	/* Security bits: half digest bits */
1454	secbits = EVP_MD_get_size(md) * 4;
1455	/*
1456	* SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
1457	* they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
1458	* really matter as long as they're lower than 80, which is our
1459	* security level 1.
1460	* https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack for
1461	* SHA1 at 2^63.4 and MD5+SHA1 at 2^67.2
1462	* https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
1463	* puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
1464	*/
1465	if (md_type == NID_sha1)
1466	secbits = 64;
1467	else if (md_type == NID_md5_sha1)
1468	secbits = 67;
1469	else if (md_type == NID_md5)
1470	secbits = 39;
1471	} else {
1472	/* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1473	if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519)
1474	secbits = 128;
1475	else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
1476	secbits = 224;
1477	}
1478	return secbits;
1479	}
1480
1481	/*
1482	* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1483	* algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1484	* s.
1485	*/
1486	int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY pkey)
1487	{
1488	const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1489	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1490	char sigalgstr[2];
1491	size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
1492	int pkeyid = -1;
1493	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1494	int secbits = 0;
1495
1496	pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey);
1497	/* Should never happen */
1498	if (pkeyid == -1)
1499	return -1;
1500	if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1501	/* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1502	if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1503	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1504	return 0;
1505	}
1506	/* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1507	if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1508	pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1509	}
1510	lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sig);
1511	/*
1512	* Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1513	* is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1514	*/
1515	if (lu == NULL
1516	\|\| (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 \|\| lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1517	\|\| (pkeyid != lu->sig
1518	&& (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS \|\| pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1519	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1520	return 0;
1521	}
1522	/* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1523	if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey), &cidx)
1524	\|\| lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1525	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1526	return 0;
1527	}
1528
1529	if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1530
1531	/* Check point compression is permitted */
1532	if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1533	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1534	SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1535	return 0;
1536	}
1537
1538	/* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1539	if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) \|\| tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1540	int curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey);
1541
1542	if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1543	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1544	return 0;
1545	}
1546	}
1547	if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1548	/* Check curve matches extensions */
1549	if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1550	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1551	return 0;
1552	}
1553	if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1554	/* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1555	if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1556	&& sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1557	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1558	SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1559	return 0;
1560	}
1561	}
1562	}
1563	} else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1564	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1565	return 0;
1566	}
1567
1568	/* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1569	sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1570	for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1571	if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1572	break;
1573	}
1574	/* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1575	if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1576	\|\| s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1577	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1578	return 0;
1579	}
1580	if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
1581	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1582	return 0;
1583	}
1584	/*
1585	* Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1586	* reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1587	*/
1588	sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1589	sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1590	secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
1591	if (secbits == 0 \|\|
1592	!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
1593	md != NULL ? EVP_MD_get_type(md) : NID_undef,
1594	(void *)sigalgstr)) {
1595	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1596	return 0;
1597	}
1598	/* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1599	s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1600	return 1;
1601	}
1602
1603	int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL s, int pnid)
1604	{
1605	if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1606	return 0;
1607	*pnid = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1608	return 1;
1609	}
1610
1611	int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL s, int pnid)
1612	{
1613	if (s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
1614	return 0;
1615	*pnid = s->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
1616	return 1;
1617	}
1618
1619	/*
1620	* Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1621	* supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1622	* by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1623	*
1624	* This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1625	* by the client.
1626	*
1627	* Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1628	*/
1629	int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1630	{
1631	s->s3.tmp.mask_a = 0;
1632	s->s3.tmp.mask_k = 0;
1633	ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3.tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1634	if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3.tmp.min_ver,
1635	&s->s3.tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
1636	return 0;
1637	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1638	/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1639	if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1640	s->s3.tmp.mask_a \|= SSL_aPSK;
1641	s->s3.tmp.mask_k \|= SSL_PSK;
1642	}
1643	#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1644	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1645	if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1646	s->s3.tmp.mask_a \|= SSL_aSRP;
1647	s->s3.tmp.mask_k \|= SSL_kSRP;
1648	}
1649	#endif
1650	return 1;
1651	}
1652
1653	/*
1654	* ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1655	* @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1656	* @c: cipher to check
1657	* @op: Security check that you want to do
1658	* @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1659	*
1660	* Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1661	*/
1662	int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL s, const SSL_CIPHER c, int op, int ecdhe)
1663	{
1664	if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
1665	\|\| c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
1666	return 1;
1667	if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
1668	return 1;
1669	if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1670	int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1671
1672	/*
1673	* For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1674	* in SSLv3 if we are a client
1675	*/
1676	if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1677	&& (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE \| SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1678	min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1679
1680	if ((min_tls > s->s3.tmp.max_ver) \|\| (c->max_tls < s->s3.tmp.min_ver))
1681	return 1;
1682	}
1683	if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
1684	\|\| DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.min_ver)))
1685	return 1;
1686
1687	return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1688	}
1689
1690	int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1691	{
1692	if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1693	return 0;
1694	return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1695	}
1696
1697	int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1698	{
1699	size_t i;
1700
1701	/* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1702	OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1703	s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1704	s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1705	/* Clear certificate validity flags */
1706	for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1707	s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1708	/*
1709	* If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1710	* the default algorithm for each certificate type
1711	*/
1712	if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1713	&& s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1714	const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1715	size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1716
1717	for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1718	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1719	size_t j;
1720
1721	if (lu == NULL)
1722	continue;
1723	/* Check default matches a type we sent */
1724	for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1725	if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1726	s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1727	break;
1728	}
1729	}
1730	}
1731	return 1;
1732	}
1733
1734	if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1735	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1736	return 0;
1737	}
1738	if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1739	return 1;
1740
1741	/* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1742	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1743	SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1744	return 0;
1745	}
1746
1747	/*-
1748	* Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1749	*
1750	* hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1751	* ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1752	* point to the resulting session.
1753	*/
1754	SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG hello,
1755	SSL_SESSION **ret)
1756	{
1757	size_t size;
1758	RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1759
1760	*ret = NULL;
1761	s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1762
1763	/*
1764	* If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1765	* (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1766	* resumption.
1767	*/
1768	if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION \|\| !tls_use_ticket(s))
1769	return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1770
1771	ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1772	if (!ticketext->present)
1773	return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1774
1775	size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1776
1777	return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1778	hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1779	}
1780
1781	/*-
1782	* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1783	*
1784	* If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1785	* expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1786	* session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1787	* s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1788	*
1789	* Side effects:
1790	* Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1791	* a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1792	* (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1793	* a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1794	* s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1795	* Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1796	*
1797	* etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1798	* eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1799	* sess_id: points at the session ID.
1800	* sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1801	* psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1802	* point to the resulting session.
1803	*/
1804	SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL s, const unsigned char etick,
1805	size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1806	size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1807	{
1808	SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1809	unsigned char *sdec;
1810	const unsigned char *p;
1811	int slen, ivlen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1812	SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1813	size_t mlen;
1814	unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1815	SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
1816	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1817	SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1818
1819	if (eticklen == 0) {
1820	/*
1821	* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1822	* one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1823	*/
1824	ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1825	goto end;
1826	}
1827	if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1828	/*
1829	* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1830	* generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1831	* abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1832	* calculate the master secret later.
1833	*/
1834	ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1835	goto end;
1836	}
1837
1838	/* Need at least keyname + iv */
1839	if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1840	ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1841	goto end;
1842	}
1843
1844	/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1845	hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
1846	if (hctx == NULL) {
1847	ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1848	goto end;
1849	}
1850	ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1851	if (ctx == NULL) {
1852	ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1853	goto end;
1854	}
1855	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1856	if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL \|\| tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1857	#else
1858	if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1859	#endif
1860	{
1861	unsigned char nctick = (unsigned char )etick;
1862	int rv = 0;
1863
1864	if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1865	rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, nctick,
1866	nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1867	ctx,
1868	ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
1869	0);
1870	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1871	else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1872	/* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1873	rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
1874	nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1875	ctx, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 0);
1876	#endif
1877	if (rv < 0) {
1878	ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1879	goto end;
1880	}
1881	if (rv == 0) {
1882	ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1883	goto end;
1884	}
1885	if (rv == 2)
1886	renew_ticket = 1;
1887	} else {
1888	EVP_CIPHER *aes256cbc = NULL;
1889
1890	/* Check key name matches */
1891	if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1892	TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1893	ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1894	goto end;
1895	}
1896
1897	aes256cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
1898	s->ctx->propq);
1899	if (aes256cbc == NULL
1900	\|\| ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1901	sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1902	"SHA256") <= 0
1903	\|\| EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, aes256cbc, NULL,
1904	tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1905	etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1906	EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1907	ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1908	goto end;
1909	}
1910	EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1911	if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1912	renew_ticket = 1;
1913	}
1914	/*
1915	* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1916	* checks on ticket.
1917	*/
1918	mlen = ssl_hmac_size(hctx);
1919	if (mlen == 0) {
1920	ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1921	goto end;
1922	}
1923
1924	ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
1925	if (ivlen < 0) {
1926	ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1927	goto end;
1928	}
1929
1930	/* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1931	if (eticklen <= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + ivlen + mlen) {
1932	ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1933	goto end;
1934	}
1935	eticklen -= mlen;
1936	/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1937	if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1938	\|\| ssl_hmac_final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL, sizeof(tick_hmac)) <= 0) {
1939	ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1940	goto end;
1941	}
1942
1943	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1944	ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1945	goto end;
1946	}
1947	/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1948	/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1949	p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + ivlen;
1950	eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + ivlen;
1951	sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1952	if (sdec == NULL \|\| EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1953	(int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1954	OPENSSL_free(sdec);
1955	ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1956	goto end;
1957	}
1958	if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1959	OPENSSL_free(sdec);
1960	ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1961	goto end;
1962	}
1963	slen += declen;
1964	p = sdec;
1965
1966	sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1967	slen -= p - sdec;
1968	OPENSSL_free(sdec);
1969	if (sess) {
1970	/* Some additional consistency checks */
1971	if (slen != 0) {
1972	SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1973	sess = NULL;
1974	ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1975	goto end;
1976	}
1977	/*
1978	* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1979	* that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1980	* structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1981	* standard.
1982	*/
1983	if (sesslen) {
1984	memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1985	sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1986	}
1987	if (renew_ticket)
1988	ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1989	else
1990	ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1991	goto end;
1992	}
1993	ERR_clear_error();
1994	/*
1995	* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1996	*/
1997	ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1998
1999	end:
2000	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
2001	ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
2002
2003	/*
2004	* If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
2005	* detected above. The callback is responsible for checking \|ret\| before it
2006	* performs any action
2007	*/
2008	if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
2009	&& (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
2010	\|\| ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
2011	\|\| ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2012	\|\| ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
2013	size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
2014	int retcb;
2015
2016	if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
2017	keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
2018	retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, sess, etick, keyname_len,
2019	ret,
2020	s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
2021	switch (retcb) {
2022	case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
2023	ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2024	break;
2025
2026	case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
2027	ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
2028	SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2029	sess = NULL;
2030	break;
2031
2032	case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
2033	if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
2034	ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
2035	/* else the value of \|ret\| will already do the right thing */
2036	SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2037	sess = NULL;
2038	break;
2039
2040	case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
2041	case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
2042	if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2043	&& ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
2044	ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2045	else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
2046	ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
2047	else
2048	ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
2049	break;
2050
2051	default:
2052	ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
2053	}
2054	}
2055
2056	if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL \|\| SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2057	switch (ret) {
2058	case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
2059	case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
2060	case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
2061	s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
2062	}
2063	}
2064
2065	*psess = sess;
2066
2067	return ret;
2068	}
2069
2070	/* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
2071	static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP lu)
2072	{
2073	unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
2074	int secbits;
2075
2076	if (lu == NULL \|\| !lu->enabled)
2077	return 0;
2078	/* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
2079	if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2080	return 0;
2081	/*
2082	* At some point we should fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello as per TLS 1.3
2083	* spec
2084	*/
2085	if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
2086	&& (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA \|\| lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
2087	\|\| lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
2088	\|\| lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
2089	return 0;
2090
2091	/* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2092	if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(s->ctx, lu->sig_idx))
2093	return 0;
2094
2095	if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2096	\|\| lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
2097	\|\| lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2098	/* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
2099	if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
2100	return 0;
2101	if (!s->server
2102	&& s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
2103	&& s->s3.tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
2104	int i, num;
2105	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
2106
2107	/*
2108	* We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
2109	* sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
2110	* ciphersuites enabled.
2111	*/
2112
2113	if (s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
2114	return 0;
2115
2116	sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
2117	num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
2118	for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
2119	const SSL_CIPHER *c;
2120
2121	c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
2122	/* Skip disabled ciphers */
2123	if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
2124	continue;
2125
2126	if ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kGOST \| SSL_kGOST18)) != 0)
2127	break;
2128	}
2129	if (i == num)
2130	return 0;
2131	}
2132	}
2133
2134	/* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2135	secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
2136	sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
2137	sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
2138	return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
2139	}
2140
2141	/*
2142	* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2143	* algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2144	* disabled.
2145	*/
2146
2147	void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t pmask_a, SSL s, int op)
2148	{
2149	const uint16_t *sigalgs;
2150	size_t i, sigalgslen;
2151	uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA \| SSL_aDSS \| SSL_aECDSA;
2152	/*
2153	* Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
2154	* in disabled_mask.
2155	*/
2156	sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
2157	for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
2158	const SIGALG_LOOKUP lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, sigalgs);
2159	const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
2160
2161	if (lu == NULL)
2162	continue;
2163
2164	clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
2165	if (clu == NULL)
2166	continue;
2167
2168	/* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
2169	if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
2170	&& tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
2171	disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
2172	}
2173	*pmask_a \|= disabled_mask;
2174	}
2175
2176	int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL s, WPACKET pkt,
2177	const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
2178	{
2179	size_t i;
2180	int rv = 0;
2181
2182	for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
2183	const SIGALG_LOOKUP lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, psig);
2184
2185	if (lu == NULL
2186	\|\| !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
2187	continue;
2188	if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
2189	return 0;
2190	/*
2191	* If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
2192	* signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
2193	*/
2194	if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2195	\|\| (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
2196	&& lu->hash != NID_sha1
2197	&& lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
2198	rv = 1;
2199	}
2200	if (rv == 0)
2201	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2202	return rv;
2203	}
2204
2205	/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2206	static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsig,
2207	const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
2208	const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
2209	{
2210	const uint16_t ptmp, atmp;
2211	size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
2212	for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
2213	const SIGALG_LOOKUP lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, ptmp);
2214
2215	/* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2216	if (lu == NULL
2217	\|\| !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
2218	continue;
2219	for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
2220	if (ptmp == atmp) {
2221	nmatch++;
2222	if (shsig)
2223	*shsig++ = lu;
2224	break;
2225	}
2226	}
2227	}
2228	return nmatch;
2229	}
2230
2231	/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2232	static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2233	{
2234	const uint16_t pref, allow, *conf;
2235	size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
2236	size_t nmatch;
2237	const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
2238	CERT *c = s->cert;
2239	unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
2240
2241	OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
2242	s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2243	s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2244	/* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2245	if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2246	conf = c->client_sigalgs;
2247	conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
2248	} else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
2249	conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
2250	conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
2251	} else
2252	conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
2253	if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE \|\| is_suiteb) {
2254	pref = conf;
2255	preflen = conflen;
2256	allow = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2257	allowlen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2258	} else {
2259	allow = conf;
2260	allowlen = conflen;
2261	pref = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2262	preflen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2263	}
2264	nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2265	if (nmatch) {
2266	if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
2267	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2268	return 0;
2269	}
2270	nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
2271	} else {
2272	salgs = NULL;
2273	}
2274	s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
2275	s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
2276	return 1;
2277	}
2278
2279	int tls1_save_u16(PACKET pkt, uint16_t pdest, size_t pdestlen)
2280	{
2281	unsigned int stmp;
2282	size_t size, i;
2283	uint16_t *buf;
2284
2285	size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2286
2287	/* Invalid data length */
2288	if (size == 0 \|\| (size & 1) != 0)
2289	return 0;
2290
2291	size >>= 1;
2292
2293	if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
2294	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2295	return 0;
2296	}
2297	for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
2298	buf[i] = stmp;
2299
2300	if (i != size) {
2301	OPENSSL_free(buf);
2302	return 0;
2303	}
2304
2305	OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
2306	*pdest = buf;
2307	*pdestlen = size;
2308
2309	return 1;
2310	}
2311
2312	int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL s, PACKET pkt, int cert)
2313	{
2314	/* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2315	if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2316	return 1;
2317	/* Should never happen */
2318	if (s->cert == NULL)
2319	return 0;
2320
2321	if (cert)
2322	return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
2323	&s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
2324	else
2325	return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs,
2326	&s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
2327
2328	}
2329
2330	/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2331
2332	int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2333	{
2334	size_t i;
2335	uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags;
2336
2337	if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
2338	return 0;
2339
2340	for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2341	pvalid[i] = 0;
2342
2343	for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2344	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2345	int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
2346
2347	/* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2348	if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2349	continue;
2350	/* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2351	if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(s->ctx, idx))
2352	pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN \| CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2353	}
2354	return 1;
2355	}
2356
2357	int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2358	int psign, int phash, int *psignhash,
2359	unsigned char rsig, unsigned char rhash)
2360	{
2361	uint16_t *psig = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2362	size_t numsigalgs = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2363	if (psig == NULL \|\| numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
2364	return 0;
2365	if (idx >= 0) {
2366	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2367
2368	if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
2369	return 0;
2370	psig += idx;
2371	if (rhash != NULL)
2372	rhash = (unsigned char)((psig >> 8) & 0xff);
2373	if (rsig != NULL)
2374	rsig = (unsigned char)(psig & 0xff);
2375	lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, *psig);
2376	if (psign != NULL)
2377	*psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
2378	if (phash != NULL)
2379	*phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
2380	if (psignhash != NULL)
2381	*psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
2382	}
2383	return (int)numsigalgs;
2384	}
2385
2386	int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2387	int psign, int phash, int *psignhash,
2388	unsigned char rsig, unsigned char rhash)
2389	{
2390	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
2391	if (s->shared_sigalgs == NULL
2392	\|\| idx < 0
2393	\|\| idx >= (int)s->shared_sigalgslen
2394	\|\| s->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
2395	return 0;
2396	shsigalgs = s->shared_sigalgs[idx];
2397	if (phash != NULL)
2398	*phash = shsigalgs->hash;
2399	if (psign != NULL)
2400	*psign = shsigalgs->sig;
2401	if (psignhash != NULL)
2402	*psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
2403	if (rsig != NULL)
2404	*rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
2405	if (rhash != NULL)
2406	*rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
2407	return (int)s->shared_sigalgslen;
2408	}
2409
2410	/* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2411	#define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2412
2413	typedef struct {
2414	size_t sigalgcnt;
2415	/* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2416	uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
2417	} sig_cb_st;
2418
2419	static void get_sigorhash(int psig, int phash, const char *str)
2420	{
2421	if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
2422	*psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2423	} else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 \|\| strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
2424	*psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
2425	} else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
2426	*psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2427	} else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2428	*psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2429	} else {
2430	*phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
2431	if (*phash == NID_undef)
2432	*phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
2433	}
2434	}
2435	/* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2436	#define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2437
2438	static int sig_cb(const char elem, int len, void arg)
2439	{
2440	sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
2441	size_t i;
2442	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
2443	char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
2444	int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
2445	if (elem == NULL)
2446	return 0;
2447	if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
2448	return 0;
2449	if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
2450	return 0;
2451	memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
2452	etmp[len] = 0;
2453	p = strchr(etmp, '+');
2454	/*
2455	* We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2456	* if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2457	* name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2458	* Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2459	* rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2460	* we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2461	* in the table.
2462	*/
2463	if (p == NULL) {
2464	for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2465	i++, s++) {
2466	if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
2467	sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2468	break;
2469	}
2470	}
2471	if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2472	return 0;
2473	} else {
2474	*p = 0;
2475	p++;
2476	if (*p == 0)
2477	return 0;
2478	get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
2479	get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
2480	if (sig_alg == NID_undef \|\| hash_alg == NID_undef)
2481	return 0;
2482	for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2483	i++, s++) {
2484	if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
2485	sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2486	break;
2487	}
2488	}
2489	if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2490	return 0;
2491	}
2492
2493	/* Reject duplicates */
2494	for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
2495	if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
2496	sarg->sigalgcnt--;
2497	return 0;
2498	}
2499	}
2500	return 1;
2501	}
2502
2503	/*
2504	* Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2505	* form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2506	*/
2507	int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT c, const char str, int client)
2508	{
2509	sig_cb_st sig;
2510	sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
2511	if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2512	return 0;
2513	if (c == NULL)
2514	return 1;
2515	return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2516	}
2517
2518	int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT c, const uint16_t psigs, size_t salglen,
2519	int client)
2520	{
2521	uint16_t *sigalgs;
2522
2523	if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2524	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2525	return 0;
2526	}
2527	memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2528
2529	if (client) {
2530	OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2531	c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2532	c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2533	} else {
2534	OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2535	c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2536	c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2537	}
2538
2539	return 1;
2540	}
2541
2542	int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT c, const int psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2543	{
2544	uint16_t sigalgs, sptr;
2545	size_t i;
2546
2547	if (salglen & 1)
2548	return 0;
2549	if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2550	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2551	return 0;
2552	}
2553	for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2554	size_t j;
2555	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2556	int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2557	int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2558
2559	for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2560	j++, curr++) {
2561	if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2562	*sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2563	break;
2564	}
2565	}
2566
2567	if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2568	goto err;
2569	}
2570
2571	if (client) {
2572	OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2573	c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2574	c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2575	} else {
2576	OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2577	c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2578	c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2579	}
2580
2581	return 1;
2582
2583	err:
2584	OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2585	return 0;
2586	}
2587
2588	static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL s, X509 x, int default_nid)
2589	{
2590	int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
2591	size_t i;
2592	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
2593	size_t sigalgslen;
2594	if (default_nid == -1)
2595	return 1;
2596	sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2597	if (default_nid)
2598	return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2599
2600	if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2601	/*
2602	* If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2603	* chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2604	* otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2605	*/
2606	sigalgslen = s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen;
2607	use_pc_sigalgs = 1;
2608	} else {
2609	sigalgslen = s->shared_sigalgslen;
2610	}
2611	for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
2612	sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
2613	? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
2614	: s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2615	if (sigalg != NULL && sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
2616	return 1;
2617	}
2618	return 0;
2619	}
2620
2621	/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2622	static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) names, X509 x)
2623	{
2624	const X509_NAME *nm;
2625	int i;
2626	nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2627	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2628	if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2629	return 1;
2630	}
2631	return 0;
2632	}
2633
2634	/*
2635	* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2636	* server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2637	* passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2638	* attempting to use them.
2639	*/
2640
2641	/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2642
2643	#define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2644	(CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE\|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2645	/* Strict mode flags */
2646	#define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2647	(CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS\|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE\|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2648	\| CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME\|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2649
2650	int tls1_check_chain(SSL s, X509 x, EVP_PKEY pk, STACK_OF(X509) chain,
2651	int idx)
2652	{
2653	int i;
2654	int rv = 0;
2655	int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2656	CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2657	CERT *c = s->cert;
2658	uint32_t *pvalid;
2659	unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2660	/* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2661	if (idx != -1) {
2662	/* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2663	if (idx == -2) {
2664	cpk = c->key;
2665	idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2666	} else
2667	cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2668	pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2669	x = cpk->x509;
2670	pk = cpk->privatekey;
2671	chain = cpk->chain;
2672	strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2673	/* If no cert or key, forget it */
2674	if (!x \|\| !pk)
2675	goto end;
2676	} else {
2677	size_t certidx;
2678
2679	if (!x \|\| !pk)
2680	return 0;
2681
2682	if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2683	return 0;
2684	idx = certidx;
2685	pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2686
2687	if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2688	check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2689	else
2690	check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2691	strict_mode = 1;
2692	}
2693
2694	if (suiteb_flags) {
2695	int ok;
2696	if (check_flags)
2697	check_flags \|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2698	ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2699	if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2700	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2701	else if (!check_flags)
2702	goto end;
2703	}
2704
2705	/*
2706	* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2707	* algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2708	*/
2709	if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
2710	int default_nid;
2711	int rsign = 0;
2712	if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2713	\|\| s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2714	default_nid = 0;
2715	/* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2716	} else {
2717	switch (idx) {
2718	case SSL_PKEY_RSA:
2719	rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2720	default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2721	break;
2722
2723	case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2724	rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2725	default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2726	break;
2727
2728	case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
2729	rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2730	default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2731	break;
2732
2733	case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2734	rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2735	default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2736	break;
2737
2738	case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2739	rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2740	default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2741	break;
2742
2743	case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2744	rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2745	default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2746	break;
2747
2748	default:
2749	default_nid = -1;
2750	break;
2751	}
2752	}
2753	/*
2754	* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2755	* preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2756	*/
2757	if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2758	size_t j;
2759	const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2760	for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2761	const SIGALG_LOOKUP lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, p);
2762
2763	if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2764	break;
2765	}
2766	if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2767	if (check_flags)
2768	goto skip_sigs;
2769	else
2770	goto end;
2771	}
2772	}
2773	/* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2774	if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2775	/*
2776	* We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2777	* so check_flags is always set.
2778	*/
2779	if (find_sig_alg(s, x, pk) != NULL)
2780	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2781	} else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
2782	if (!check_flags)
2783	goto end;
2784	} else
2785	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2786	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2787	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2788	if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2789	if (check_flags) {
2790	rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2791	break;
2792	} else
2793	goto end;
2794	}
2795	}
2796	}
2797	/* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2798	else if (check_flags)
2799	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE \| CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2800	skip_sigs:
2801	/* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2802	if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2803	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2804	else if (!check_flags)
2805	goto end;
2806	if (!s->server)
2807	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2808	/* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2809	else if (strict_mode) {
2810	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2811	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2812	X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2813	if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2814	if (check_flags) {
2815	rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2816	break;
2817	} else
2818	goto end;
2819	}
2820	}
2821	}
2822	if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2823	STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2824	int check_type = 0;
2825
2826	if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "RSA"))
2827	check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2828	else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "DSA"))
2829	check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2830	else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC"))
2831	check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2832
2833	if (check_type) {
2834	const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
2835	size_t j;
2836
2837	for (j = 0; j < s->s3.tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2838	if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2839	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2840	break;
2841	}
2842	}
2843	if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2844	goto end;
2845	} else {
2846	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2847	}
2848
2849	ca_dn = s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
2850
2851	if (ca_dn == NULL
2852	\|\| sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn) == 0
2853	\|\| ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2854	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2855	else
2856	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2857	X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2858
2859	if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2860	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2861	break;
2862	}
2863	}
2864
2865	if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2866	goto end;
2867	} else
2868	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME \| CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2869
2870	if (!check_flags \|\| (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2871	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2872
2873	end:
2874
2875	if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2876	rv \|= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN \| CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2877	else
2878	rv \|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN \| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2879
2880	/*
2881	* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2882	* chain is invalid.
2883	*/
2884	if (!check_flags) {
2885	if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2886	*pvalid = rv;
2887	} else {
2888	/* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2889	*pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN \| CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2890	return 0;
2891	}
2892	}
2893	return rv;
2894	}
2895
2896	/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2897	void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2898	{
2899	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2900	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2901	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2902	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2903	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2904	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2905	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2906	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2907	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
2908	}
2909
2910	/* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2911	int SSL_check_chain(SSL s, X509 x, EVP_PKEY pk, STACK_OF(X509) chain)
2912	{
2913	return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2914	}
2915
2916	EVP_PKEY ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL s)
2917	{
2918	EVP_PKEY *dhp = NULL;
2919	BIGNUM *p;
2920	int dh_secbits = 80, sec_level_bits;
2921	EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2922	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
2923	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
2924
2925	if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 2) {
2926	if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL \| SSL_aPSK)) {
2927	if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2928	dh_secbits = 128;
2929	else
2930	dh_secbits = 80;
2931	} else {
2932	if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
2933	return NULL;
2934	dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
2935	}
2936	}
2937
2938	/* Do not pick a prime that is too weak for the current security level */
2939	sec_level_bits = ssl_get_security_level_bits(s, NULL, NULL);
2940	if (dh_secbits < sec_level_bits)
2941	dh_secbits = sec_level_bits;
2942
2943	if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2944	p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2945	else if (dh_secbits >= 152)
2946	p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL);
2947	else if (dh_secbits >= 128)
2948	p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2949	else if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2950	p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL);
2951	else
2952	p = BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL);
2953	if (p == NULL)
2954	goto err;
2955
2956	pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(s->ctx->libctx, "DH", s->ctx->propq);
2957	if (pctx == NULL
2958	\|\| EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx) != 1)
2959	goto err;
2960
2961	tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2962	if (tmpl == NULL
2963	\|\| !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
2964	\|\| !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_uint(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, 2))
2965	goto err;
2966
2967	params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl);
2968	if (params == NULL
2969	\|\| EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &dhp, EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params) != 1)
2970	goto err;
2971
2972	err:
2973	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
2974	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
2975	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2976	BN_free(p);
2977	return dhp;
2978	}
2979
2980	static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL s, SSL_CTX ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2981	{
2982	int secbits = -1;
2983	EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2984	if (pkey) {
2985	/*
2986	* If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2987	* security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2988	* reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2989	* omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2990	*/
2991	secbits = EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkey);
2992	}
2993	if (s)
2994	return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2995	else
2996	return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2997	}
2998
2999	static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL s, SSL_CTX ctx, X509 *x, int op)
3000	{
3001	/* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
3002	int secbits, nid, pknid;
3003	/* Don't check signature if self signed */
3004	if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
3005	return 1;
3006	if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
3007	secbits = -1;
3008	/* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
3009	if (nid == NID_undef)
3010	nid = pknid;
3011	if (s)
3012	return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
3013	else
3014	return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
3015	}
3016
3017	int ssl_security_cert(SSL s, SSL_CTX ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
3018	{
3019	if (vfy)
3020	vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
3021	if (is_ee) {
3022	if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY \| vfy))
3023	return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
3024	} else {
3025	if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY \| vfy))
3026	return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
3027	}
3028	if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD \| vfy))
3029	return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
3030	return 1;
3031	}
3032
3033	/*
3034	* Check security of a chain, if \|sk\| includes the end entity certificate then
3035	* \|x\| is NULL. If \|vfy\| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
3036	* one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
3037	*/
3038
3039	int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL s, STACK_OF(X509) sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
3040	{
3041	int rv, start_idx, i;
3042	if (x == NULL) {
3043	x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
3044	if (x == NULL)
3045	return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3046	start_idx = 1;
3047	} else
3048	start_idx = 0;
3049
3050	rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
3051	if (rv != 1)
3052	return rv;
3053
3054	for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
3055	x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
3056	rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
3057	if (rv != 1)
3058	return rv;
3059	}
3060	return 1;
3061	}
3062
3063	/*
3064	* For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
3065	* with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
3066	*/
3067
3068	static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP lu)
3069	{
3070	int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3071	const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
3072
3073	/* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
3074	if (clu == NULL
3075	\|\| (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
3076	\|\| (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
3077	&& (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
3078	return -1;
3079
3080	return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
3081	}
3082
3083	/*
3084	* Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
3085	* the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
3086	* the key.
3087	* Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
3088	*/
3089	static int check_cert_usable(SSL s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP sig, X509 *x,
3090	EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3091	{
3092	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
3093	int mdnid, pknid, supported;
3094	size_t i;
3095	const char *mdname = NULL;
3096
3097	/*
3098	* If the given EVP_PKEY cannot support signing with this digest,
3099	* the answer is simply 'no'.
3100	*/
3101	if (sig->hash != NID_undef)
3102	mdname = OBJ_nid2sn(sig->hash);
3103	supported = EVP_PKEY_digestsign_supports_digest(pkey, s->ctx->libctx,
3104	mdname,
3105	s->ctx->propq);
3106	if (supported <= 0)
3107	return 0;
3108
3109	/*
3110	* The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
3111	* on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
3112	*/
3113	if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
3114	if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
3115	return 0;
3116	for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
3117	lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s, s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
3118	if (lu == NULL)
3119	continue;
3120
3121	/*
3122	* This does not differentiate between the
3123	* rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
3124	* have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
3125	* signing certificate.
3126	*/
3127	if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
3128	return 1;
3129	}
3130	return 0;
3131	}
3132
3133	/*
3134	* Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
3135	* a viable public key is permitted.
3136	*/
3137	return 1;
3138	}
3139
3140	/*
3141	* Returns true if \|s\| has a usable certificate configured for use
3142	* with signature scheme \|sig\|.
3143	* "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
3144	* the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
3145	* Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
3146	*/
3147	static int has_usable_cert(SSL s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP sig, int idx)
3148	{
3149	/* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
3150	if (idx == -1)
3151	idx = sig->sig_idx;
3152	if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
3153	return 0;
3154
3155	return check_cert_usable(s, sig, s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509,
3156	s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
3157	}
3158
3159	/*
3160	* Returns true if the supplied cert \|x\| and key \|pkey\| is usable with the
3161	* specified signature scheme \|sig\|, or false otherwise.
3162	*/
3163	static int is_cert_usable(SSL s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP sig, X509 *x,
3164	EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3165	{
3166	size_t idx;
3167
3168	if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
3169	return 0;
3170
3171	/* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
3172	if ((int)idx != sig->sig_idx)
3173	return 0;
3174
3175	return check_cert_usable(s, sig, x, pkey);
3176	}
3177
3178	/*
3179	* Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate \|x\| and key
3180	* \|pkey\|. \|x\| and \|pkey\| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
3181	* available certs/keys to find one that works.
3182	*/
3183	static const SIGALG_LOOKUP find_sig_alg(SSL s, X509 x, EVP_PKEY pkey)
3184	{
3185	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3186	size_t i;
3187	int curve = -1;
3188	EVP_PKEY *tmppkey;
3189
3190	/* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
3191	for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3192	lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3193
3194	/* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
3195	if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
3196	\|\| lu->hash == NID_sha224
3197	\|\| lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
3198	\|\| lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3199	continue;
3200	/* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
3201	if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
3202	continue;
3203	if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
3204	\|\| (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
3205	continue;
3206
3207	tmppkey = (pkey != NULL) ? pkey
3208	: s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
3209
3210	if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3211	if (curve == -1)
3212	curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(tmppkey);
3213	if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
3214	continue;
3215	} else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3216	/* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3217	if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, tmppkey, lu))
3218	continue;
3219	}
3220	break;
3221	}
3222
3223	if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen)
3224	return NULL;
3225
3226	return lu;
3227	}
3228
3229	/*
3230	* Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
3231	* Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
3232	*
3233	* For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
3234	* an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
3235	*
3236	* For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
3237	* a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
3238	* to the server. In this case no error is set.
3239	*/
3240	int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
3241	{
3242	const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
3243	int sig_idx = -1;
3244
3245	s->s3.tmp.cert = NULL;
3246	s->s3.tmp.sigalg = NULL;
3247
3248	if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3249	lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
3250	if (lu == NULL) {
3251	if (!fatalerrs)
3252	return 1;
3253	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3254	SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3255	return 0;
3256	}
3257	} else {
3258	/* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
3259	if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
3260	return 1;
3261	if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
3262	return 1;
3263
3264	if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3265	size_t i;
3266	if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
3267	int curve = -1;
3268
3269	/* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
3270	if (tls1_suiteb(s))
3271	curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]
3272	.privatekey);
3273
3274	/*
3275	* Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
3276	* cert type
3277	*/
3278	for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
3279	lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
3280
3281	if (s->server) {
3282	if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
3283	continue;
3284	} else {
3285	int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
3286
3287	sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3288	if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
3289	continue;
3290	}
3291	/* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
3292	if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
3293	continue;
3294	if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
3295	/* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3296	EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
3297
3298	if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, pkey, lu))
3299	continue;
3300	}
3301	if (curve == -1 \|\| lu->curve == curve)
3302	break;
3303	}
3304	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3305	/*
3306	* Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
3307	* in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
3308	* we have to assume GOST support.
3309	*/
3310	if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aGOST01 \| SSL_aGOST12)) {
3311	if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3312	if (!fatalerrs)
3313	return 1;
3314	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3315	SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3316	return 0;
3317	} else {
3318	i = 0;
3319	sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3320	}
3321	}
3322	#endif
3323	if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
3324	if (!fatalerrs)
3325	return 1;
3326	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3327	SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3328	return 0;
3329	}
3330	} else {
3331	/*
3332	* If we have no sigalg use defaults
3333	*/
3334	const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
3335	size_t sent_sigslen;
3336
3337	if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3338	if (!fatalerrs)
3339	return 1;
3340	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3341	SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3342	return 0;
3343	}
3344
3345	/* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3346	sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
3347	for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
3348	if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
3349	&& has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
3350	break;
3351	}
3352	if (i == sent_sigslen) {
3353	if (!fatalerrs)
3354	return 1;
3355	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3356	SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3357	return 0;
3358	}
3359	}
3360	} else {
3361	if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3362	if (!fatalerrs)
3363	return 1;
3364	SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3365	SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3366	return 0;
3367	}
3368	}
3369	}
3370	if (sig_idx == -1)
3371	sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3372	s->s3.tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
3373	s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3374	s->s3.tmp.sigalg = lu;
3375	return 1;
3376	}
3377
3378	int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
3379	{
3380	if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3381	&& !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3382	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3383	return 0;
3384	}
3385
3386	ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3387	return 1;
3388	}
3389
3390	int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
3391	{
3392	if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3393	&& !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3394	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3395	return 0;
3396	}
3397
3398	ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3399	return 1;
3400	}
3401
3402	uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
3403	{
3404	return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
3405	}
3406
3407	/*
3408	* Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3409	*/
3410	SSL_HMAC ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX ctx)
3411	{
3412	SSL_HMAC ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(ret));
3413	EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
3414
3415	if (ret == NULL)
3416	return NULL;
3417	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3418	if (ctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb == NULL
3419	&& ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
3420	if (!ssl_hmac_old_new(ret))
3421	goto err;
3422	return ret;
3423	}
3424	#endif
3425	mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx->libctx, "HMAC", ctx->propq);
3426	if (mac == NULL \|\| (ret->ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL)
3427	goto err;
3428	EVP_MAC_free(mac);
3429	return ret;
3430	err:
3431	EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret->ctx);
3432	EVP_MAC_free(mac);
3433	OPENSSL_free(ret);
3434	return NULL;
3435	}
3436
3437	void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3438	{
3439	if (ctx != NULL) {
3440	EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
3441	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3442	ssl_hmac_old_free(ctx);
3443	#endif
3444	OPENSSL_free(ctx);
3445	}
3446	}
3447
3448	EVP_MAC_CTX ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC ctx)
3449	{
3450	return ctx->ctx;
3451	}
3452
3453	int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC ctx, void key, size_t len, char *md)
3454	{
3455	OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
3456
3457	if (ctx->ctx != NULL) {
3458	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, md, 0);
3459	*p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3460	if (EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx, key, len, params))
3461	return 1;
3462	}
3463	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3464	if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3465	return ssl_hmac_old_init(ctx, key, len, md);
3466	#endif
3467	return 0;
3468	}
3469
3470	int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC ctx, const unsigned char data, size_t len)
3471	{
3472	if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3473	return EVP_MAC_update(ctx->ctx, data, len);
3474	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3475	if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3476	return ssl_hmac_old_update(ctx, data, len);
3477	#endif
3478	return 0;
3479	}
3480
3481	int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC ctx, unsigned char md, size_t *len,
3482	size_t max_size)
3483	{
3484	if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3485	return EVP_MAC_final(ctx->ctx, md, len, max_size);
3486	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3487	if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3488	return ssl_hmac_old_final(ctx, md, len);
3489	#endif
3490	return 0;
3491	}
3492
3493	size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3494	{
3495	if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3496	return EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx->ctx);
3497	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3498	if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3499	return ssl_hmac_old_size(ctx);
3500	#endif
3501	return 0;
3502	}
3503
3504	int ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
3505	{
3506	char gname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
3507
3508	if (EVP_PKEY_get_group_name(pkey, gname, sizeof(gname), NULL) > 0)
3509	return OBJ_txt2nid(gname);
3510
3511	return NID_undef;
3512	}
3513
3514	__owur int tls13_set_encoded_pub_key(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
3515	const unsigned char *enckey,
3516	size_t enckeylen)
3517	{
3518	if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "DH")) {
3519	int bits = EVP_PKEY_get_bits(pkey);
3520
3521	if (bits <= 0 \|\| enckeylen != (size_t)bits / 8)
3522	/* the encoded key must be padded to the length of the p */
3523	return 0;
3524	} else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC")) {
3525	if (enckeylen < 3 /* point format and at least 1 byte for x and y */
3526	\|\| enckey[0] != 0x04)
3527	return 0;
3528	}
3529
3530	return EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(pkey, enckey, enckeylen);
3531	}

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